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ABSTRACT 
The history of now-developed countries implies a common transformation path of economic 
development. That is, within an economy, as wage grows in non-farm sectors, labour migrates 
out of agriculture. With fewer workers, agricultural land resources may concentrate into the 
hands of fewer but larger farm operations (agricultural land consolidation), with more investment 
and higher production specification. However, the development process of China is less likely to 
trace the same path as it does in these countries, given its distinctive institutions. To examine the 
development process in the unique context of China, this dissertation focuses on two questions: 
(1) how do China’s rural workers self-select into off-farm employment (OFE)? (2) How does 
agricultural land consolidation occur in China? 
In addressing the first question, I use Roy’s self-section model to analyze the following three 
occupational choices of China’s rural residents: farming only, local OFE, and migratory OFE. 
Based on household survey data from 101 communities in rural China in 2004 and 2007, the 
empirical results show that individual and household characteristics are important self-selecting 
factors for OFE participation. More importantly, I find that the increase of OFE in China is 
largely consistent with market-driven expectations. 
In addressing the question of whether and why the consolidation of farm operations develops 
in China’s agriculture, I assess the divergence between the size of farm operations from equal 
entitlements. The theoretical model predicts that a higher opportunity cost of farm labour, in the 
form of the urban wage, exerts a positive influence on consolidation of farm operations through 
rental arrangements. A Gini index is used to measure the inequality of farmland operations 
relative to equal farmland entitlements, with greater inequality being consist with higher 
consolidation of farm operations. Empirical results support the theoretical prediction, 
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specifically, a 1000-yuan increase in the annual urban wage, holding all other influences 
constant, increases the Gini index by 0.012 (mean=0.26) over the 2004-2007 period.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Development economists perceive the out-migration of agricultural labour as an integral part 
of economic development, instrumental in improving workforce allocation among sectors, and a 
potential trigger for further economic development (Lewis 1954; Ranis and Fei 1961; Todaro 
1969; Eswaran and Kotwal 1993; De Haas 2010). The transformation from an agrarian economy 
to one that is industry- and urban-oriented, requires labour to move from the low-productivity 
rural, agricultural sector to the higher-productivity urban, industrial sector. The labour migration 
ceases when the wages of rural, agricultural sector and the urban, industrial sector converge. As 
the opportunity cost of farm labour increases, the agricultural land holdings consolidate and the 
agricultural sector becomes transformed from small-scale subsistence farming to larger-scale 
commercial farming, including the investments in land and mechanization. This transition is both 
apparent in today’s developing countries and in the histories of developed countries (Hathaway 
1960; Barkley 1990; Auty 1994; Taylor and Martin 2001; Henderson 2005; World Bank 2008). 
However, the development process of China may not trace the same path as it does in the 
developed countries, because of its institutional arrangements. For example, with respect to the 
agricultural labour out-migration, China rural residents face some regulatory restrictions of the 
Hukou system. In addition, the land tenure system in China will influence the process by which 
land consolidation occurs. Both of these institutions, Hukou and the absence of private 
ownership of agricultural land, will influence the transformation process in China. 
The Hukou system was implemented during the 1950s, when China carried out a Big Push 
industrialization approach (Chan 2009). The Big Push industrialization approach designated the 
industrial, urban sector as a priority sector, offering superior welfare and subsidies for the 
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industrial sectors, mostly located in cities. As a result, The Big Push industrialization approach 
generated immense outflows of labour from agricultural, rural sector. To control the rural-urban 
migratory labour flows and maintain social and political stability, the Hukou system was then 
introduced by China’s government.  
The Hukou system was designed as a de facto internal passport system which works chiefly as 
an entitlement distribution mechanism to segregate rural and urban populations. Each Chinese 
person has a Hukou status (registration status), classified as “rural” or “urban”, which is 
determined by his/her parent’s Hukou status at the time of his/her birth1. An individual with rural 
Hukou is ineligible for the urban-based amenities, such as education, employment, medical care, 
retirement programs, affordable housing, and other basic public services of cities, for which 
ordinary urban residents qualify automatically. Similarly, the individual holding urban Hukou is 
not eligible for rural-based benefits and rights, for which ordinary rural resident qualify 
automatically, these include entitlement to agricultural land and dividends from the rural 
collectively owned businesses and properties of villages. 
China’s Hukou system is regarded as the major regulatory force that shapes its rural workers’ 
off-farm activities. Due to the Hukou system, the rural workers of China who participate in 
urban-based OFE usually take marginal jobs (Wang and Zuo 1999; Meng and Zhang 2001), and 
their engagement in OFE has been characterized as partial, temporary, and circular (Hare 1999; 
Zhao 1999b; Hare 2002; Chang, Dong, and MacPhail 2011). Characterized by long hours, poor 
working conditions, and low and unstable pay, OFE of China’s rural workers is described as 
“marginal.” The word “partial” refers to the practice where most rural households send some of 
                                                          
1 Although it is possible for an individual to change his/her Hukou status, the conversion of the Hukou status is 
under a strict quota and subject to approval by the relevant local government, with annual quota for each locale as 
low as 0.15 to 0.2 percent of the rural population (Wu 1994; Chan 2010). 
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their family members to work in urban employment, leaving the rest in the origin communities 
where they have some access to social services and a family support system. The “temporary” 
nature of OFE does not describe the duration of employment, since the time can be as short as 
several days or for several years. Instead “temporary” describes the low levels of attachment of 
the rural residents to their place of work, for they do not have employment guarantees or an 
urban Hukou in the non-farm work place. The OFE is “circular” in that some members of the 
household regularly leave for OFE in part of the year but return to the rural areas for the rest of 
the year and are thus still considered rural household members.  
Despite the regulatory restrictions from the Hukou system, China’s OFE has grown 
dramatically. Since China’s market-oriented reforms2 in the late 1970s, the urban sector and the 
rural nonfarm sector have grown dramatically (Borensztein and Ostry 1996; Zhu 2012). The fast 
growing nonfarm sectors provide OFE opportunities at wage rates higher than the returns to 
labour in agriculture (Yang and Zhou 1999; Yao 1999a; Cai and Du 2011), pulling hundreds of 
millions of farm workers out of agriculture (Zhao, 1999a; De Brauw et al. 2002; Dong, Bowles, 
and Chang 2009; Cai and Wang 2010, Wang et al. 2011a). In the future, as China’s economic 
transformation proceeds, there will be more farmers moving into non-farm and urban sectors 
(Fan, Zhang, and Robinson 2003; Au and Henderson 2006). For example, in 2013, China 
announced an urbanization plan to move about 250 million rural residents into cities over the 
next dozen years (Johnson 2013). 
At the same time as OFE is growing as part of China’s urbanization, the structure of 
agriculture production may also change when more labour is removed from this sector. The 
                                                          
2 Until the 1980s China pursued inward-oriented growth strategies, relying heavily on state-owned enterprises that 
were highly protected and regulated. China’s industrialization process began with its vigorous export- oriented 
industrial policies after 1980s. The accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) of China led to an 
explosion in international exports. 
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histories of developed countries suggest that the labour out-migration from agriculture coincides 
with a transition to larger scale and more mechanized production and a reduction in the rural-
urban income gap. Hathaway (1960, p. 379) explains that “such a transfer” (a large-scale transfer 
of labour from agriculture) “would: result in a recombination of resources in agriculture …; 
increase incomes in agriculture relative to incomes in the nonfarm economy; and reduce the 
disparity in agricultural income between regions”.  
It has been a long-standing practice in the history of developed economies (Hathaway 1960; 
Peterson and Brooks 1993; Gebremedhin and Christy 1996) that agricultural land consolidation 
occurs through the transfer of ownership. However, this path is not applicable for China, because 
of its land tenure system – the Household Responsibility System (HRS).  
The HRS, an institutional reform involving a shift from collective agricultural production 
systems to individual household production in China’s agricultural sector, was established in the 
late 1970s. According to the HRS, the agricultural land resources were equally assigned to 
individual households on a per capita basis, giving the farming decision and residual claim of 
agricultural surplus to rural households. The HRS has proved a great success as an institutional 
innovation in China. It generated a private incentive for production by giving farmers land use 
rights and residual income rights, and consequently led to a dramatic increase in agricultural 
output in China during the early reform period (Lin 1992). Because of the HRS, China did not 
face serious problems of urban slums. Rural-urban migrants always have their entitlements of 
farmland in their origin villages, which provide the basic needs for living when they are 
unemployed in the urban areas. 
 At present, the HRS exposes a number of limitations for China’s agricultural land 
consolidation. According to the HRS, farmland in a village is owned by all of its members 
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collectively. As a result, every member has equal claim on land property rights. The collective 
land ownership of farmland in China becomes an obstacle for agricultural land consolidation, as 
land consolidation cannot occur though land ownership transfers.  
The land consolidation experience of developed countries may be somewhat modified for 
China. While agricultural land in China is collectively owned and equally distributed as 
entitlement, increased land tenure security and greater tolerance of rental or leasing arrangements 
since the late 1990s might have allowed for some consolidation of farm operations, if not 
ownership. Further, the attraction of urban wages, seen in the high level of participation in OFE 
by rural family members, results in reduced farm labour for all or parts of the year. This OFE 
creates pressures for consolidation of farm operations.  
The discussion described above raise two critical questions: 1) how do China’s rural workers 
self-select into OFE?; and 2) how will the required land consolidation occur as labour moves out 
of agriculture in the absence of ownership transfer? Answers to these questions have particular 
policy importance for China. The institutional arrangements of the Hukou system and the HRS 
were initially designated to address particular problems in another era. As the nature of China’s 
economy has changed and new problems have risen, there may be a disconnect between these 
institutions and modern goals and objectives. For example, at present, the most important priority 
for China’s development is to urbanize its rural population and increase the production efficiency 
in agriculture. However, the Hukou system and the collective land ownership of HRS, both more 
than 30 years old, makes the labour and land less mobile and less transferable, thus presenting 
obstacles to reaching these development goals. Although these institutions may represent barriers 
to China’s economic transformation, removing them may create additional problems. For 
example, removing the Hukou system would lead to a massive increase in population flows to 
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urban areas, exacerbating the overpopulation problems of current large cities. Privatizing the 
collective land ownership would increase the income inequality of China’s rural population, 
contributing to the poverty problem. To make effective urbanization policies and agricultural 
policies, one must understand the development process of China, such as the nature of OFE 
growth and agricultural land consolidation, given its unique institutional context. Beyond the 
importance for policy, it has been the long-standing interest of development economists to 
understand the development process in the unique context of China, given its mixed command-
market economy. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
This dissertation has the following two objectives. First, based on the survey data from 101 
communities in rural China in 2004 and 2007, I examine the farm and non-farm employment 
choices of rural residents in China. I view the decision as a self-selection process into one of 
three occupational choices: farming only; local OFE; and migratory OFE. A self-selection model 
is developed and is empirically tested to show how various economic factors influence the OFE 
decisions. Second, I assess whether land consolidation in China’s agriculture is occurring and 
investigate its determinants, with a particular emphasis on the role of urban wages. A “Gini” 
index is used to measure the inequality of farmland operations relative to equal farmland 
entitlements, with greater inequality representing higher consolidation. Based on a market 
equilibrium model of the land rental market and a simplified household agricultural production 
model, I investigate the role of urban wages in the consolidation of farm operations. 
1.3 Organization of Thesis 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 addresses the first 
objective –to provide better understanding of household OFE choices in China. Chapter 3 
provides a link between Chapter 2 on OFE patterns and Chapter 4 on the consolidation of farm 
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operations. Chapter 4 addresses the second research objective of investigating whether and how 
the consolidation of farm operations is occurring in China’s agriculture. This study concludes 
with a summary of the key findings, an outline of the policy implications of the current work and 
a discussion of areas of further study in Chapter 5. 
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2. OFF-FARM EMPLOYMENT IN CHINA: PATTERNS AND DRIVING FORCES 
2.1 Introduction 
China has experienced dramatic growth in non-farm employment since its economic reforms 
began in 1979 (Zhao 1999b; De Brauw et al. 2002; World Bank 2008; Cai and Wang 2010; 
CNBS 2010; Chan Forthcoming). From 1979 to 2009, the share of China’s non-farm sectors in 
overall employment increased from 30 to 62% (CNBS 2010). Numerous studies show that the 
non-farm employment growth of China has raised household income and reduced poverty (De 
Brauw et al. 2002; Zhang, Huang, and Rozelle 2002; Du et al. 2005; De Janvry, Sadoulet, and 
Zhu 2005; Giles 2006; Goh, Luo, and Zhu 2009).  
Despite the rapid growth of nonfarm employment, China’s population is still 
disproportionately concentrated in agriculture1. Moreover, rural Chinese workers’ participation 
in non-farm production, also termed “off-farm employment” (OFE), has been characterized as 
partial and temporary (Hare 1999; Zhao 1999b; Hare 2002; Chang, Dong, and MacPhail 2011). 
The word “partial” refers to the practice where most rural households send some of their family 
members to work in urban employment, leaving the rest in their origin communities where they 
have some access to social services and a family support system. The “temporary” nature of OFE 
does not describe the duration of employment, since the time can be as short as several days or 
for several years. Instead “temporary” describes the low levels of attachment of the rural 
residents to their place of work, for they do not have employment guarantees nor urban Hukou in 
the work place. Therefore, the transition to an urban-based economy in China requires more 
                                                          
1 China’s urbanization has lagged behind its economic development (Chen 2006). China has greater share of 
agricultural population than most countries with similar income levels. the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
United Nations (2012) reports that 60% of total population of China (about 830 million) depended for their 
livelihood on agriculture in 2011, a proportion significantly higher than most developing countries with similar per 
capita GDP.  
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farm/rural workers to move from subsistence farming to non-farm/urban sectors (Johnson 2000; 
Fan, Zhang, and Robinson 2003; Au and Henderson 2006).  
In 2013, China announced its urbanization plan to move about 250 million rural residents into 
cities over the next dozen years (Johnson 2013). The urbanization plan not only refers to labour 
migration into cities but also the geographic expansion of urban areas, such as urban sprawl and 
the rise of new cities in rural areas. That is, rural workers’ OFE in both urban and rural areas is 
critical for urbanization. For effective urbanization policy making, one must know how rural 
Chinese workers self-select into rural and urban off-farm activities.  
The objective of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence of the farm and non-farm 
employment choices of China’s rural workers. The employment decision is viewed as a self-
selection process into one of three occupational choices: farming only; local OFE; and migratory 
OFE. “Farming only” includes the possibility of involvement in household domestic work. Local 
OFE refers to employment in non-farm sectors while living at home, thus allowing for the 
possibility of remaining involved in farming and domestic work. Most local OFE in China is 
with township and village enterprises (TVEs), rural private enterprises, and self-employment (De 
Brauw et al. 2002; Fu and Balasubramanyam 2003; Zhang, De Brauw, and Rozelle 2004; Zhang 
et al. 2006; Mohapatra, Rozelle, and Goodhue 2007; Cai and Wang 2010). In 2007, 32% (150.9 
million people) of the rural labour force was employed in TVEs and 10% (48.6 million) were 
either self-employed or employed in private enterprises (Cai and Wang 2010). “Migratory OFE” 
refers to OFE in distant localities, thus not living at home. These individuals are not involved in 
household farm or domestic activities when they participate in OFE. Most migratory OFE 
opportunities are found in growth sectors or informal sectors in urban areas (Zhu 2002; 
Christiansen 2009; Chan Forthcoming), such as construction of new cities, railways, airports, 
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ports, and roads, manufacturing and mining sectors, and domestic service for urban families 
(Christiansen 2009). Without local hukou status in the workplace, migratory OFE workers 
usually take up marginal jobs with long working hours, poor working conditions, low and 
unstable pay, and enjoy no local-hukou-based benefits such as housing, education, and medical 
programs and other social insurance (Wang and Zuo 1999; Meng and Zhang 2001). My results 
are designed to provide a better understanding of rural labour force’s OFE participation in China, 
and to inform the policies directed at China’s transformation into an urbanized economy.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents a literature review 
related to China’s OFE. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical model, followed by Section 2.4 
which introduces the data and provides descriptive statistics. The empirical implementation is 
then presented in Section 2.5 and the results in Section 2.6, followed by conclusions and policy 
implications in Section 2.7.  
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Determinants of Labour Migration  
The labour out-migration from agriculture is evident both in developing countries and in the 
history of developed countries (Hathaway 1960; Barkley 1990; Taylor and Martin 2001; World 
Bank 2008). In neo-classical labour migration theory, migration is perceived as a form of optimal 
allocation of labour as a production factor, with wage differentials among sectors and regions 
being the major driving force (De Haas 2010). For example, Lewis (1954) proposes a two-sector 
model and concludes that the wage differential between the capitalist sector (non-farm) and the 
subsistence sector (farm) drives labour migration. Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) 
focus on the rural-urban labour migration and argue that rural workers decide whether or not to 
re-locate to cities by considering not only the simple wage differential but the expected future 
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income differential between rural and urban, that is, the discounted future stream of expected 
income including the consideration of unemployment rates.  
The Lewis and Todaro models stress the role of wage/income gaps in labour migration, while 
the self-selection within labour migration remains largely unexplored. That is, the out-migrants 
from agriculture may not be representative of the communities which they come from. Roy 
(1951) proposes a self-selection occupational choice model, showing how workers self-select 
into employment opportunities between fishing and hunting.  
Borjas (1987) formalizes Roy’s model in the context of labour migration, highlighting the 
endogeneity issues of the selection of labour migration. Later, the self-selection of labour 
migration is refined by using the elements of Sjaastad (1962) and Becker’s (1964) human capital 
models (Taylor and Martin 2001), for example, in Taylor (1987), Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo 
(1992), Borjas (1999), Chiswick (1999), De Coulon and Piracha (2005), Feliciano (2005), and 
Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008). First, it is proposed that the probability of migration may 
decrease with age, because older people will gain utility from the migration over only a shorter 
period of time. Second, the individuals facing higher migration costs2 are less likely to migrate. 
Third, individuals move from places where the return on their individual human capital is 
relatively low, to places where their return is relatively high. In other words, human capital that 
yields higher returns in the destination localities, net of costs, may facilitate migration. 
2.2.2 OFE in China 
Most research examining the drivers of China’s OFE has focused on migratory OFE. Many 
researchers find that migratory OFE is driven primarily by the expected wage differentials net of 
migration costs (Liang and White 1997; Zhao 1997; Hare 2002; Zhu 2002; Wu and Yao 2003; 
                                                          
2 Migration costs include not only distance-related transportation costs, but also opportunity costs and psychic costs. 
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Zhang and Song 2003; Poncet 2006; Ge and Yang 2011). For example, Zhu (2002) argues that 
urban to rural income gaps provide strong economic incentives for China’s rural workers to 
migrate to urban areas. Furthermore, Zhao (1997) and Zhu (2002) find that China’s rural out-
migrants are more likely to choose large urban centres or the coastal regions with higher wages 
and more job opportunities. Ge and Yang (2011) find that China’s migration flows respond 
negatively to unemployment rates of urban areas.  
China’s OFE has been affected not only by the market forces of wage differences but also by 
its institutions. For example, the Hukou system, the HRS, and the mandatory quota system have 
made OFE labour supplies relatively inelastic in response to the increase of off-farm wages 
(Knight, Song, and Huaibin 1999; Yang 1999; Yang and Zhou 1999; Meng 2000; Meng and 
Zhang 2001; Lin, Wang, and Zhao 2004; Bao et al. 2011; Vendryes 2011). China’s Hukou 
system is regarded as the major regulatory force that shapes its rural workers’ off-farm activities. 
The Hukou system is a de facto internal passport system in China which works chiefly as an 
entitlement distribution mechanism to segregate rural and urban populations. Due to the Hukou 
system, most rural-urban migrants are excluded from the urban welfare system and urban-based 
jobs because of their rural Hukou (Zhao 2002; Bao et al. 2011; Cai 2011). Thus, the Hukou 
system, which has changed little throughout the reform era (Chan 2010), is considered to be a 
major institutional barrier, preventing many rural workers from participating fully in urban 
employment (Zhao 1999a; Meng and Zhang 2001; Au and Henderson 2006; Bao et al. 2011; 
Vendryes 2011). Yang and Zhou (1999), Meng (2000), Benjamin and Brandt (2002) and Brandt 
et al. (2002) argue that land tenure arrangements and the mandatory quota system increase the 
opportunity costs of migration and dampen migratory OFE.  
 13 
The self-selection into OFE of China’s rural workers is well-documented in literature. 
Individual-level characteristics are important self-selection factors because they represent 
differences in opportunity costs as well as different expected income. Fan (2003), Du, Park, and 
Wang (2005), and De Brauw et al. (2008) find that female workers are less likely to participate 
in migratory OFE than male workers, especially senior and married women. De Brauw et al. 
(2002) and Zhang, De Brauw, and Rozelle (2004) find that the probability of migration generally 
rises with years of schooling and decreases with age, suggesting that younger individuals with 
higher education may receive higher returns in migration. Zhang and Li (2003), Zhao (2003), 
and Giles (2006) find that individuals with better migration networks may have lower migration 
costs and be more likely to participate in migratory OFE. Cook (1998), Yao (1999b), Xia and 
Simmons (2004), Guang and Zheng (2005), Glauben, Herzfeld, and Wang (2008), and  Zhou 
(2011) find that individuals with better local social connections have better access to local OFE 
opportunities. 
Household characteristics, including household productive asset holdings, labour 
endowments, and labour composition, may also affect selection into OFE, through the 
opportunity cost of migratory OFE. For example, Hare (2002) argues that larger productive asset 
holdings of a household raise the household members’ opportunity cost of OFE in distant 
locations, thereby discouraging selection into migratory OFE participations. Giles and Mu 
(2007) find that poor health of an elderly parent is likely to decrease his/her young adult child’s 
probability of self-selection into migratory OFE. Similarly, having more young children within 
the family decreases the probability of an individual selecting into migratory OFE (Shi, Heerink, 
and Qu 2007). 
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2.2.3 Research Gaps 
Most empirical studies of China’s OFE are limited to particular geographic areas. Due to 
varying local socioeconomic conditions (e.g., differing industry structures, local institutions, 
social contexts, and histories), evidence from different regions are likely to be place-specific and 
might not be estimates of global outcomes. If the place-specific estimates about China’s OFE are 
inconsistent or contradictory to the global outcomes, their policy implicaitons for national issues, 
e.g. urbanization, are likely to be biased and misleading. Having a wider coverage of China’s 
rural areas, this research can generate results more consistent with a global assessment, thus 
yielding implications more generalizable for China’s urbanization policy. 
Second, another contribution of this study is to show that the pattern of self-selection can vary 
substantially for different types of labour market activities. In the literature, most researchers 
view the OFE participation of China’s rural residents as a dichotomous choice. That is, rural 
residents of China choose between participating in OFE or not, participating in migration or not, 
or participating in local OFE or not. In contrast, for this study, I construct three mutually 
exclusive occupational choices, including farming only, local OFE, and migratory OFE, and 
integrate them within one framework. Since the effects of a given factor may differ across 
different occupational choices, I can systematically and simultaneously explain, within the same 
group of rural resident, the selectivity into OFE of China’s rural residents. This approach offers a 
comparison of the influence of a given factor across different off-farm activities of China’s rural 
residents, thereby offering a more complete picture of China’s residents’ responses to labour 
market incentives. 
Third, most empirical studies of OFE determinants in China have found the significant effects 
of individual and household characteristics, implying a self-selection process. That is, OFE 
participants are not random samples of their home communities’ work force. However, few of 
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these studies use Roy’s (1951) self-selection model as their theoretical base. With Roy’s model 
as a theoretical base, after a consistency check between theoretical prediction and empirical 
estimates, I can answer the core research question of this study–whether the OFE participation of 
China’s rural residents is consistent with the market-driven expectations. The theoretical model 
predicts that an increase in the opportunity costs of migratory OFE (e.g. having more young 
dependents in a household) decreasing the probability of selection into migratory OFE. However, 
in the empirical results, I find that an increase in the opportunity costs of migratory OFE does not 
decrease the probability of selecting into migratory OFE. In this case the market-driven force 
(migration cost) does not play its expected role. In most other instances, however, market 
incentives have the expected influence. 
Lastly, although some studies in China find that the wage growth in urban areas is a 
significant driving force behind migratory OFE participation, little is known about the role of 
rural-urban economic linkages in local OFE. Local OFE participation of a rural resident may not 
only be affected by the economic conditions of his/her rural community, but also by those of the 
nearby urban agglomerations. For example, a wage increase in an urban centre within daily 
commuting distance may increase the local OFE participation of a rural resident. Investigation of 
the role of rural-urban linkages in OFE participation has important policy implications for 
improving the effectiveness of urbanization plans. 
2.3 Theoretical Model 
In analyzing the labour supply of migration or OFE, some researchers use household model 
(Gronau 1977, Kooreman and Kapteyn1987, Olfert, Taylor, and Stabler 1992). Following 
Becker's (1965) household time allocation model, these studies consider a household as the 
decision unit. That is, the family members of a household act collectively and make time 
allocation decisions to maximize joint household utility, subject to time and income constraints. 
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The more time that is allocated towards increasing household income, the less time is available 
for other utility-generating activities (domestic work and leisure). As a result, households tend to 
choose a combination of market work, domestic work, and leisure hours that maximize its utility.  
Becker's  household time allocation model implies that an individual’s time allocation 
decision is highly related to the characteristics of his/her household and the rest family members. 
For example, the individuals with more dependents in their families will spend more time in 
household domestic work, and thus spend less time for OFE. 
Becker’s household time allocation model models the household as it were a single 
individual. This assumption is convenient in model-building, but raises several conceptual and 
methodological difficulties. Theoretically, the household time allocation model ignores the fact 
that a household consists of a group of individuals who have different preferences and bargaining 
positions by construction3 (Chiappori 1992). Empirically, household models may not be 
appropriate, as the prominent feature of migration or off-farm decisions is that they are made and 
conducted by individuals, not households. In recent years, increasing numbers of studies use 
individual models as their decision-making models for OFE or migration decision (Hunt 2006; 
Grogger and Hanson 2011; Kennan and Walker 2011). Therefore, in this study, I choose the 
individual-based Roy’s self-selection model to analyse China’s OFE.  In addition, given that 
individuals within a household may make OFE decision collectively, I also add some household 
characteristics into the model so that I can control for some household differences, such as some 
time-variant household characteristics (land entitlement, young dependents, labour endowment 
                                                          
3 The household time allocation model is built upon the assumption that there always exists an altruistic dictator who 
can freely modify allocation of the household resources and has the last word about “who get what”, which is 
unlikely to be true. Further, it still faces another problem to aggregate the individual-based preferences into a 
household one because of heterogeneous tastes and information asymmetries. 
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and composition), a household fixed effects term, and the family role of an individual in his/her 
household.  
The core analytical framework for this study is Roy’s (1951) self-selection model. I assume 
that a rural worker i (i∈ I) faces three occupational choices, J= {j | f, l, m}, which are: farming 
only (j=f); local OFE (j=l); and migratory OFE (j=m). Farming only (j=f) describes a worker 
who does not participate in OFE but may engage in household farm production. Local OFE (j=l) 
refers to participation in OFE while living at home. Migratory OFE (j=m) refers to participation 
in OFE and not returning to his/her home on a daily basis. Note that since workers who select 
into farming only or local OFE live at home, they can allocate parts of their labour to the 
household’s farm or domestic production.  
I assume that each of the occupational choices has its own expected utility, 𝐸�𝑊𝑗𝑖�, measured 
as the expected utility that i can achieve in occupation j, measured in monetary value. Therefore, 
in my model, Roy’s (1951) self-selection decision rule is that i will self-select into j if it provides 
maximum expected utility. Specifically, that is, 
i will self-select into f iff E�𝑊𝑓𝑖� ≥ E�𝑊𝑙𝑖� and E�𝑊𝑓𝑖� ≥ E�𝑊𝑚𝑖 �  
i will self-select into l iff E�𝑊𝑙𝑖� ≥ E�𝑊𝑓𝑖� and E�𝑊𝑙𝑖� ≥ E�𝑊𝑚𝑖 �  
i will self-select into m iff E�𝑊𝑚𝑖 � ≥ E�𝑊𝑓𝑖� 𝑎𝑛𝑑 E�𝑊𝑚𝑖 � ≥ E�𝑊𝑙𝑖�  
where E�𝑊𝑓𝑖�= i’s expected utility from participating in farming only; 
 E�𝑊𝑙𝑖�= i’s expected utility from participating in local OFE, potentially also 
including farm and domestic production; and  
 E�𝑊𝑚𝑖 �= i’s expected utility from participating in migratory OFE.  
Based on the self-selection rule, the theoretical model can be written in a linear probability 
function: 
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𝑃𝑟�𝑖 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑗� = 𝛼𝑗𝑓E�𝑊𝑓𝑖� + 𝛼𝑗𝑙E�𝑊𝑙𝑖� + 𝛼𝑗𝑚E�𝑊𝑚𝑖 �     (2.1) 
where 𝑃𝑟�𝑖 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑗�= the probability that i self-select into j ;  
Parameter constraints: �
𝛼𝑓𝑓 > 0 𝛼𝑓𝑙 < 0 𝛼𝑓𝑚 < 0
𝛼𝑙𝑓 < 0 𝛼𝑙𝑙 > 0 𝛼𝑙𝑚 < 0
𝛼𝑚𝑓 < 0 𝛼𝑚𝑙 < 0 𝛼𝑚𝑚 > 0�. 
The parameter constraints of equation (2.1) reflect the self-selection decision rule, which 
shows that having higher expected utility of a given occupational choice always increases the 
probability of selecting in this choice and reduces the probability of selecting in the other two 
competing occupational choices. 
Specifically, I define the function forms of 𝐸�𝑊𝑓𝑖�, 𝐸�𝑊𝑙𝑖�and 𝐸�𝑊𝑚𝑖 � as follows:  
𝐸�𝑊𝑓
𝑖� = 𝑤𝑓𝑖 + 𝑢𝑓,𝑑𝑖          (2.2) 
𝐸�𝑊𝑙
𝑖� = 𝑤𝑙𝑖 + 𝑢𝑙,𝑓𝑖 + 𝑢𝑙𝑓,𝑑𝑖          (2.3) 
𝐸�𝑊𝑚
𝑖 � = 𝑤𝑚𝑖 − ℎ𝑐𝑖           (2.4) 
where: 𝑤𝑓𝑖= the monetary value of i’s labour time when it is allocated entirely to farm 
production. Note that 𝑤𝑓𝑖  is a function of i’s individual characteristics (𝑍𝐼𝑖) and 
household characteristics (𝑍𝐻𝑖). For example, 𝑤𝑓𝑖  may be affected by i’s 
human capital and by i’s household land holdings;  
 𝑢𝑓,𝑑𝑖 = the monetary value of the extra utility that i may gain by reallocating parts of 
his/her labour time to household domestic good4 production. Note that, 
                                                          
4 Household domestic good is a Beckerian “home-made and non-tradable commodity" (Becker 1991), such as child 
care, homemade meals, security, housekeeping, and other household collective utility-generating activities. 
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𝑢𝑓,𝑑𝑖 ≥05, and it is related to i’s preference for domestic goods as well as i’s 
marginal productivity in domestic good production. For example, 𝑢𝑓,𝑑𝑖  is a 
function of 𝑍𝐼𝑖 and 𝑍𝐻𝑖, e.g., i’s demographic variables6 and the number of 
dependents7 in i’s household; 
 𝑤𝑙𝑖= the monetary value of i’s labour time if it is allocated exclusively to local OFE. 
Note that, 𝑤𝑙𝑖 is a function of the average off-farm wage of i’s local community 
(𝜔𝑙𝑖), 𝑍𝐼𝑖, 𝑍𝐻𝑖, and i’s community characteristics (𝑍𝐶𝑖). For example, 
individuals with higher levels of human capital may expect to receive higher 
income in local OFE. Individuals with more local political contacts may have 
more local OFE opportunities. Individuals whose local community have more 
enterprises are likely to have higher local OFE wages, given a fixed labour 
supply within the local community. 
 𝑢𝑙,𝑓𝑖 = the monetary value of the additional utility from allocating labour time to 
household farm production, since i can continue to be engaged in farming when 
he/she selects into local OFE. Note that, 𝑢𝑙,𝑓𝑖 ≥ 08 and it is a function of 𝑍𝐼𝑖 
and 𝑍𝐻𝑖; 
                                                          
5 𝑢𝑓,𝑑𝑖 ≥0, as i may gain more utility since i has an option to allocate part of his/her labour to domestic good 
production. If the marginal value of labour time in household domestic good production is greater than the marginal 
value of labour time in farm production, i will reallocate labour time to domestic good production, 𝑢𝑓,𝑑𝑖 . 
6 Conventional wisdom suggests that female and elderly individuals might be more experienced and productive in 
domestic good production, compared with males and the young. 
7 More dependents will tend to increase the marginal utility of household domestic goods.  
8 𝑢𝑙,𝑓𝑖 ≥0, as i may increase utility from farm production.  
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 𝑢𝑙𝑓,𝑑𝑖 = the monetary value of the additional utility from allocating labour time to 
household domestic production, possible when he/she selects into local OFE. 
Note that, 𝑢𝑙𝑓,𝑑𝑖 ≥ 09 and it is a function of 𝑍𝐼𝑖 and 𝑍𝐻𝑖; 
 𝑤𝑚𝑖 = the monetary value of i’s labour time when it is allocated to migratory OFE; it 
is a function of the average wage in the potential migratory OFE destinations 
and 𝑍𝐼𝑖.; and 
 ℎ𝑐= the Hukou cost of migration. Note that, ℎ𝑐≥ 0, which is a function of 𝑍𝐻𝑖  10; 
In reduced form, equations (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4) can be expressed as: E�𝑊𝑓𝑖� = 𝜃𝑓𝐼𝑍𝐼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑓𝐻𝑍𝐻𝑖         (2.5) E�𝑊𝑙𝑖� = 𝜔𝑙𝑖 + 𝜃𝑙𝐼𝑍𝐼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑙𝐻𝑍𝐻𝑖 + 𝜃𝑙𝐶𝑍𝐶𝑖       (2.6) E�𝑊𝑚𝑖 � = 𝜔𝑚𝑖 + 𝜃𝑚𝐼 𝑍𝐼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑚𝐻𝑍𝐻𝑖        (2.7) 
Next I build up the rural-urban wage linkage and define 𝜔𝑙𝑖 and 𝜔𝑚𝑖 . Considering that urban 
centre 𝑐𝑖 is the nearest city to i’s local community, with distance 𝐷𝑐𝑖  from i’s local community.  𝜔𝑐𝑖  is the average wage of the urban residents of 𝑐𝑖, 𝜔𝑚𝑖  can be defined as: 
𝜔𝑚
𝑖 = 𝜌𝜔𝑐𝑖 − 𝜑𝑚𝐷𝑐𝑖          (2.8) 
As shown in equation (2.8), 𝜔𝑚𝑖  is an increasing function of 𝜔𝑐𝑖  (𝜌 > 0). That is, if the 
average wage of the urban residents in 𝑐𝑖 increase by 1 unit, it is expected that 𝜔𝑚𝑖  increase by 𝜌. 
𝜔𝑚
𝑖  is a decreasing function of the distance between i’s local community and 𝑐𝑖, 𝐷𝑐𝑖  (𝜑𝑚 > 0). I 
use 𝐷𝑐𝑖  to index all forms of distance-related transaction costs, including information transfer 
                                                          
9 𝑢𝑙𝑓,𝑑𝑖 ≥0, as i may gain utility from labour allocation to domestic good production.  
10 The Hukou costs of migration refer to the extra costs due to the artificial barriers of the Hukou system. The Hukou 
system entitles the residents who live in their Hukou registration places to a set of local-based public goods and 
social services, such as access to public schools, medical programs, pension plans, and low-cost housing. As a result, 
migratory OFE workers who work and live outside of their Hukou registration places have to purchase them or learn 
to live without them. Hukou costs vary with the household characteristics, due to different number of dependents.  
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costs about migratory off-farm job opportunities, cultural and linguistic differences, psychic 
costs of migration, as well as simply transport costs of migration. 
The average off-farm wage in i’s local OFE, 𝜔𝑙𝑖, is defined as 
𝜔𝑙
𝑖 = 𝜌𝜔𝑐𝑖(1 − 𝜏𝐷𝑐𝑖) − 𝜑𝑙𝐷𝑐𝑖         (2.9) 
As shown in equation (2.9), 𝜔𝑙𝑖 increases with the average wage of its nearest city (𝜔𝑐𝑖 ) and 
declines with greater distances from its nearest city (𝐷𝑐𝑖). In equilibrium, an average rural 
worker’s local off-farm wage,𝜔𝑙𝑖, will equal to his/her net income from commuting. As 𝐷𝑐𝑖  
increases, not only will a commuter incur more transport costs, but also will spend more time 
traveling (implying less time in working). Note that I assume that the transport costs increase at a 
rate of 𝜑𝑙 (𝜑𝑙 > 0, a constant commuting monetary cost per unit distance), while the time 
consumed in commuting increases at a rate of 𝜏 (𝜏 > 0, a constant commuting time cost per unit 
distance).  
With equations (2.5), (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9), equation (2.1) can be transformed into: 
𝑃𝑟�𝑖 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑗� = 𝛼𝑗𝐼𝑍𝐼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗𝐻𝑍𝐻𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗𝐶𝑍𝐶𝑖 + �𝛼𝑗𝑙 + 𝛼𝑗𝑚�𝜌𝜔𝑐𝑖 − (𝛼𝑗𝑙𝜑𝑙 + 𝛼𝑗𝑚𝜑𝑚)𝐷𝑐𝑖 −
𝛼𝑗𝑙𝜌𝜏𝜔𝑐
𝑖𝐷𝑐
𝑖            (2.10) 
That is, the probability that i self-selects into j is a function of i’s individual’s, household’s 
and local community’s characteristics, as these variables can affect i’s expected incomes in 
farming only, local OFE, and migratory OFE. For example, if a higher level of human capital 
yields higher marginal labour income in migratory OFE than in farming only, one may expect a 
negative coefficient of human capital for the probability of farming only and a positive 
coefficient for migratory OFE. 
 In equations (2.8) and (2.9), the urban wage of the nearest city (𝜔𝑐𝑖 ) and the distance to the 
nearest city (𝐷𝑐𝑖) influence in a systematic way the average off-farm wages in the local 
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community and in the potential migratory destinations. In equation (2.10), the coefficients of 
𝜔𝑐
𝑖 is 𝜌�𝛼𝑗𝑙 + 𝛼𝑗𝑚�. According to the self-selection decision rule in equation (2.1) and definition 
in equation (2.8), it is expected that 𝜌�𝛼𝑓𝑙 + 𝛼𝑓𝑚� < 0. That is, higher urban wages in the 
nearest city (𝜔𝑐𝑖 ) will increase the expected income of the local and migratory OFE choices (part 
of the spatial wage structure), thus decreasing the probability of selection into farming only. The 
coefficient of 𝐷𝑐𝑖  is – �𝛼𝑗𝑙𝜑𝑙 + 𝛼𝑗𝑚𝜑𝑚�. According to the self-selection decision rule in equation 
(2.1), it is expected that – �𝛼𝑓𝑙𝜑𝑙 + 𝛼𝑓𝑚𝜑𝑚� > 0. That is, greater distances to the nearest city 
(𝐷𝑐𝑖) tend to decrease the expected income of local and migratory OFE choices, thus increasing 
the probability of selection into farming only. 
 The coefficient of the interaction term of distance and the nearest city’s wage, 𝜔𝑐𝑖𝐷𝑐𝑖 , is –𝛼𝑗𝑙𝜌𝜏. According to the self-selection decision rule in equation (2.1), it is expected that –𝛼𝑓𝑙𝜌𝜏 > 0; −𝛼𝑚𝑙𝜌𝜏 > 0 and −𝛼𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜏 < 0. That is, a decrease in the expected income in local 
OFE (or an increase of the monetary value of commuting time cost in traveling) will increase the 
probability of an individual’s self-selection into farming only and migratory OFE, and decrease 
the probability of an individual’s self-selection into local OFE.  
2.4 Data 
2.4.1 Household and Village Survey 
The data for this study were collected by the Centre for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP), 
Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing, China. Two separate rounds of surveys11 were 
                                                          
11 The data collection effort involved students and staff from the Centre for Chinese Agricultural Policy and a group 
of masters and Ph.D. students from a number of other agricultural universities. Households were paid 20 Yuan and 
given a gift in compensation for the time that they spent with the survey team. The author participated in collecting 
the data in the second round survey. 
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conducted: one in April 2005 and the second in April 2008. These surveys focused on the years 
2004 and 2007, respectively.  
The first survey covered a randomly selected, nationally representative sample of 101 rural 
villages in five provinces (Jiangsu, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Jilin, and Hebei). The sample provinces 
were randomly selected from each of China’s major economic zones12. To reflect accurately the 
differing income distributions within each province, one county was selected randomly from 
within each income quintile for the province (Figure 2-1), as measured by the per capita gross 
value of industrial output. The same procedure was used in the selection of the townships and 
villages. Within each county, two townships were selected randomly within each county, and 
two villages were selected randomly within each township. Finally, the survey teams used 
village rosters to randomly choose eight households holding residency permits (Hukou) in each 
village. In total, 808 households (or 3,267 individuals) were included in the survey in 2005 
(Table 2-1). 
                                                          
12 To approximate a nationally representative sample, the provinces were selected from five distinct regions to 
reflect variations in economic development and geography. Jiangsu was selected to represent China’s most 
developed southeast coastal area (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Shanghai, Fujian and Guangdong); Sichuan 
represents China’s southwest area (Sichuan, Yunnan, Tibet, Guizhou and Guangxi); Shaanxi represents China’s 
northwest area (Shaanxi, Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang); Hebei represents north and 
central provinces (Hebei, Henan, Shanxi, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi); Jilin represents China’s north-eastern 
provinces (Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang). 
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Figure 2-1. Sample provinces and counties 
Table 2-1. Sample distribution 
Province County Township Village  
2004  2007 
 Household Individual  Household
a Individual 
Jiangsu 5 10 20  160 644  401 (142) 1637 
Sichuan 5 10 20  160 688  400 (125) 1752 
Shaanxi 5 10 20  160 685  400 (129) 1765 
Jilin 5 10 21  168 606  421 (137) 1550 
Hebei 5 10 20  160 644  402 (149) 1623 
Total 25 50 101  808 3267  2024 (682) 8327 a The number in the parentheses refers to the households that were visited in both survey years. 
Source: Author’s calculation using the CCAP rural household survey, 2005 and 2008. 
 
For the second survey, the same households that had been surveyed in 2005 were visited. 
Following the same sampling technique, the survey team increased the household sample size to 
20 per village (the original eight survey households plus 12 other households randomly chosen 
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from the 2005 village rosters). There are 682 households that are included for both years. 
Including replacement, the second round survey included a total of 2,024 households and 8,328 
individuals (Table 2-1).  
During the survey, the enumerators used pre-coded forms (e.g., a village survey form and a 
household survey form) to collect a wide range of information about the villages, the households, 
and the individuals of the households during the survey years. In the village survey form, 
enumerators mainly questioned China’s Communist Party secretaries and/or the accountants of 
the villages about the community characteristics in 2004 and 2007. In the household survey 
form, the enumerators mainly asked the heads of the selected households for detailed information 
about household members during the survey years, including their gender, ages, education, and 
production activities.  
In the household survey, information on household members’ activities in OFE during the 
survey years was included, such as the occupation, the locality and the residency of the OFE 
participants. Tables 2-2 and 2-3 summarize the information about the labour force composition 
and their production activities of my sample for the year 2004 and year 2007 respectively. The 
results show that, from 2004 to 2007, the farm labour force decreased from 74 to 70% and the 
OFE labour force increased from 52 to 54%. 
2.4.2 Information about the Nearest Cities of Sample Villages 
I collected the geographic, population, and wage information of the nearest cities of the 
sample villages from the China City Statistical Yearbook (CNBS 2005; 2008) and Google Maps 
(2012). Specifically, for each of the sample villages, I find its nearest city by using the electronic 
map of Google Maps (2012) and measure the distance from the centre of the village to the centre 
of the city. The urban wage, 𝜔𝑐𝑖 , which was collected from the China City Statistical Yearbook 
(CNBS 2005; 2008) for years of 2004 and 2007 respectively, is defined as “the average annual 
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wage of the urban residents (with urban Hukou) who live in the core area of the sample village’s 
nearest city”.  
Table 2-2. Sample composition by production activities in 2004 
 Total 
Jiangsu 
(coastal) Sichuan 
Shaanxi 
(inland) Jilin Hebei 
Sample size: 3267 644 688 685 606 644 
 Age<16 601 100 142 150 80 129 
 Age>65 200 22 63 33 35 47 
 Labour force
a: 2182 456 449 428 439 410 
 
 Farmingb 1607 
(74%) 
314 
(69%) 
307 
(68%) 
323 
(75%) 
324 
(74%) 
339 
(83%) 
 
 Farming only 1041 
(48%) 
169 
(37%) 
206 
(46%) 
220 
(51%) 
236 
(54%) 
210 
(51%) 
 
 OFEc: 1129 
(52%) 
285 
(63%) 
241 
(54%) 
207 
(48%) 
197 
(45%) 
199 
(49%) 
 
  Local OFEd 596 
(27%) 
163 
(36%) 
101 
(22%) 
95 
(22%) 
111 
(25%) 
126 
(31%) 
 
  Migratory OFEe 533 
(24%) 
122 
(27%) 
140 
(31%) 
112 
(26%) 
86 
(20%) 
73 
(18%) 
a Labour force consists of everyone of working age, between 16 and 65, except for those in schooling, military and 
prison, those who do not participate in farming or OFE due to health consideration (e.g., too old and ill) and those 
who only do domestic work at own home.  
b Farming refers to that an individuals in the labour force who participated in their own household farm production 
in a survey year.  
c OFE refers to the individuals in the labour force who participated in OFE in the survey years.  
d Local OFE refers to that an individuals in the labour force whose major OFE is local OFE in a survey year.  
e Migratory OFE refers to an individuals in the labour force whose major OFE is migratory OFE in a survey year.  
Percentage of the labour force in the parentheses 
Source: Author’s calculation using the CCAP rural household survey, 2005. 
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Table 2-3. Sample composition by production activities in 2007 
 Total 
Jiangsu 
(coastal) Sichuan 
Shaanxi 
(inland) Jilin Hebei 
Sample size: 8327 1637 1752 1765 1550 1623 
 Age<16 1301 236 328 284 189 264 
 Age>65 619 88 173 113 106 139 
 Labour forcea: 5600 1180 1145 1147 1072 1056 
  
Farmingb 3902 
(70%) 
807 
(68%) 
712 
(62%) 
795 
(69%) 
786 
(73%) 
802 
(76%) 
 
 Farming only 2443 
(44%) 
411 
(35%) 
500 
(44%) 
543 
(47%) 
527 
(49%) 
462 
(44%) 
  
OFEc: 2996 
(54%) 
748 
(63%) 
609 
(53%) 
565 
(49%) 
509 
(47%) 
565 
(54%) 
  
 Local OFEd 1445 
(26%) 
400 
(34%) 
188 
(16%) 
226 
(20%) 
294 
(27%) 
337 
(32%) 
  
 Migratory OFEe 1551 
(28%) 
348 
(29%) 
421 
(37%) 
339 
(30%) 
215 
(20%) 
228 
(22%) 
a Labour force consists of everyone of working age, between 16 and 65, except for those in schooling, military and 
prison, those who do not participate in farming or OFE due to health consideration (e.g., too old and ill) and those 
who only do domestic work at own home.  
b Farming refers to that an individuals in the labour force who participated in their own household farm production 
in a survey year.   
c OFE refers to the individuals in the labour force who participated in OFE in the survey years.  
d Local OFE refers to that an individuals in the labour force whose major OFE is local OFE in a survey year.  
e Migratory OFE refers to an individual in the labour force whose major OFE is migratory OFE in a survey year.  
Percentage of the labour force in the parentheses 
Source: Author’s calculation using the CCAP rural household survey, 2008. 
 
2.5 Empirical Framework 
2.5.1 Pooled Linear Probability Model 
The empirical model follows from the theoretical model represented by equation (2.10). For 
individual i in period t (year 2004 or year 2007), the probability of self-selection into activity j 
can be estimated with a linear probability model (2.11) with robust standard errors adjusted for 
clustering. Although Logit, Probit or Multinomial models are technically preferred to a linear 
probability model, only the latter can be used as the base (comparison) model for a fixed effects 
model. A fixed effects model can remove the effect of all time-invariant influences from the 
dependent variable, including observable and the unobservable characteristics, thus it may 
produce estimates of the relationships closer to the true value than another estimator. Because of 
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the importance of controlling for the time-invariant disturbances which can only accomplished 
with a linear probability model I rely on the latter as the base model. I also estimate Logit, 
Probit, and Multinomial Logit models (selected results reported n Appendices) to test for 
robustness of my results.  
The base linear probability model is: 
𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗,𝐼𝑍𝐼𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗,𝐻𝑍𝐻𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗,𝐶𝑍𝐶𝑡𝑖 + �𝛼𝑗𝑙 + 𝛼𝑗𝑚�𝜌𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 − (𝛼𝑗𝑙𝜑𝑙 + 𝛼𝑗𝑚𝜑𝑚)𝐷𝑐𝑖 −
𝛼𝑗𝑙𝜌𝜏𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 𝐷𝑐𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡          (2.11) 
where j =f, l, and m, respectively farming only, local OFE, and migratory OFE. 
 𝛼𝑗,𝑡= time specific constant term;  
 𝑍𝐼𝑡𝑖 = individual characteristics in period t; 
 𝛼𝑗,𝐼= marginal effects of i’s individual characteristics on 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑖 ; 
 𝑍𝐻𝑡𝑖 = household characteristics in period t;  
 𝛼𝑗,𝐻= marginal effects of i’s household characteristics on 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑖 ; 
 𝑍𝐶𝑡𝑖 = community characteristics in period t;  
 𝛼𝑗,𝐶= marginal effects of i’s community characteristics on 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑖 ; 
 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 = the average wage rate of the urban residents of individual i’s nearest city 𝑐 in 
period t; 
 �𝛼𝑗𝑙 + 𝛼𝑗𝑚�𝜌= marginal effects of 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 on 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑖 ; 
 𝐷𝑐𝑖= the distance to the nearest city 𝑐; 
 −(𝛼𝑗𝑙𝜑𝑙 + 𝛼𝑗𝑚𝜑𝑚)= marginal effects of 𝐷𝑐𝑖  on 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑖 ; 
 −𝛼𝑗𝑙𝜌𝜏 = marginal effects of 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 𝐷𝑐𝑖  on 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑖 ,; 
  𝜇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡= the error term.  
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The dependent variable 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑖  of Eq. (2.11) is the dummy variable reflecting i’s probability of 
self-selection into j in period t. For example,  𝑃𝑓,2004𝑖  =1 if i participated in farming only in 2004; 
otherwise 0, similarly for selection into local and migratory OFE.  
The vectors of independent variables of Eq. (2.11) are 𝑍𝐼𝑡𝑖, 𝑍𝐻𝑡𝑖, 𝑍𝐶𝑡𝑖, 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 , 𝐷𝑐𝑖 , and an 
interaction term of wage and the distance, 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 𝐷𝑐𝑖 . The vector 𝑍𝐼𝑡𝑖 consists of i’s individual 
characteristics, i.e., gender, age (age groups16-20; 21-30; 31-40; 41-50; 51-65), and education 
attainment (in five categories13). Younger age groups (e.g. age groups of 16-20, 21-30, and 31-
40) are expected to have greater probability of selection into local and migratory OFE (𝑃𝑙,𝑡𝑖  and 
𝑃𝑚,𝑡𝑖 ) and lower probability of selection into farming only (𝑃𝑓,𝑡𝑖 ). Theoretically, younger workers 
have longer periods of lifetime to capture the income premium of OFE (Taylor and Martin 
2001). Empirically, numerous studies show that migratory OFE participants are more likely to be 
young (Hare 1999; Knight, Song, and Huaibin 1999; Rozelle, Taylor, and De Brauw 1999; Zhao 
1999b; Roberts 2001; Zhu 2002).  
Education may play a critical role in individual’s self-selection into OFE. The literature 
demonstrates that higher education attainment tends to garner higher incomes in markets with 
greater labour demand (Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo 1992; Taylor and Martin 2001; Hare 2002). 
Larger urban centres are more attractive to more skilled workers because of higher wages and 
built amenities (Partridge et al., 2009; Glaeser and Resseger, 2010). Therefore, it is expected 
those individuals with higher education attainments are more likely to self-select into migratory 
OFE rather than farming only and local OFE. 
                                                          
13 The educational attainment ranges from “illiterate or primary school unfinished”, through “primary school 
completed”, “mid-school completed”, “high school completed” and “college, university, or higher.” 
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The vector 𝑍𝐻𝑡𝑖 consists of i’s household characteristics including the number of pre-school 
children in the household, the number of additional female and male labour force members, the 
quantity of land entitlement at the beginning of the year, and household social contact (a dummy 
variable for the membership in China Communist Party).  
The probability of self-selection into migratory OFE is expected to be negatively affected by 
the number of pre-school children in the household due to a higher shadow price of domestic 
good production and higher marginal labour productivity in domestic work. Note this negative 
relationship is empirically confirmed by Shi, Heerink, and Qu (2007) in the context of China. 
Also, more pre-school children in the household leads to higher Hukou costs, thereby decreasing 
the expected utility of migratory OFE.  
The probability of self-selection into migratory OFE is expected to be positively related to the 
number of female labour force members in the household. De Brauw et al. (2002) and Zhang, De 
Brauw, and Rozelle (2004) document an increasingly feminized farming labour force in China. 
Therefore, individuals with more female family members are likely to have more labourers able 
to work on the farm. As a result, the number of female labour force members may positively 
affect 𝑃𝑚,𝑡𝑖  and negatively affect  𝑃𝑓,𝑡𝑖  and 𝑃𝑙,𝑡𝑖  
I expect that the probability of self-selection into migratory and local OFE decreases and the 
probability of farming increases with the quantity of household’s land entitlement. Individuals 
from households with more land are likely to be more productive in farm production than the 
ones with less land. Therefore it is expected that greater land endowments of household to 
positively affect 𝑃𝑓,𝑡𝑖  and negatively affect 𝑃𝑙,𝑡𝑖  and 𝑃𝑚,𝑡𝑖 .  
Numerous studies show how local political connections may facilitate local OFE participation 
(Cook 1998; Yao 1999b; Xia and Simmons 2004; Guang and Zheng 2005; Glauben, Herzfeld, 
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and Wang 2008; Zhou 2011). In the empirical model, I use a dummy variable that indicates if 
there is a Chinese Communist Party member (CCP member) among the family members of i to 
approximate individual’s connections to local political power. In rural China, CCP members are 
more likely to be the political and economic elites of the local communities, usually having 
better connections with local political authorities. To become a CCP member, two current CCP 
members must recommend the applicant to the local party leadership. Further the recommending 
CCP members must acquaint themselves with the applicant, and be aware of their personnel 
records, educational attainment, and work performance (Sullivan 2012). Therefore, it is expected 
that individuals who have a family member in the CCP have better connections with the local 
governments, thus a greater probability of selection into local OFE and lower probability of 
selection into migratory OFE.  
The vector 𝑍𝐶𝑡𝑖 consists of the number of village enterprises
14 per 1000 population in i’s local 
rural community. Having more enterprises may increase local off-farm employment 
opportunities, thereby raising the expected income of local OFE. As a result, an increase of the 
number of enterprises per 1000 population in i’s community is expected to increase the 
probability of selection into local OFE and decrease the probability of selection into migratory 
and farming only. 
The average urban wage of the nearest city (𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 ) and the distance (𝐷𝑐𝑖), and the interaction 
term of wage and distance (𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 𝐷𝑐𝑖) are used to index the average off-farm wages of i’s local 
community and potential migratory destinations in period t. As shown in equation 2.9, I use the 
urban wage of nearest city 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  to approximate the general off-farm wage accessible by potential 
participants. An increase in 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  will increase the local OFE wage and the migratory OFE wage 
                                                          
14 In this study, enterprises are businesses in the non-farm sector, both manufacturing and services. 
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of the rural residents of the community. I use the distance (𝐷𝑐𝑖) to approximate the total migration 
cost of a rural resident participating in migratory OFE, and the commuting transportation costs 
when a rural resident participates in local OFE. That is, as shown in equation 2.9, the greater the 
distance 𝐷𝑐𝑖  is, the higher the migration costs of a rural-urban migrant who chooses the nearest 
city as migration destination. The greater the distance 𝐷𝑐𝑖  is, the higher the transport costs will be 
of a rural-urban commuter who chooses the nearest city as workplace. Moreover, when a rural 
resident commutes to an off-farm job in the nearest city, not only will he/she incur transport 
costs, but also time spent in traveling (implying less time in working). I use the interaction term 
of wage and distance (𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 𝐷𝑐𝑖) to approximate this time costs spent in commuting. That is, the 
greater 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 𝐷𝑐𝑖  is, the more time will be spent by a rural commuter in commuting when he/she 
commute daily from his/her community to the nearest city, and the greater will be the erosion of 
OFE income. The accuracy of this measurement is based on two assumptions. First, there is 
regional wage equilibrium that the rural workers in the local community are free to choose their 
off-farm work places, either in distant cities or in the local community.  Second, the distance 
(𝐷𝑐𝑖) is an accurate measurement of the transporting distance (the road distance) between the 
rural community and its nearest city. It is expected that �𝛼𝑓𝑙 + 𝛼𝑓𝑚� < 0 and – �𝛼𝑓𝑙𝜑𝑙 +
𝛼𝑓𝑚𝜑𝑚� > 0, as an increase in the expected income in local or migratory OFE will decrease the 
probability of an individual’s self-selection into farming only. It is expected that –𝛼𝑓𝑙𝜌𝜏 > 0,  
−𝛼𝑚𝑙𝜌𝜏 > 0, and −𝛼𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜏 < 0, because an increase of the monetary value of commuting time 
cost in traveling will increase the probability of an individual’s self-selection into farming only 
and migratory OFE and decrease the probability of an individual’s self-selection into local OFE. 
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2.5.2 Repeated Observation of Individuals and Household Characteristics 
Our data set contains repeated observations of individuals over two periods of time. However, 
the pooled OLS model (2.11) is based on the assumption that all observations are uncorrelated 
and independent. A partial solution is to exclude the repeated observations from the regression 
model. I therefore first exclude all 2007 observations that are repeated to construct the pooled 
sample. 
Further, the individual observations in equation (2.11) are based on random sampling of 
households, not individuals, which may be problematic. For each individual within a household, 
all other household members are also in the sample. Since individuals within the same household 
will share the same household characteristics, household characteristics will be repeated and 
‘double-counted’ to the extent of the number of individuals in the household, again violating the 
assumption of uncorrelated and independent observations thus introducing bias. My solution is to 
estimate the models for a number of ‘focal persons’ in the household, yielding a random 
subsample without repetition of household characteristics. For each household in the sample, I 
select three working-age labour force members as the ‘focal person’. They are the household 
head, the spouse of household head, and the youngest15 working-age child of household head 
(the youngest son/son-in-law or daughter/daughter-in-law), respectively. As the household 
sample is randomly generated and the selection rule of the focal person for each household 
sample is exogenous, the focal person sub-sample satisfies the assumption of OLS model. That 
is, the observations are independent.  
                                                          
15 The youngest children are more likely to remain in the sample for the two survey period.  
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2.5.3 Fixed Effects Model  
Using the dependent and independent variables in equation (2.11) and a panel data set16, I 
estimate a fixed effects model (FE model). The construction of the FE model is shown as 
follows. For the observations in 2004 survey, one has  
𝑃𝑗,2004𝑖 = 𝛽𝑗,2004 + 𝛽𝑗,𝐼𝑍𝐼2004𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗,𝐻𝑍𝐻2004𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗,𝐶𝑍𝐶2004𝑖 + �𝛽𝑗𝑙 + 𝛽𝑗𝑚�𝜌𝜔𝑐,2004𝑖 − (𝛽𝑗𝑙𝜑𝑙 +
𝛽𝑗𝑚𝜑𝑚)𝐷𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑗𝑙𝜌𝜏𝜔𝑐,2004𝑖 𝐷𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,2004      (2.12) 
For the repeated observations in 2007 survey, one has 
𝑃𝑗,2007𝑖 = 𝛽𝑗,2007 + 𝛽𝑗,𝐼𝑍𝐼2007𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗,𝐻𝑍𝐻2007𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗,𝐶𝑍𝐶2007𝑖 + �𝛽𝑗𝑙 + 𝛽𝑗𝑚�𝜌𝜔𝑐,2007𝑖 − (𝛽𝑗𝑙𝜑𝑙 +
𝛽𝑗𝑚𝜑𝑚)𝐷𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑗𝑙𝜌𝜏𝜔𝑐,2007𝑖 𝐷𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,2007      (2.13) 
After taking the differencing between (2.12) and (2.13), one has 
∆𝑃𝑗
𝑖 = ∆𝛽𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,𝐼∆𝑍𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗,𝐻∆𝑍𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗,𝐶∆𝑍𝐶𝑖 + �𝛽𝑗𝑙𝜌 + 𝛽𝑗𝑚𝜌 − 𝛽𝑗𝑙𝜌𝜏𝐷𝑐𝑖�∆𝜔𝑖 + ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑗 
            (2.14)  
where 𝛽𝑗,𝑡=a time-varying constant term; 
 𝛽𝑗,𝐼=marginal effects of i’s individual characteristics on 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑖 ; 
 𝛽𝑗,𝐻=marginal effects of i’s household characteristics on 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑖 ; 
 𝛽𝑗,𝐶=marginal effects of i’s community characteristics on 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑖 ; 
 �𝛽𝑗𝑙 + 𝛽𝑗𝑚�𝜌=marginal effects of 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 on 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑖 , corresponding to the term of �𝛼𝑗𝑙 +
𝛼𝑗𝑚�𝜌 in equation (2.11); 
 −(𝛽𝑗𝑙𝜑𝑙 + 𝛽𝑗𝑚𝜑𝑚)=marginal effects of 𝐷𝑐𝑖  on 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑖 , corresponding to the term of 
−(𝛼𝑗𝑙𝜑𝑙 + 𝛼𝑗𝑚𝜑𝑚)= in equation (2.11); 
                                                          
16 I use a balanced panel data for the FE model who were interviewed both in 2004 and 2007.  
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 −𝛽𝑗𝑙𝜌𝜏=marginal effects of 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 𝐷𝑐𝑖  on 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑖 , corresponding to the term of −𝛼𝑗𝑙𝜌𝜏 in 
equation (2.11); 
 𝛽𝑗𝑖=individual dummy (the individual-based fixed effect); 
 ∆𝑃𝑗𝑖 = 𝑃𝑗,2007𝑖 -𝑃𝑗,2004𝑖 ; 
 ∆𝛽𝑗 = 𝛽𝑗,2007-𝛽𝑗,2004; 
 ∆𝑍𝐼𝑖= 𝑍𝐼2007𝑖 -𝑍𝐼2004𝑖 ; 
 ∆𝑍𝐻𝑖= 𝑍𝐻2007𝑖 -𝑍𝐻2004𝑖 ; 
 ∆𝑍𝐶𝑖= 𝑍𝐶2007𝑖 -𝑍𝐶2004𝑖 ; and 
 ∆𝜔𝑚𝑖 =𝜔𝑚,2007𝑖 -𝜔𝑚,2004𝑖  
The FE model removes the effect of all time-invariant influences from the dependent 
variables, including observable and the unobservable characteristics. Using a FE model, one can 
assess the net effects of variations in the independent variables for an individual. Each individual 
i has a fixed effect term, 𝛽𝑗𝑖, which can control for all of the individual-based time-invariant 
variables that cannot be observed or measured, like individual’s preferences, ability, race, and 
cultural factors, etc. As the effect of all time-invariant characteristics has been removed from the 
outcome variables, the FE model can assess the net effect of the time-varying independent 
variables. The estimated coefficients of the FE models are more consistent because the FE model 
controls for the bias caused by the omitted time-invariant unobservable characteristics. 
One side effect of FE model is that effects of time-invariant factors of the dependent variables 
(such as gender, education and distance variables) are not identified, as these time-invariant 
characteristics are perfectly collinear with the individual dummy, 𝛽𝑗𝑖. To get a sense of the 
correlations between OFE and time invariant characteristics, one can use the linear probability 
model (Eq. 2.11).  
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2.6 Results of Focal Person Approach17 
2.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In Appendices A-2 to A-7, I present some basic descriptive statistics of selected focal persons 
by self-selection for the years of 2004 and 2007 (the variable definition and sources are shown in 
Appendix A-1). In Appendices A-2 and A-3, I present the summary statistics of about 2,500 
household head focal persons.18 More than 95% were men, with average age around 47 to 49. In 
general, household heads are moderately educated. About 70% finished primary school or mid 
school, 10 to 12% completed high school, few have post-secondary degrees. Most household 
heads select “farming only” (46%) or “local OFE” (37 to 41%), while about 13 to 16% select 
migratory OFE. Through the migratory OFE is not the dominant occupational choice for 
household heads, its share increased from 2004 to 2007.  
In Appendices A-4 and A-5, I report the summary statistics of the spouse focal person. Of the 
approximately 2,400 spouses, more than 96% are female, with an average age around 46 to 49. 
Spouses of household heads are less educated than the heads (their partners). More than 30% of 
spouses did not finish primary school, about 53 to 57% finished primary school or mid school, 
few completed high school or higher. As for their occupational choices, spouses concentrate in 
“farming only” (about 74 to 76%). Local OFE is the second most selected, about 20 to22%. Few 
spouses select into migratory OFE. 
Appendices A-6 and A-7 contain descriptive statistics for the youngest working-age child of 
household heads (hereafter child focal persons). The child focal persons are almost equally 
                                                          
17 All statistical and econometric analyses were performed with Stata 13.0 software in the Canada Rural Economy 
Research Lab (C-RERL) of University of Saskatchewan. 
18 Note that, I have 808 households for 2004. Each household has a household head, so I have 808 household head 
focal persons in 2004. However, as some household heads cannot be classified as working-age labour force (e.g. age 
above 65), the sample size of household head focal persons is 725. The same for 2007 sample, from 2,024 household 
heads, 1,757 are in the labour force. 
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distributed in terms of gender, and they are the most educated focal person group in this study. 
Their average age is around 24 to 25. About 61 to 68% have finished mid school or high school; 
4 to 7% have college or university degrees. In terms of occupational choices, the majority of 
child focal persons select into “migratory OFE” (61%). “Farming only” and “local OFE” have 
about equal shares of 20% respectively.  
Overall, these descriptive statistics suggest two patterns: (1) different focal persons have 
distinctive individual average characteristics; and (2) different focal persons select into different 
occupational choices. These observations suggest that there is a correlation between individual 
characteristics and occupational choices. Spouse focal persons, mostly female, are more likely to 
work in farming only than the household head focal persons, mostly male. The child focal 
persons, mostly young and more educated, are more likely to work in migratory OFE than the 
household head focal persons and the spouse focal persons. Within each focal person group, 
migratory OFE workers are more likely to be male, young, and highly educated, while farming 
only workers are more likely to be female, senior, and less educated.  
In addition, some household and community characteristics seem to be correlated with 
occupational choices. Within each focal person group, the workers who select into farming only 
are more likely to come from the households with more land endowments. Migratory OFE 
participants are likely to come from the households with fewer preschool children. Local OFE 
participants are likely to come from the households with CCP member(s). Local OFE 
participants are more likely to come from communities with more village enterprises per 1000 
population. 
2.6.2 Results of Pooled Linear Probability and Fixed Effects Models 
In Tables 2-4, 2-5, and 2-6, I report the estimated coefficients for household head focal 
persons, spouse focal persons, and child focal persons, respectively. Further, for each table, 
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columns (2), (3), and (4) present the results of pooled linear probability models for farming only, 
local OFE, and migratory OFE, respectively, while columns (5), (6), and (7) present the results 
of corresponding FE model.  
2.6.2.1 Results for household head focal persons 
The pooled linear probability (PLP) results in column (2) in Table 2-4 suggest that the female, 
senior, and less educated household head focal persons are more likely to select into farming 
only. Female household head has about 19 percentage points greater probability of selecting into 
farming only than males. Senior household heads (ages 41 and 50) have about 12 percentage 
points greater probability of selecting into farming only than ages 21 to 40. Household heads 
with lower educational attainment always have higher probabilities of selecting into farming 
only. 
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2-4 suggest that the male, young, and more educated household 
head focal persons are more likely to select into local or migratory OFE. For example, male 
household heads have about 15 percentage points greater probability of selecting into migratory 
OFE than female. Household heads between 21 and 40 have 5-8 percentage points greater 
probability of selecting into local or migratory OFE than those ages between 41 and 50. Higher 
educational attainment is associated with a higher probability of selecting into local OFE. 
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Table 2-4. Regression results for household head  
 Pooled Linear Probability (PLP)  Fixed Effects (FE) 
Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE  Farm only Loc. OFE  Mig. OFE 
Male -0.188*** 0.04* 0.148***     
(0.058) (0.06) (0.027)     
Age between 21-30 -0.336*** 0.183*** 0.153***  0.156 -0.125 -0.031 
(0.044) (0.067) (0.048)  (0.166) (0.167) (0.139) 
Age between 31-40 -0.340*** 0.150*** 0.190***  -0.03 -0.002 0.032 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.03)  (0.113) (0.106) (0.097) 
Age between 41-50 -0.211*** 0.103*** 0.108***  -0.011 -0.003 0.014 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.022)  (0.066) (0.051) (0.057) 
Primary school -0.125*** 0.119*** 0.006     
(0.032) (0.028) (0.021)     
Mid school -0.157*** 0.148*** 0.009     
(0.033) (0.03) (0.024)     
High school -0.213*** 0.202*** 0.011     
(0.046) (0.048) (0.037)     
College or higher -0.486*** 0.237 0.249     
(0.069) (0.147) (0.169)     
Number of children -0.006 -0.003 0.009  0.029 -0.012 -0.017 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.022)  (0.03) (0.037) (0.032) 
Hhld female labour  -0.004 0.002 0.002  0.062** -0.033 -0.03 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.012)  (0.03) (0.028) (0.025) 
Hhld male labour  -0.017 0.003 0.014  -0.036 0.048 -0.012 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.014)  (0.046) (0.046) (0.034) 
Hhld entitled land 0.008*** -0.006** -0.003**  0.003 0.005* -0.008** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Having CCP member -0.013 -0.006 0.019  -0.088 0.017 0.071 
(0.044) (0.041) (0.03)  (0.099) (0.12) (0.073) 
Village enterprises  -0.005* 0.008*** -0.004***  0.005** -0.001 -0.004 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Distance to city -0.01 0.006 0.004     
(0.012) (0.011) (0.005)     
Wage of nearest city -0.020*** 0.025*** -0.005  0.001 -0.008*** 0.007*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Interaction term of 
distance and wage 
0.001 -0.001 0.0002     
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0003)     
Year 2007 0.094** -0.186*** 0.091***     
(0.039) (0.036) (0.027)     
Obs. 1882 1882 1882  1112 1112 1112 
R square 0.166 0.117 0.067  0.02 0.019 0.037 
* Sig. at 10%; ** sig. at 5%; *** sig. at 1%; Robust & township-clustered S. E. in Parentheses.  
The descriptive statistics and the definition of variables are shown in Appendix A. 
The dummy of “Age between 16-20” is omitted, as there is no observation with age between 16-20. 
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Table 2-5. Regression results for household head’s spouse 
 Pooled Linear Probability (PLP) Fixed Effects (FE) 
Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE  Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE 
Male 
 
-0.268*** 0.089 0.180***     
(0.076) (0.055) (0.061)     
Age between 21-30 
 
-0.142** 0.102 0.041  0.172 -0.212 0.04 
(0.062) (0.069) (0.034)  (0.146) (0.154) (0.117) 
Age between 31-40 
 
-0.103*** 0.078** 0.025  -0.076 0.049 0.026 
(0.036) (0.033) (0.017)  (0.084) (0.08) (0.053) 
Age between 41-50 
 
-0.080*** 0.069** 0.011  -0.129** 0.109** 0.02 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.015)  (0.05) (0.045) (0.027) 
Primary school -0.038 0.031 0.006     
(0.029) (0.026) (0.012)     
Mid school -0.132*** 0.099*** 0.034*     
(0.027) (0.024) (0.017)     
High school -0.323*** 0.221*** 0.102***     
(0.054) (0.039) (0.031)     
College or higher -0.420*** 0.430** -0.009     
(0.147) (0.172) (0.095)     
Number of children 0.017 0.005 -0.022**  0.059** -0.045* -0.013 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.009)  (0.025) (0.024) (0.013) 
Hhld female labour  0.023 -0.039* 0.017**  0.046* -0.044* -0.001 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.008)  (0.025) (0.022) (0.015) 
Hhld male labour  0.0001 -0.017 0.017**  -0.002 0.013 -0.01 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.008)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.013) 
Hhld entitled land 0.006* -0.005** -0.002***  0.005* -0.005* 0.0001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.0005)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Having CCP member 0.018 -0.003 -0.015  0.063 -0.067 0.004 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.011)  (0.061) (0.06) (0.01) 
Village enterprises  -0.007*** 0.007*** 0.0003  -0.003 0.004* -0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Distance to city -0.006 0.004 0.003     
(0.011) (0.01) (0.004)     
Wage of nearest city -0.019*** 0.022*** -0.003**  -0.004 0.003 0.001 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Interaction term of 
distance and wage 
0.00005 -0.0002 0.0001     
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0002)     
Year 2007 0.095*** -0.114*** 0.019     
(0.029) (0.032) (0.015)     
Obs. 1787 1787 1787  1064 1064 1064 
R square 0.152 0.131 0.063  0.044 0.046 0.004 
* Sig. at 10%; ** sig. at 5%; *** sig. at 1%; Robust & township-clustered S. E. in Parentheses.  
The descriptive statistics and the definition of variables are shown in Appendix A. 
The dummy of “Age between 16-20” is omitted, as there is no observation with age between 16-20. 
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Table 2-6. Regression results for head’s youngest working-age child 
 Pooled Linear Probability (PLP) Fixed Effects (FE) 
Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE  Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE 
Male 
 
-0.065*** 0.014 0.051*     
(0.023) (0.022) (0.027)     
Age between 16-20 
 
-0.016 -0.416* 0.432**  0.305 -0.655** 0.35 
(0.165) (0.225) (0.184)  (0.319) (0.266) (0.474) 
Age between 21-30 
 
-0.017 -0.363 0.380**  0.415 -0.571** 0.156 
(0.163) (0.223) (0.184)  (0.308) (0.244) (0.454) 
Age between 31-40 
 
-0.012 -0.255 0.267  0.29 -0.327 0.037 
(0.166) (0.225) (0.188)  (0.293) (0.244) (0.461) 
Age between 41-50 
 
0.19 -0.156 -0.034     
(0.189) (0.243) (0.218)     
Primary school -0.146** 0.075* 0.071     
(0.06) (0.044) (0.064)     
Mid school -0.277*** 0.122*** 0.155**     
(0.058) (0.042) (0.058)     
High school -0.316*** 0.053 0.263***     
(0.06) (0.045) (0.07)     
College or higher -0.385*** 0.013 0.372***     
(0.063) (0.064) (0.078)     
Number of children 0.021 0.076** -0.098***  -0.032 0.123** -0.09 
(0.025) (0.03) (0.036)  (0.054) (0.057) (0.064) 
Hhld female labour  -0.065*** -0.021 0.087***  0.024 0.022 -0.046 
(0.021) (0.019) (0.023)  (0.034) (0.034) (0.043) 
Hhld male labour  0.041* -0.042** 0.001  -0.007 -0.096 0.103 
(0.023) (0.019) (0.026)  (0.066) (0.061) (0.084) 
Hhld entitled land 0.004*** -0.002 -0.002  -0.005 0.002 0.003 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
Having CCP member -0.033 0.032 0.001  -0.018 0.055 -0.037 
(0.025) (0.029) (0.032)  (0.083) (0.075) (0.117) 
Village enterprises  0.0002 0.006*** -0.006**  -0.009 0.004 0.005 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
Distance to city -0.001 0.016 -0.015     
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012)     
Wage of nearest city -0.005 0.028*** -0.023***  -0.005 -0.005 0.010** 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Interaction term of 
distance and wage 
0.0002 -0.001* 0.001     
(0.001) (0.0007) (0.001)     
Year 2007 0.012 -0.138*** 0.126***     
(0.032) (0.037) (0.042)     
Obs. 1185 1185 1185  520 520 520 
R square 0.115 0.128 0.123  0.048 0.079 0.047 
* Sig. at 10%; ** sig. at 5%; *** sig. at 1%; Robust & township-clustered S. E. in Parentheses.  
The descriptive statistics and the definition of variables are shown in Appendix A 
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The effects of individual characteristics above are consistent with the literature and the 
theoretical predictions. The influence of gender is consistent with the current literature on the 
feminization of China’s agriculture (De Brauw et al. 2002; Zhang, De Brauw, and Rozelle 2004). 
Age and education results are likewise consistent with younger individuals being more likely to 
participate in migratory OFE, and higher education attainments garnering higher incomes in 
nonfarm sectors than the farm sector (Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo 1992; Taylor and Martin 2001; 
Hare 2002). The results also indicate that education contributes to higher income in the non-farm 
sector than that in the farm sector.  
Column (4) of Table 2-4 shows that the quantity of household entitled land19 has a negative 
highly statistically significant influence, decreasing the probability of selecting in migratory 
OFE. Further, this result continues to hold in column (7) of Table 2-4 (the FE model). The 
consistency of the Pooled Linear Probability (PLP) results and FE results shows that the estimate 
of household entitled land is robust to whether one adds controls for the individual time-invariant 
characteristics, supporting the theoretical prediction. That is, larger land endowment raises the 
opportunity cost of migratory OFE, thereby discouraging migratory OFE participation.  
As for the community characteristics, the PLP results show that they are highly significant 
and have the expected signs. Column (3) of Table 2-4 shows that having one more enterprise per 
1000 population in the local rural community significantly increases the probability of self-
selecting into local OFE and decreases the probability of self-selecting into farming only and 
migratory OFE. 
                                                          
19While several institutional changes made access to land more secure in the late 1990s, land entitlements should fall 
out of the Fixed Effects specification. However, land still can be appropriated by the village collective for residential 
and industrial use, thus resulting in changes in household land entitlements. I still treat land entitlement as 
exogenous, as this land conversion is a collective decision of the village, rather than the individual household. 
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The main prediction of the theoretical model is that higher levels of wage faced by migrants 
and local enterprises will reduce the probability of selecting farming only and increase the 
probability of selecting OFE (Eq. 2.1). To test these predictions, I use the average urban wage of 
the nearest city, 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 , the distance from the community to its nearest city, 𝐷𝑐𝑖 , and their 
interactive term, 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 𝐷𝑐𝑖 , to index local and migratory off-farm wages (as shown in Eq. 2.11). 
The estimates of the coefficients of 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  in farming only decision are significant and consistent 
with the theoretical prediction. As shown in column (2) of Table 2-4, the estimate of the 
coefficients of 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  is significant and negative, showing that �𝛼𝑓𝑙 + 𝛼𝑓𝑚�𝜌 < 0 in the pooled 
linear probability model in (Eq. 2.11) and the theoretical model (Eq. 2.1).  In column (2) of Table 
2-4, the estimate of the interactive term 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 𝐷𝑐𝑖  is not significant. To interpret these results, 
holding all else constant and 𝐷𝑐𝑖  at its average (50km, shown in Appendix A), having an increase 
of 1000 yuan in 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  decreases the probability of self-selecting into farming only, by about 2 
percentage points. 
The estimates of the coefficients of 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  in local OFE decision are significant and consistent 
with the theoretical prediction. As shown in column (3) of Table 2-4, the estimate of the 
coefficients of 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  is significant and positive, showing that (𝛼𝑙𝑙 + 𝛼𝑙𝑚)𝜌 > 0 in the PLP model 
in (Eq. 2.11) and the theoretical model (Eq. 2.1).  In column (3) of Table 2-4, the estimate of the 
interactive term 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 𝐷𝑐𝑖  is not significant. To interpret these results, holding all else constant and 
𝐷𝑐
𝑖  at its average (50km, shown in Appendix A), having an increase of 1000 yuan of 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  
increases the probability of self-selecting into local OFE, by about 2.5 percentage points.  
With respect to the FE results, column (6) of Table 2-4 show that, holding all else constant, a 
1000-yuan increase in 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  decreases the probability of selecting into local OFE by about 0.8 
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percentage points, suggesting that �𝛽𝑙𝑙𝜌 + 𝛽𝑙𝑚𝜌 − 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜏𝐷𝑐𝑖� < 0 in the FE model (Eq. 2.14). 
Further, it is equivalent to �𝛼𝑙𝑙𝜌 + 𝛼𝑙𝑚𝜌 − 𝛼𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜏𝐷𝑐𝑖� < 0 in theoretical model (Eq. 2.10). 
Combining this results with the PLP results in column (3), that is (𝛼𝑙𝑙 + 𝛼𝑙𝑚) > 0, one has 
𝛼𝑙𝑙 > 0, which is the expected results of the theoretical model (Eq. 2.1). 
Column (7) of Table 2-4 show that, holding all else constant, a 1000-yuan increase in 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  
increases the probability of selecting into migratory OFE by about 0.7 percentage points, which 
indicates that �𝛽𝑚𝑙𝜌 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝜌 − 𝛽𝑚𝑙𝜌𝜏𝐷𝑐𝑖� > 0 in the FE model (Eq. 2.14). Further, it is 
equivalent to �𝛼𝑚𝑙𝜌 + 𝛼𝑚𝑚𝜌 − 𝛼𝑚𝑙𝜌𝜏𝐷𝑐𝑖� > 0 in theoretical model (Eq. 2.10).  
2.6.2.2 Results for spouse focal persons 
In general, the PLP results for spouse focal persons are consistent with the findings from 
household head focal persons. The results show that the female, senior, and less educated 
workers are more likely to select into farming only and less likely to select into local or 
migratory OFE. Household land endowment, the number of enterprises of the local rural 
community, and urban wage in the nearest city are all consistent with results described above for 
household heads.  
As expected, the PLP results of the spouse focal person in column (4) Table 2-5 show that, 
holding all else constant, having one more preschool child in the family significantly decreases 
the probability of selecting into migratory OFE by about 2 percentage points. Additionally, the 
FE results in column (5) of Table 2-5 show that, holding all else constant, increasing the number 
of preschool child in a household by one significantly increases the probability of selecting into 
farming only by about 6 percentage points. Note that, these results support the theoretical 
predictions, that is, having more preschool children in the family increases the opportunity costs 
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and also the Hukou costs of migratory OFE, thus decreasing participation in migratory OFE and 
increase the probability of selecting into the competing occupations (farming only).  
The PLP results in column (4) of Table 2-5 show that having an additional female work force 
member in family significantly increases the probability of selecting into migratory OFE, as 
predicted. As shown in literature as well as in descriptive statistics, female workers are more 
likely to work in the farm sector than male workers. Therefore, workers with more female labour 
force members, even spouses, may have a lower opportunity cost of selecting into migratory 
OFE.  
As for the estimates of local and migratory off-farm wage variables (indexed by 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 , 𝐷𝑐𝑖 , and 
their interactive term, 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 𝐷𝑐𝑖  ), the results of household spouse focal persons are consistent with 
the household head results. For example, the PLP results suggest that the coefficient of 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  in 
farming only decision is negative and the coefficient of 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  in local OFE decision is positive.  
Additionally, the household spouse focal person results reveal some new findings. For 
example, the PLP results of spouses show that the coefficient of 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  in migratory OFE decision 
is negative, indicating that (𝛼𝑚𝑙 + 𝛼𝑚𝑚)𝜌 < 0 in the PLP model in (Eq. 2.11). In column (3) of 
Table 2-5, the estimate of the interactive term of distance and wage is not significant. To 
interpret these results, holding all else constant and 𝐷𝑐𝑖  at its average (50km, shown in Appendix 
A), having an increase of 1000 yuan of 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  increases the probability of self-selecting into 
migratory OFE, by about 0.3 percentage points. 
2.6.2.3 Results for child focal persons 
The results of child focal persons are also consistent with the previous findings. The results 
indicate that female, senior, and less educated workers are more likely to select into farming only 
and that the male and more educated are more likely to select into local or migratory OFE. 
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Moreover, the number of preschool children and female labour force members of the household, 
the land endowment, the number of enterprises of the local rural community are all playing 
expected roles.  
Notably, the child focal person results also bring some interesting findings. Although still 
significant, the coefficient of the gender variable is much smaller. This result is consistent with 
the literature. Liang and Chen (2004) and Zhang, De Brauw, and Rozelle (2004) document 
reduced gender inequality in OFE in China’s labour markets and find that women have 
participated in OFE at rates equaling or surpassing those of their male counterparts.  
The PLP results in column (3) and (4) of Table 2-6 show that having higher education (high 
school or above) significantly increases the probability of selecting into migratory OFE, rather 
than local OFE, indicating that there might be a significant gap of net income returns to higher 
education between distant agglomerations and the local rural communities. This may be due both 
to wage differentials and to education-related migration costs. For example, Zhao (1997) argues 
that higher education plays a significant role in facilitating rural-urban migration in China as it 
raises the accessibility of urban formal employment to rural people. 
As for the PLP estimates of 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 , the results of household youngest child focal persons are 
consistent with previous findings in the household head focal person results and spouse results . 
For example, The PLP results show that the coefficient of 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  in local OFE decision is positive 
and in migratory OFE decision is negative, confirming that (𝛼𝑙𝑙 + 𝛼𝑙𝑚)𝜌 > 0 and (𝛼𝑚𝑙 +
𝛼𝑚𝑚)𝜌 < 0 in the PLP model in (Eq. 2.11).   
Additionally, the FE results suggest that an increase of the urban wage 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  increases the 
probability of selecting into migratory OFE, which is consistent with the household head focal 
person results, suggesting that �𝛼𝑙𝑙𝜌 + 𝛼𝑙𝑚𝜌 − 𝛼𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜏𝐷𝑐𝑖� < 0 in theoretical model (Eq. 2.10). To 
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interpret this result, holding all else constant, a 1000-yuan increase in 𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖  increases the 
probability of selecting into migratory OFE by about 1 percentage points. 
Last, as shown in the theoretical framework, I use the interaction term of distance and the 
nearest city’s wage, 𝐷𝑐𝑖𝜔𝑐,𝑡𝑖 , to approximate the wage gap between local and migratory OFE. In 
column (3) of Table 2-6, the results show that a larger wage gap between local and migratory 
OFE decreases the probability of self-selecting into local OFE, indicating that –𝛼𝑙𝑙𝜌𝜏 < 0 in 
equation (Eq. 2.11) which is equivalent to 𝛼𝑙𝑙 > 0. The estimated result is consistent to the 
theoretical prediction shown in equation (2.1). To interpret this results, holding all else constant, 
if a worker’s community is located 1km farther away from its nearest city, which has the average 
urban wage 18,000 yuan/per year (as shown in Appendix A), the probability of self-selecting into 
local OFE will decrease by about 2 percentage points. 
2.6.2.4 Robustness checks 
My first robustness check is to examine if the focal person results of PLP model are sensitive 
to different regression models. Specifically, for each type of focal persons, I estimate a pooled 
Logit and a pooled Probit model. The estimates are shown in Table B-1, Table B-2, and Table B-
3. The results are very similar to those for the linear probability model. For example, the 
individual characteristics (gender, age, education) and the household characteristics (the number 
of young dependent and land entitlement) are consistent with those findings in PLP model. The 
regression results of urban wage and the intersection term of distance and urban wage are 
significant and also consistent with previous findings.  
Second, to check whether the focal person results of PLP model and FE model are sensitive to 
different samples, I apply the PLP model and FE model to all household members. The estimates 
are shown in Table B-4. After the comparison to the results of focal person approach, I find that 
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the regression results for all household members are consistent with the previous findings, with a 
notable minor difference. Some variables are not significant in the regression results of all 
household members, while they are in the focal person approaches. For example, in the FE 
results of all household members, the household land entitlement and the number of preschool 
children are not significant factor for farming only and local OFE, while they were significant in 
the focal person results. 
Last, I check whether our results are sensitive to alternative specifications of the Logit model 
and Probit model. Instead of using dichotomous Logit and Probit models, I use the pooled 
Multinomial Logit model and Multinomial Probit model for each type of focal persons. The 
estimates are shown in Table B-5, Table B-6, Table B-7. Generally, these results are completely 
consistent with those of the dichotomous Logit and Probit models. 
2.7 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Using data collected from rural households in five provinces in China, this chapter examines 
the characteristics associated with rural Chinese workers’ self-selection into farming only, local 
OFE, and migratory OFE for the years of 2004 and 2007.  
My results show the importance of individual characteristics in different self-selection 
patterns. The highly educated, young, and male workers are more likely to select into migratory 
OFE, while the less educated, senior, and female workers are more likely to select into farming 
only. Moreover, the estimates also show that having higher educational attainment increases the 
probability of migratory OFE relative to local OFE, confirming that high educational attainments 
may yield higher net earnings in distant agglomerations than in local rural communities.  
Household-level characteristics are important in the following ways. Having more preschool 
children or fewer female labour force members in the household reduces the probability of an 
individual’s self-selection into migratory OFE. Additionally, the FE results of young workers 
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strongly confirm that having more preschool children in the family increases the probability of 
an individual’s self-selection into local OFE, suggesting that providing care for young 
dependents may be the reason why some young rural workers choose local OFE over migration.  
In the literature on China, connections to local political power have been proven to be 
significant determinants of local OFE participation (Cook 1998; Yao 1999b; Xia and Simmons 
2004; Guang and Zheng 2005; Zhou 2011). However, these effects have not been found in this 
study. The results show that having CCP member in the family is not significant determinant of 
local OFE participation, suggesting that the local institutions may play a marginal role in off-
farm labour allocation in rural China. 
 Lastly, consistent with the literature (De Brauw et al. 2002), I confirm that the market-based 
driving forces (e.g. average off-farm wages) play key roles in OFE growth. For example, the 
results show that an increase in off-farm wages increases the probability of selection into OFE 
and decreases the probability of selection into farming only. The larger the off-farm wage gap 
between local OFE and migratory OFE (reflected by the interactive term of distance variable and 
urban wage variable), the smaller is the probability of self-selection into local OFE. Most 
notably, FE results show different “total” or “net” marginal effects of the urban wage growth of 
the nearest city on the probability of selecting in migratory and local OFE participation—an 
increase of urban wage significantly increases the probability of selecting into migratory OFE 
and decrease the probability of selecting into local OFE.  
This study contributes the literature of development economics by theoretically modelling and 
empirically characterizing the dynamics of rural labour use changes during China’s transition to 
an industrial and urban based economy, improving our understanding of the nature of China’s 
economic transformation. My findings have some policy implications for China’s future 
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development and urbanization aspirations. First, as the young, highly educated, and male rural 
workers are continuously leaving from the rural areas and the agricultural sectors, China’s rural 
and agricultural economy may face some challenges in the future, such as agricultural 
feminization, lack of knowledge, and lower investment.  
Second, the results show that household domestic good provision is still a significant 
constraint to labour migration for China’s rural young workers. Having a new-born child is a 
significant constraint that makes people stay home rather than participate in migratory OFE. 
Therefore, offering reliable social services in the rural areas as well as in migration destinations 
for them, e.g. providing more health services for elderly and disabled, building up more child 
care facilities, may help to stabilize and foster current progress in industrialization and 
urbanization.  
Lastly, the empirical results confirm that a decrease in migration costs will significantly 
increase migratory OFE. The presence of the Hukou restrictions has created regulatory migration 
costs for rural-urban migrants, thus discouraging migration. Although the Hukou system may 
represent a barrier to the required rural-urban migration and an obstacle for urbanization, 
removing it may create other problems. Given the huge rural-urban income gap in China, 
eliminating the Hukou system would lead to a massive increase in population flows to urban 
areas, exacerbating the overpopulation problem of current cities and undermining China’s social 
stability. To balance China's urbanization and stability goals, a gradual and selective reduction of 
Hukou barrier may hold promise. In practice, scholars and policy makers have suggested several 
possible ways of carrying out the Hukou reform. To find the best way of going forward, a careful 
cost-benefit analysis of all the options is needed. A cost benefit analysis should take into account 
the costs of expanding the urban-based social welfares (e.g. public school, health care, social 
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security) and the benefits of efficiency gains from effective allocation of labour. In addition the 
incidence of those costs and benefits must be articulated.  
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3. SELF-SELECTION INTO OFE LINKAGES TO LAND CONSOLIDATION 
Urbanization, agricultural growth, and food self-sufficiency are all important for China’s 
transportation. Chapter 2 shows that individual and household characteristics are important in the 
self-selection into of individuals into local OFE, migratory OFE, and farming only. For example, 
the highly educated, young, and male rural workers of China are more likely to select into 
migratory OFE, while the less educated, senior, and female rural workers of China are more 
likely to select into farming only. The disproportionate selection of highly educated young men 
into migratory OFE may present obstacles to the development of China’s agricultural sector, as 
these migratory OFE participants are the most likely agricultural innovators.  
The histories of developed countries show that rural-urban migration (analogous to the OFE 
of China) led to more mechanization and capital intensive farming, as well as land consolidation 
(Hathaway 1960). That is, due to the relatively high cost of labour, other factors, such as land 
and capital, were substituted for labour. This was evident in a “recombination” of land resources 
and increases in the land-labor ratio. Economies of scale were realized as farm operations 
became larger. Improvements in mechanization, technology, and management facilitated the 
transition to commercial and modernized agriculture. However, in the case of China, farm land 
consolidation cannot occur through the ownership transfers of land due to its collective land 
ownership, so it remains an open question whether larger farm operations will develop following 
the decline in agricultural labour force.  
In China, agriculture is an economically, politically, and socially important sector that 
policymakers cannot afford to ignore. Agriculture plays an important role in the economic 
development of China. A modern and efficient agricultural sector can produce low cost food for 
industrial workers. Manufactured goods can then be produced and can be exported and earn 
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foreign exchange to help finance imports of the required key technology packages and capital 
equipment (Huang, Otsuka, and Rozelle 2008). Moreover, given China’s population size and 
growing food demands, a decrease or stagnation in agricultural production would increase food 
prices and raise concerns about food security, negatively affecting economic development in 
general. In the future, if China’s agriculture continues to consist of small-scale subsistence 
farming without major new investments, there is a risk of a widening income gap between farm 
and non-farm population, undermining the political and social stability. For a successful 
economic transformation, China must find a path where urban, rural non-farm and agricultural 
economies can grow together. 
In Chapter 4, one aspect of the agriculture sector’s structural change is addressed by explicitly 
examining the degree to which farm operations have become consolidated through rental 
arrangements, given that sales are not possible. Specifically, the impact of the urban wages on 
the consolidation of farm operations is examined, along with other potential determinants. In the 
absence of the ownership transfers of land, the market-based land use right transfers through land 
rental markets may be the way in which the farm households of China respond to the pull of 
rising urban wages. Evidence of the consolidation of farming operations will be a positive 
indication that modernization of agriculture, at least in the form of larger operations, can proceed 
in China even within the existing land tenure system. 
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4. URBAN WAGES AND CONSOLIDATION OF FARMS OPERATIONS IN CHINA 
4.1 Introduction 
China’s agriculture has been dominated by a large number of small-scale farms since the 
egalitarian distribution of land beginning in the end of 1970s. In 2006, more than 80 percent of 
China’s farms were less than 0.6 ha (Tan et al. 2013). Not being able to take advantage of 
economies of scale, small-scale farmers have difficulties making productivity-enhancing 
investments (Wan and Cheng 2001), such as specialized machines (Yang et al. 2013), and in 
using productive inputs such as financial services, technical assistance, and output marketing 
services (Hazel et al. 2007). Therefore, one may argue that China’s agriculture has a great 
potential for growth through the consolidation of farm operations, that is, the concentration of 
agricultural land into larger operational units.  
In currently developed countries, agricultural land consolidation historically occurred through 
existing farms buying up additional land from other farms (Hathaway 1960; Heady and Sonka 
1974; Peterson and Brooks 1993). However, given the fact that agricultural land in China is 
collectively owned and is equally distributed as entitlements1, consolidation of farm operations 
through land ownership transfers cannot occur. Thus, consolidation of farm operations in China 
can occur only through the transfer of land use rights through rental arrangements. For purposes 
of this study, then, “land consolidation” will be used to refer to the concentration of agricultural 
land into larger farm operations through market-based rental or leasing agreements among 
farmers. 
                                                          
1 The Household Responsibility System (HRS) was gradually implemented between the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
According to the HRS, individual farmers have only land-use and residual income rights to their entitled land, while 
ownership remains with the collective (Dong 1996; Kung 2000). Collective ownership refers to the communal rights 
and equality in the agricultural land resources of a village for all its members (Wang et al. 2011b). 
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There is some evidence that the massive out-migration of China’s rural labour from the 
agricultural sector has put pressure on agricultural productivity improvement (Rozelle, Taylor, 
and De Brauw 1999; Taylor, Rozelle, and De Brauw 2003). That is, agricultural labour out-
migration implies a negative “lost labour” effect in agriculture. To overcome this negative effect, 
China’s agricultural production must substitute capital for labour. That is, if labour becomes the 
relatively more expensive factor of production then mechanization should occur. Further, the 
needed mechanization imply a larger land base (land consolidation) to realize economies of 
scale. Moreover, from the demand side, the industrialization and urbanization of China has raised 
concerns about whether the country’s small-scale agriculture can meet the food demands of an 
increasingly rich and urbanized population (Zhang, Mount, and Boisver 2004; Chen 2007). For a 
successful economic transformation, China needs to find a path where urban, rural non-farm and 
agricultural economies can grow together. Land consolidation may help achieve this balance 
through facilitating the realization of economies of scale in agriculture and the needed 
productivity-enhancing investment.  
Beyond the important policy implications, it has been a long-standing academic interest of 
development economists to understand how China’s agriculture may adjust to the competitive 
pressures from the industrial sector, given its non-market context. Increased land tenure security 
and greater tolerance of rental or leasing arrangements since the late 1990s may have facilitated 
the consolidation of farm operations. That is, while land entitlements cannot change, market 
forces are clearly operating through the rental market, opening up the possibility of land 
consolidation analogous to what has happened in developed market economies. Though there is 
an extensive and growing literature which analyses how China’s agricultural sector is changing 
at the micro level (Wu and Meng 1997; Rozelle, Taylor, and De Brauw 1999; Taylor, Rozelle, 
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and De Brauw 2003; Zhang, De Brauw, and Rozelle 2004; De Brauw and Rozelle 2008; Zhu et 
al. 2012), relatively little is known about land consolidation at the village or regional level.  
The objective of this chapter is to first provide empirical evidence of land consolidation in 
China’s agriculture and, second, to investigate its determinants, with a particular emphasis on the 
role of the opportunity cost of farm labour (urban wage). The remainder of this chapter is 
organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents a literature review. Section 4.3 introduces the data, 
followed by Section 4.4, which provides of an overview of the consolidation of farm operations 
in China through rental arrangements. In Section 4.5, the theoretical model of the determinants 
of land consolidation is presented. The empirical implementation follows in Section 4.6 with 
results in Section 4.7, and conclusions and policy implications in Section 4.8.  
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 The Land Institutions of China 
Before the late 1970s, China’s agriculture was organized in a communal system and farmland 
was operated collectively by production teams, usually consisting of a group of neighboring 
households (Dong 1996). Within a production team, all members worked collectively and 
claimed a share of the output. The production of a team is supervised by a monitor. It was 
expected that the more a member contributes to the team production, a higher share he/she can 
claim after.  
Due to the high monitoring costs and the free-rider problem of the commune system, farm 
workers have low incentive for agricultural production (Lin 1988). In the early 1980s, the 
commune system was replaced by the household responsibility system (HRS). During the reform 
era of the HRS, production teams were abolished and the agricultural land was distributed to 
individual households as entitlements in a substantially egalitarian fashion. Though agricultural 
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land is still collectively owned, individual households have the land use and residual income 
rights to their entitled land. 
Until the late 1990, this egalitarian distribution of agricultural land entitlement was reinforced 
by administrative land re-allocations, which were undertaken by the local officials. For example, 
due to the increasing nonfarm use of land and population change (death, birth, marriage, or 
migration), different households had different access to land resources. In order to maintain 
equal distribution of land entitlement among households, most Chinese villages redistributed 
land up to the late 1990s (Putterman 1992; Dong 1996; Liu, Carter, and Yao 1996; Kung 2000; 
Kung 2002). Through these administrative land re-allocations, families with lower land-to-labour 
ratios gained land, while families with higher land-to-labour ratios returned parts of their land to 
the village collective. This administrative land re-allocation has been described as a major threat 
to land tenure security (Brandt, Rozelle, and Turner 2004), and as retarding the development of 
China’s rural land rental markets, since it raises the transaction costs in the land rental market 
(Turner, Brandt, and Rozelle 1998; Liu, Carter, and Yao 1998; Kimura et al. 2011; Deininger 
Jin, and Xia 2012).  
In the late 1990s, China’s central government gradually banned administrative land re-
allocation and legalized private market-based farmland rental transfers (Prosterman, 
Schwarzwalder, and Ye 2000; Prosterman, Li, and Zhu 2006; Wang et al. 2011b). In 2003 China 
implemented the Rural Land Contracting Law (RLCL) and the administrative land re-allocation 
was officially banned. These institutional changes make land tenure more secure. Wang et al. 
(2011b) find that the frequency of agricultural land reallocation has decreased significantly in 
Chinese villages since 1998. Also more secure land tenure in China has considerably reduced the 
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transaction costs in the land rental market, thus improving its functioning (Deininger and Jin 
2005). 
4.2.2 Lewis Turning Point and Rising Farm Labour Costs 
In the wake of China’s market-oriented reforms starting in the late 1970s, the urban sector and 
rural non-farm sector have grown dramatically (Borensztein and Ostry 1996; Zhu 2012). The 
fast-growing non-agricultural sectors provide off-farm employment opportunities at wage rates 
higher than the returns to labour in agriculture (Yang and Zhou 1999; Yao 1999a; Fan, Zhang, 
and Robinson 2003; Cai and Du 2011), pulling hundreds of millions of rural workers out of 
agriculture (Zhao, 1999b; De Brauw et al. 2002; Dong, Bowles, and Chang 2009; Cai and Wang 
2010; Chan Forthcoming).  
The continuous labour out-migration from agriculture decreases the supply of rural labour, 
and the opportunity cost of farm labour begins to rise. In Lewis (1954), this stage of the 
economic development is called the Lewis turning point. For China, the literature shows the 
economy has passed the Lewis turning point since 2003 and the opportunity cost of farm labour 
(or off-farm wage) has increased dramatically (Zhang, Yang, and Wang 2010; Cai and Du 2011; 
Fleisher, Fearn, and Ye 2011; Li et al. 2012). 
4.2.3 Determinants of Land Consolidation 
While few studies have focused on land consolidation in Chinese agriculture, the literature is 
extensive for developed countries where most development trajectories are characterized by a 
transition from small-scale subsistence farming to consolidated large-scale farming. With 
industrialization and growth in the non-farm sectors, wages in manufacturing increased relative 
to what could be earned in farming (Lewis 1954). Alston and Hatton (1991) find that, in the early 
1930s, the gap between farm and factory earnings in the U.S. increased dramatically. This gap 
between farm and non-farm sectors has been considered the major driver of agricultural labour 
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out-migration and the resulting increases in farm size (Lewis 1954; Hathaway 1960; Harris and 
Todaro 1970; Mundlak 1978; Mundlak and Strauss 1978; Barkley 1990). In regard to the U.S. in 
the1950s and 60s, Hathaway (1981, p. 780) writes that “as a result of low returns in agriculture, 
new entrants in commercial agriculture declined” and “the number of workers, both family and 
hired, employed in agriculture continued to decline.” Further, Hathaway (1960, p. 386) finds that 
“the farms that have disappeared … were the smaller, less-productive farms”, implying that the 
land consolidation as a result of out-migration was selective.  
After 1980, despite reduced wage differentials between farm and nonfarm sector, the pace of 
land consolidation in U.S. agriculture continued, due to the increasing role of technological 
innovations and the supply-chain-based reductions in transaction costs (MacDonald, Korb, and 
Hoppe 2013). Innovations in equipment, chemical, seeds, tillage practice, and information 
technology reduce the amount of labour required for field operations, allowing larger operations 
(Olmstead and Rhode 2001, Bechdol, Gray, and Gloy 2010; MacDonald, Korb, and Hoppe 
2013). Innovations that make labour supervision easier and reduce diseconomies of scale of large 
farm operations may continue to make large farms attractive (Deininger and Derek 2012). 
A number of other factors have also contributed to larger farms. Drabenscott (1999) and 
Ahearn, Korb, and Banker (2005) argue that the supply chains play a critical role in the more 
recent wave of land consolidation in U.S agriculture. For example, supply chains are highly 
effective at ensuring high-quality consumer products and minimizing risk, and prefer to 
concentrate agriculture production in specific places and coordinating with fewer and larger 
rather than many small farm operations.  
Land consolidation patterns and determinants in currently developed countries may not be 
directly transferable to China. First, the labour out-migration from agriculture in China is not the 
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same as that of U.S. where the exit is permanent and the migrant takes up full residence in the 
urban areas, without any continuing involvement in farming. Chinese farmers’ participation in 
non-farm production, also termed “off-farm employment” (OFE), has been characterized as 
“partial” and “temporary” (Hare 1999; Zhao 1999b; Hare 2002; Chang, Dong, and MacPhail 
2011). Since migrant retain their rural Hukou and cannot (with exceptions) obtain urban Hukou, 
they retain their land entitlements and are not able to access social services for themselves or 
their families in urban areas. As a result family members are often left behind in rural areas, 
ensuring that the ‘migration’ to urban areas is temporary or partial. Second, due the collective 
land ownership in China, land consolidation through the transfers of ownership cannot occur. 
Farmers cannot sell their entitlement of land as part of their exit from farming, and thus farms 
wishing to expand operations cannot buy up the land of those leaving the sector. Thus land 
consolidation in China, if it occurs at all, will have to be of a different form. 
In China, as in other countries, relatively high urban wages are clearly a motivation for the 
massive, though temporary, rural to urban migration. Similarly, the loss of farm labour will 
decrease farm labour supply. As a result, in order to reduce costs of production, agricultural 
household may shift from labour-intensive production to more land-intensive and/or capital-
intensive production. With more secure land tenure and more liberalized land rental markets after 
1990s, farms may be able to respond to the increasing opportunity cost of farm labour 
(represented by off-farm wage) by consolidating farm operations through the rental market. As 
the off-farm wage outpaces the marginal value product of labour in agricultural production, 
farmers that can access OFE have an incentive to rent out their land (Kung 1995; Deininger and 
Jin 2005; Jin and Deininger 2009). To remain competitive, other farmers (with fewer OFE 
opportunities or higher productivity in farming) will expand their farm size by renting in land, 
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thereby increasing productivity with land resources concentrating into larger operational units 
(Deininger and Jin 2005; Jin and Deininger 2009). 
4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Source of Data 
The primary data for this study were collected by the Centre for Chinese Agricultural Policy, 
Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing, China (CCAP). Two rounds of surveys2 were 
conducted: one in April of 2005 and one in April of 2008. These surveys focused on the years 
2004 and 2007, respectively.  
The first survey (CCAP rural household survey, 2005) was conducted in a randomly selected, 
nationally representative sample of 101 rural communities in five provinces (Jiangsu, Sichuan, 
Shaanxi, Jilin, and Hebei). The sample provinces were randomly selected from each of China’s 
major economic zones3. To reflect accurately varying income distributions within each province, 
one county was selected randomly from within each income quintile for the province, as 
measured by the per capita gross value of industrial output (Figure 4-1). The same procedure was 
used in the selection of the townships. Two townships were selected randomly within each 
county, and two communities were selected randomly within each township. Finally, the survey 
teams used community rosters to randomly choose eight households holding residency permits 
(Hukou) in each village. In total, 808 households were included in the survey (Table 4-1). 
                                                          
2 The data collection involved students and staff from the Centre for Chinese Agricultural Policy and a group of 
masters and Ph.D. students from a number of other agricultural universities. Households were paid 20 yuan and 
given a gift in compensation for the time that they spent with the survey team. I participated in collecting the data in 
the second survey. 
3 Jiangsu was selected to represent China’s most developed southeast coastal area (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, 
Shanghai, Fujian and Guangdong); Sichuan represents the southwest area (Sichuan, Yunnan, Tibet, Guizhou and 
Guangxi); Shaanxi represents the northwest (Shaanxi, Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang); 
Hebei represents north and central provinces (Hebei, Henan, Shanxi, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi); Jilin 
represents the north-eastern provinces (Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang). 
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Figure 4-1. Sample provinces and counties 
Table 4-1. Sample distribution 
Province County Township Village  
2004  2007 
 Household Individual  Household
 a Individual 
Jiangsu  5 10 20  160 644  401 (142) 1637 
Sichuan  5 10 20  160 688  400 (125) 1752 
Shaanxi  5 10 20  160 685  400 (129) 1765 
Jilin  5 10 21  168 606  421 (137) 1550 
Hebei  5 10 20  160 644  402 (149) 1623 
Total  25 50 101  808 3267  2024 (682) 8327 a The number in the parentheses refer to the households which were visited by both survey years. 
Source: Author’s calculation using the CCAP rural household survey, 2005 and 2008. 
 
For the second survey (CCAP rural household survey, 2008), the same households that had 
been surveyed in 2005 were again visited. Following the same sampling technique, the survey 
team increased the household sample size to 20 per community (the original eight survey 
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households plus 12 other households randomly chosen from the 2008 community rosters). In 
total, I have observations on 682 households for both years. Including replacement, the second 
round survey included a total of 2,024 households and 8,328 individuals (Table 4-1).  
During the survey, enumerators used pre-coded forms (consisting of two main parts: a multi-
topic household survey and a community-level surveys) to collect a wide range of information 
about the communities, the households, and individuals. In the community survey form, 
enumerators mainly asked the respondents (usually party secretaries and/or the accountants of 
the communities) about community characteristics in 2004 and 2007, such as resource bases, 
labour use patterns, income sources, transportation conditions, and geographic characteristics. 
In the household survey, household information was collected including demographics, 
education, production activities (farming and off-farm work), past off-farm work experience, on-
farm labour, land endowments, and land rental transfers. For the household’s past participation in 
off-farm work, an eight-year past off-farm work history between 1997 and 2004 was completed 
for each household labour force member in the 2005 survey; a two-year past off-farm work 
history for 2005 and 2006 was completed for each household labour force member in the 2008 
survey. 
The geographic/distance information was collected from Google Maps (2012). For each 
sample community, I find its nearest city by using the electronic map of Google Maps (2012) 
and measure the distance from the centre of the community to the centre of the city. The urban 
wage, collected from the China City Statistical Yearbook (CNBS 2005; 2008), is defined as “the 
average annual wage of the urban residents (with urban Hukou) who live in the core area of the 
community’s nearest city”.  
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4.3.2 Characteristics of Farm Operations and Farmland Rental Decisions  
Table 4-2 presents the basic descriptive statistics for farm operations from the CCAP rural 
household survey, including their land entitlements, the size of their farm operations, and land 
rental transfers they were involved in. Almost all surveyed households (more than 96%) have 
some entitled land, that is, non-zero land entitlement. These rural households are synonymous 
with “household farm operators;” even households who have left farming and rent out all of their 
entitled land are still “household farm operators”, as they still collect rents and earn incomes 
from their entitled land.  
Table 4-2. Summary of land distribution and land rental transfers 
 
 
2004  2007 Mean Std. dev.  Mean Std. dev. Number of hhld observations: 795   1942  
Land entitlement (mu) 7.488 6.268a  7.727 7.557
a 
  With land entitlement % 97.61%   96.24%  
      
% of hhlds who rented in land  11.07%   19.58%  
   a. from community (% hhlds) 6.04%   11.48%         Area of rented-in land (mu) 7.065 10.003  5.750 6.674    b. from the other hhlds (% hhlds) 5.03%   8.65%         Area of rented-in land (mu) 3.34 3.925  6.916 7.883       
Percentage of rented-out hhlds % 4.15%   7.72%         Area of rented out land (mu) 4.542 7.168  4.374 5.122       
The size of land operation (mu) 7.894 6.885  8.648 8.720 a Note that the large value of standard deviation of land entitlement is largely caused by the large differences of 
households across communities. The land entitlement difference within communities is small. 
Source: Author’s calculation using the CCAP rural household survey, 2005 and 2008. 
 
 
On average, the household farm operators have entitled land of 7.5-7.7 mu (approximately 0.5 
hectares). Through land rental markets, the household farm operators can rent out their entitled 
land to other households or/and the village collectives, and they can rent in land from other 
households or/and the village collectives. From 2004 to 2007, the share of the household farm 
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operators who rented in land from village collectives increased from 6 to 11%, the share of the 
household farm operators who rented in land from other operators increased from 5 to 9%, and 
the share of the household farm operators who rent out land increased from 4 to 8%. Thus the 
rural land rental market was growing, which is consistent with the findings by Deininger and Jin 
(2005). 
In Figure 4-2, Panels (a) and (b) show the scatterplots of the size of household land 
entitlement and the size of household farm operations for 2004 and 2007, respectively. 
Observations falling on the diagonal solid line represent the household farm operators who 
operate the same amount of land as their entitlement. The observations above the diagonal are 
the household farm operators who operate more land than their entitlements (the renting-in 
household farm operators), while observations below the diagonal are household farm operators 
who operate less land than their entitlements (the renting-out household farm operators). Note 
that both land entitlement and land operations are those of the household farms.  
4.4 Measuring Land Consolidation 
The Histogram in Figure 4-3 is a way of representing whether farm operations have become 
more consolidated from 2004 to 2007. Panel (a) shows that the share of the small-size household 
farm operations (with land operations less than 2 mu) increased from 12% to 16%, the share of 
the medium-size household farm operations (with land operations greater than or equal 2 mu but 
less than 18 mu) decreased from 80% to 61%, and the share of the large-scale household farm 
operations (with land operations greater than or equal 18 mu) increased from 8% to 13%. The 
increases in the share of the small household farm operations, the absence of medium-size 
household farm operations and the increases in the share of large household farm operations 
suggests that the agricultural land is concentrating into larger operational units, that is, land 
consolidation had occurred between 2004 and 2007.  
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Figure 4-2. Household farmland operation and entitlement in 2004 and 2007   
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Figure 4-3. Distribution of farm operators in 2004 and 2007  
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Using the same data set, kernel density curves4 for 2004 and 2007 respectively are shown in 
Panel (b) of Figure 4-3. The density curve of 2007 has a fatter tail on the right hand side than in 
2004, reinforcing the evidence that the share of the large-size farms was increasing, confirming 
land consolidation.  
Rather than using a household approach, I use village level approach, as the latter is a more 
direct way to examine how land consolidation develops. A household-approach may yield 
information about the participation rate of land rental transaction of individual households, and 
which kind of households is likely to rent out/in land. However, a household-level approach will 
not reveal the land distribution among households, which is a collective outcome. A village level 
study, on the other hand, can examine the collective outcomes of the net land rental transfers in a 
region. It can show whether and how the constituent renting in and out of agricultural land is 
resulting in the consolidation of agricultural operations in a village. 
The Lorenz curve is a convenient summary graphical device to compare the divergence 
between the equal size of land entitlements (an egalitarian distribution) and the actual size of 
farm operations between 2004 and 2007. The Lorenz curve is constructed as follows. For a given 
year, one has the farmland data of n household farm operations. All of the household farm 
operators are ranked in increasing order by their land operations, 𝐴1 ≤ 𝐴2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝐴𝑛, where 𝐴𝑖 
is the land operation of household farm operator h. The Lorenz curve is defined at the points ℎ/
𝑛, 𝑖 = 0, … ,𝑛, by 𝐿(0) = 0 and 𝐿(ℎ/𝑛) = 𝑆ℎ/𝑆𝑛, where 𝑆ℎ = 𝐴1 + ⋯+ 𝐴ℎ. Thus the Lorenz 
curve consists of a cumulative land operation share of sorted household farm operations on the y-
axis plotted against a cumulative share of the farm households on the x-axis, also equal to the 
cumulative share of the land entitlements assuming equal entitlements. 
                                                          
4 Kernel density estimation is a non-parametric way to estimate the probability density function of a random 
variable. I chose a bandwidth of 1 mu to produce the kernel density curves. 
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Figure 4-4 shows the Lorenz curves for the 2004 and 2007, where the diagonal solid line 
represents the situation where all households operate exactly the amount of land that is their 
entitlement. The more the Lorenz curve bows away from the line of perfect equality, the more 
unequal (consolidated) is the distribution of the farm operations. In Figure 4-4, the long dash 
Lorenz curve (2007) bows farther away from the diagonal line than the short dash one (2004), 
confirming that the distribution of land operations in 2007 is more distant from the perfectly 
equal (entitlement) benchmark than in 2004, signifying that more land consolidation has 
occurred. 
 
 
Figure 4-4. Consolidation of farm operations in 2004 and 2007: Lorenz curves  
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The degree of land consolidation in a community, shown by the Lorenz curves in Figure 4-4, 
can be summarised by a Gini index5 (Wunderlich 1958). In this context, the Gini index is used to 
measure inequality of land operations relative to equal land entitlement. It varies between zero 
and one, where zero is a perfectly equal distribution of land among the household operators in a 
community (every household operates the same amount of land equalling to its entitlement). A 
value of one would indicate that all of the land in a community is operated by a single household, 
that is, complete consolidation.  
In Figure 4-5, using a highly simplified depiction, I demonstrate how the Gini index is 
constructed and how it would reflect the level of land consolidation in China’s setting. If each 
household farm operator operates the amount of land they are entitled to (an idealized perfectly 
egalitarian farming system), the Lorenz curve is the straight line AC in Figure 4-5. The more the 
actual Lorenz curve bows away from the line of perfect equality (AC), the more unequal is the 
distribution of the land operations in the community. The size of the area between the Lorenz 
curve and the line of perfect equality (AC) represents the degree of inequality of household farm 
operations. The Gini index is the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of 
perfect equality, and the total area of the triangle formed by the two axes and the line of perfect 
equality (ABC). If land operations are perfectly equal to the households’ (equal) entitlements, the 
Lorenz curve falls along AC, the Gini index is zero. If households AD rent out their land to 
group DB, the land operations in the community have become more consolidated, and the Lorenz 
curve shift from AC to ADC, and the Gini index is equal to the shaded area ADC/ABC. As more 
households rent out their land, D will shift to the right, leading to greater consolidation, and a 
larger Gini index.  
                                                          
5 The Gini index dates back to 1912 when it was formulated by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini.  
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Figure 4-5. The Gini index of land consolidation within a community  
Empirically, I construct the community-level Gini index as:  
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐 = 2∑ 𝑖𝐴ℎ𝑛𝑐ℎ=1
𝑛𝑐 ∑ 𝐴ℎ
𝑛𝑐
ℎ=1
−
𝑛𝑐+1
𝑛𝑐
         (4.1) 
where 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐 = Gini index for community c; 
 𝑛𝑐 = the total number of household farm operators in c; 
 ℎ = the rank of a household farm operator. Household farm operators in c are ranked 
in increasing order by size of their land operations; 
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 𝐴ℎ = the size of the land operations of household farm operator h; 
As shown in Eq. (4.1), to obtain an accurate Gini index for a community, one needs data for 
the land operations of all households in the community. Unfortunately, I do not have a complete 
data for the community. Instead, I have a randomly-selected and community-representative 
household data (Table 4-1). The community’s Gini index is thus approximated by using the 
sample data. In 2004 survey, a community has 8 randomly selected household farm operators on 
average; in the 2007 survey, the average is 20. Based on the assumption that those selected 8 or 
20 household farm operators are representative of all household farm operators in the 
community, Eq. (4.2) is used to approximate 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐. That is, 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎
𝑐 = 2∑ 𝑖𝐴ℎ𝑚𝑐ℎ=1
𝑚𝑐 ∑ 𝐴ℎ
𝑚𝑐
ℎ=1
−
𝑚𝑐+1
𝑚𝑐
         (4.2) 
where 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑐  = approximated Gini index of land operations for community c; 
 𝑚𝑐 = the total number of surveyed and community representative household farm 
operators in c; 
 𝑖 = the rank of a household farm operator. Selected household farm operators in the 
community c are ranked in increasing order by the size of their land operations; 
 𝐴ℎ = the size of the land operation of household farm operator h; 
The approximated Gini index (as shown in Eq. 4.2) tends to be a downward-biased measure if 
the household sample size is small (Deltas 2003). A small sample adjustment is necessary. 
Following Deltas (2003), I use an adjusted Gini index, 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑐 , which is defined as 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑗
𝑐 = 𝑚𝑐
𝑚𝑐−1
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎
𝑐          (4.3) 
Table 4-3 presents the summary statistics of adjusted Gini indexes. As shown in Table 4-3, 
the average value of 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑐  increases from 0.260 to 0.352 from 2004 to 2007, indicating that 
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the household farm operations became more dissimilar from the equal entitlements, evidence of 
land consolidation. The same trend is apparent for each of the five provinces. 
Table 4-3. The community-level adjusted Gini, by provinces, 2004 and 2007 
Province Number of communities 
 2004  2007 
 Mean Std. dev.  Mean Std. dev. 
Jiangsu 20  0.287 0.133  0.373 0.140 
Sichuan 20  0.329 0.154  0.383 0.104 
Shaanxi 20  0.289 0.095  0.352 0.096 
Jilin 21  0.318 0.162  0.419 0.217 
Hebei 20  0.267 0.087  0.328 0.072 
Total 101  0.298 0.130  0.371 0.137 
Source: Author’s calculation using the CCAP rural household survey, 2005 and 2008. 
 
4.5 Theoretical Model 
In this section, I construct a theoretical model of land consolidation in a community. 
Considering a community c with 𝑛𝑐 household farm operators (𝑛𝑐 is large), I assume that all 
household farm operators in c are equally endowed with household6 labour time 𝐿�𝑐 27F7 and land 
entitlement ?̅?𝑐. 
The household farm operator can earn income from farming, land rental and off-farm work. 
Following Barnum and Squire (1979) and Singh, Squire, and Strauss (1986), I construct a neo-
classical household model. In the model, all the family members’ resources of a household, such 
as labour time, land, and income, are pooled within the household as constraints, and all 
household members follow a unitary decision-making process and act collectively to maximize 
joint family income subject to constraints.  
Household farm operator h will choose 𝑙𝑎ℎ and 𝐴ℎ by solving the maximization problem: 
                                                          
6 “Household” in the theoretical model refers to “combination of all household members”.  
7 The household labour time refers to the sum of discretionary marketable labour time of all household labour force 
members after excluding time spent on necessary activities such as eating, sleeping and personal time, and time 
spent on non-market activities such as domestic work and leisure. 
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max𝑙𝑎ℎ,𝐴ℎ 𝑝𝑐 𝑓(𝑙𝑎ℎ,𝐴ℎ) + 𝑤(𝑍ℎ)(𝐿�𝑐 − 𝑙𝑎ℎ ) + 𝑟𝑐(?̅?𝑐 − 𝐴ℎ)     (4.4) 
where  𝑝𝑐 = the price of farm outputs of community c; 
 𝑓(𝑙𝑎ℎ,𝐴ℎ) = household agricultural production function; 
 𝑤(𝑍ℎ) = the off-farm wage rate of h’s household labour; 
 𝑍ℎ = h’s human capital endowment, related to average education and past off-farm 
work experience. For numerical convenience, it is assumed that 𝑍ℎ in 
community c follows a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 
  𝑙𝑎ℎ = labour used in farming; 
  𝐴ℎ = land operation of h; and 
  𝑟𝑐 = the land rental rate of the local land rental market of community c.  
The household farm operators are heterogeneous with respect to their off-farm income 
earning abilities. Specifically, I assume that, for household farm operator h with 
characteristics 𝑍ℎ, its off-farm wage rate (or opportunity cost of household farm labour) is 
𝑤(𝑍ℎ) = 𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ         (4.5) 
where 𝜔𝑐 = the unskilled off-farm labour wage accessible to all farm households in rural 
community c. 
The optimal choices of 𝑙𝑎ℎ
∗,𝐴ℎ∗ will either satisfy the first order conditions (FOC):  
𝑝𝑐𝑓𝑙𝑎ℎ(𝑙𝑎ℎ,𝐴ℎ) = 𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ        (4.6) 
𝑝𝑐𝑓𝐴ℎ(𝑙𝑎ℎ,𝐴ℎ) = 𝑟𝑐  
or locate at one of the following two boundary points:  
𝑙𝑎
ℎ∗ = 0 and 𝐴ℎ∗ = 0; or         (4.7) 
𝑙𝑎
ℎ∗ = 𝐿�𝑐 and 𝐴ℎ∗ = 𝐴(𝑝𝑐, 𝑟𝑐,𝜔𝑐,𝑍ℎ, 𝐿�𝑐)        (4.8) 
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Next, I nest the neo-classical agricultural household model (4.4) into a community-level land 
rental market equilibrium framework8. In the land rental market equilibrium framework, I 
assume that agricultural output prices, 𝑝𝑐, and input prices of labour, 𝜔𝑐, are exogenously 
determined, while land rental rate 𝑟𝑐 is endogenously determined within the community. That is, 
the land rental rate in c is an endogenous “equilibrium” price at which supply and demand of 
rental land in the local market are in balance. Note that, because 𝑛𝑐 is large, the land rental rate 
𝑟𝑐 is still exogenous for individual household farm operators, and the assumptions of micro-level 
household model (4.4) still hold. 
Each household farm operator has three alternative labour allocation choices: allocating 
household labour in farming only, allocating household labour in farming and off-farm work, 
allocating labour in off-farm work only. Therefore, without losing generality, I define the 
farming only household as the subgroup 𝑛1𝑐, the farming and off-farm households as the 
subgroup 𝑛2𝑐 , and off-farm only household as the subgroup 𝑛3𝑐 . Therefore, one has: 
𝑛1
𝑐 + 𝑛2𝑐 + 𝑛3𝑐 = 𝑛𝑐 
For a farming only household, ℎ ∈ 𝑛1𝑐, its optimal labour allocation choice is at boundary 
point (4.7), indicating that its marginal labour income from farm production is higher than that 
from off-farm work. For farming and off-farm household, ℎ ∈ 𝑛2𝑐 , its optimal labour allocation 
choice is at FOC (4.6), indicating that its marginal labour income from farm production equals 
that from off-farm employment. For the off-farm employment only household, ℎ ∈ 𝑛3𝑐 , its 
optimal labour allocation choice is at boundary point (4.8), where the marginal labour income 
                                                          
8 The neo-classical household model is limiting in that it assumes that all markets are perfect and all goods and 
factors are tradable between a community and the outside world (Taylor and Dyer 2009). However, land resources 
are highly localized, immobile, and with high geographic dispersion. Therefore, I assume that the land rental 
markets in rural China for each community are highly localized and that lessors and lessees are the residents of the 
same community.  
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from farm production is less than the off-farm employment wage. 
Further, given 𝑝𝑐, 𝜔𝑐, 𝜃, 𝑟𝑐, and 𝛼, it is assumed that 𝑛2𝑐 ≠ ∅. That is, there exists at least one 
household farm operator, ℎ′, with characteristics 𝑍ℎ′ ∈ [0, 1], in the community, satisfying FOC 
(6)9. That is, 
𝑝𝑐𝑓𝑙𝑎ℎ�𝑙𝑎
ℎ∗,𝐴ℎ∗� = 𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ′         (4.9) 
𝑝𝑐𝑓𝐴ℎ�𝑙𝑎
ℎ∗,𝐴ℎ∗� = 𝑟𝑐         (4.10) 
For sake of simplicity, I assume that all household farm operators in community c use the 
same agricultural technology, which in Cobb-Douglas function form: 
𝑓(𝑙𝑎ℎ,𝐴ℎ) = 𝑙𝑎ℎ𝛼𝐴ℎ1−𝛼 where 0 < 𝛼 < 1 
Therefore, (4.9) and (4.10) implies that 
𝑝𝑐𝑓𝑙𝑎ℎ�𝑙𝑎
ℎ∗,𝐴ℎ∗� = 𝑝𝛼𝑙𝑎ℎ∗𝛼−1𝐴ℎ∗1−𝛼 = 𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ′      (4.11) 
𝑝𝑐𝑓𝐴ℎ�𝑙𝑎
ℎ∗,𝐴ℎ∗� = 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑎ℎ∗𝛼𝐴ℎ∗−𝛼 = 𝑟𝑐      (4.12) 
From (4.9) and (4.10), one has 
 𝐴
ℎ
𝑙𝑎
ℎ = [𝜔𝑐+𝜃𝑍ℎ′ 𝑝𝛼 ] 11−𝛼 = [(1−𝛼)𝑝𝑟𝑐 ]1𝛼        (4.13) 
Representing the model graphically (shown in Figure 4-6) is a useful starting point to 
illustrate how land consolidation occurs.  
                                                          
9 There are two extreme cases in which 𝑛2𝑐 = ∅. One is that farming is so profitable that no household in community 
c participates in off-farm production or 𝑝𝑐𝑓𝑙𝑎ℎ(𝐻𝑐𝐿�𝑐 ,𝐻𝑐?̅?𝑐) > 𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃 𝑍ℎ for any h. The other one is that the OFE 
wage is so high that no household in community c work on the farm, 𝑝𝑐𝑓𝑙𝑎ℎ(1,𝐻𝑐?̅?𝑐) < 𝜔𝑐 (that is, even if all the 
land of the community c were operated by one unit of labour, the marginal labour productivity still less than 𝜔𝑐).  
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Figure 4-6. Theoretical model  
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First, the characteristics of household farm operators in community c, 𝑍ℎ, follows a uniformly 
distribution between 0 and 1. As a result, their opportunity costs of farm labour (represented by 
their accessible off-farm wages), 𝑤(𝑍ℎ), follows a uniformly distribution between 𝜔𝑐 and 
𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃. As discussed above, ℎ′ has equalized marginal labour income between farming and off-
farm work. As all households use the same technology in farming, one has  
Faming only household farm operator group:  𝑛1𝑐 = �ℎ�0 ≤ 𝑍ℎ < 𝑍ℎ′�  
Faming and off-farm household farm operator group: 𝑛2𝑐 = �ℎ�𝑍ℎ = 𝑍ℎ′�  
Off-farm only household farm operator group:  𝑛3𝑐 = �ℎ�𝑍ℎ′ < 𝑍ℎ ≤ 1�  
Therefore, the Gini index of community c is,  
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐 = 1 − 𝑍ℎ′           (4.14) 
Next, to solve 𝑍ℎ′, the market clearing condition of the local farmland rental market requires:  
𝑟𝑐 = 𝑓𝐴ℎ�∑ 𝑙𝑎ℎ∗𝐻ℎ=1 , 𝑛𝑐?̅?𝑐� = 𝑓𝐴ℎ�𝑛𝑐𝑍ℎ′ 𝐿�𝑐,𝐻𝑐?̅?𝑐�     (4.15) 
With Eq. (4.11), one has  
𝑛𝑐?̅?𝑐
𝑛𝑐𝑍ℎ
′
𝐿�𝑐
= [(1−𝛼)𝑝𝑐
𝑟𝑐
]1𝛼 = [𝜔𝑐+𝜃𝑍ℎ′
𝑝𝑐𝛼
] 11−𝛼       (4.16) 
With two equations and two unknowns (𝑍ℎ′and 𝑟𝑐) in Eq. (4.16), one can solve  
𝑍ℎ
′ = 𝑧(𝑝𝑐,𝜔𝑐,𝜃, ?̅?𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
,𝛼)  
Further, combined with equation (4.14), one has  
 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐 = 1 − 𝑧(𝑝𝑐,𝜔𝑐,𝜃, ?̅?𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
,𝛼)         (4.17) 
Based on the theoretical model above, the following propositions are submitted (the proof is 
shown in the Appendix C): 
1. 𝑑𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑐
𝑑𝜔𝑐
> 0. The higher the unskilled off-farm wage, the higher value of the Gini 
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index (more consolidation); 
2. 𝑑𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑐
𝑑𝑝𝑐
< 0 . The higher 𝑝, the lower value of the Gini index (less consolidation); 
3. 𝑑𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑐
𝑑
𝐴�𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
< 0 . The higher land-to-labour ratio, the lower value of the Gini index 
(less consolidation). 
Based on the theoretical model (Eq. 4.17) and propositions (1), (2) and (3) above, for each 
time period t, the theoretical model can be written in a linear function: 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑐 = 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐 + 𝛾1𝜔𝑡𝑐 − 𝛾2𝑝𝑡𝑐 − 𝛾3(?̅?𝑐𝐿�𝑐)𝑡       (4.18) 
where 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑐 = the Gini index of community c in time period t; 
 𝛾𝑡 = a time specific constant term; 
 𝛾𝑐 = the community-specific constant term for community c. Note that this variable 
can remove the effect of all time-invariant characteristics from the independent 
variables, including observable and the unobservable characteristic; 
 𝜔𝑡𝑐 = the unskilled off-farm wage rate of community c in time period t; 
 𝛾1 = marginal effects of 𝜔𝑡𝑐. Note that, 𝛾1> 0; 
 𝑝𝑡𝑐 = the agricultural output price of community c in time period t; 
 𝛾2 = marginal effects of 𝑝𝑡𝑐. Note that, 𝛾2> 0; 
 (?̅?𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
)𝑡 = the land-to-labour ratio of community c in time period t; and 
 𝛾3 = marginal effects of (?̅?𝑐𝐿�𝑐)𝑡 . Note that, 𝛾3>0; 
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4.6 Empirical Implementation 
4.6.1 A Change-to-Change Model of Land Consolidation 
Our empirical model strictly follows the theoretical model (4.18). The empirical 
implementation involves obtaining data or estimates for theoretical variables in Eq. (4.18), 
including 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑐, 𝜔𝑡𝑐, 𝑝𝑡𝑐, and (?̅?𝑐𝐿�𝑐)𝑡. Based on the data, these variables are constructed as follows. 
The dependent variable, 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑐, is constructed as  
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑐 = 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑡𝑐           (4.19) 
where  𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑡𝑐  = the adjusted Gini index of community c in time period t, as shown Eq. 
(4.3); and 
 𝑡 = year 2004 or 2007. 
The independent variable 𝜔𝑡𝑐, the unskilled off-farm wage that is accessible in c in year t, is 
constructed as: 
𝜔𝑡
𝑐 = 𝜌𝜔𝑢,𝑡𝑐 − 𝜑𝐷𝑢𝑐 + 𝜋𝐸𝑡𝑐         (4.20) 
where:  𝜔𝑢,𝑡𝑐  = the average annual wage of the urban residents in community c’s nearest city 
in year t. “Urban resident” is defined by having urban Hukou status.. 
Considering that rural migratory off-farm workers in the cities do not have the 
urban Hukou, 𝜔𝑢,𝑡𝑐  is treated as an exogenous variable; 
 𝐷𝑢𝑐 = the distance from c to its nearest city; and 
 𝐸𝑡𝑐 = the number of enterprises
 per 1,000 labourers of c in year t where enterprises 
refers to businesses in the non-farm sector, both manufacturing and services. 
As shown in Eq. (4.20), the accessible unskilled off-farm labour wage for workers in 
community c, 𝜔𝑡𝑐, is an increasing function of 𝜔𝑢,𝑡𝑐  (𝜌 > 0). That is, if the urban wage of c’s 
nearest city increases by 1 unit, holding all other factors constant,  𝜔𝑡𝑐 is expected to increase by 
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𝜌. Cai and Du (2011) find that the average wage rate of rural-urban migrant workers is 88.2% of 
the wage of the workers with urban Hukou in those cities. 𝜔𝑡𝑐 is a decreasing function of the 
distance between community c and its nearest city, 𝐷𝑢𝑐(𝜑 > 0). 𝜑 is used to index all forms of 
distance-related transaction costs, including information transfer costs about urban job 
opportunities, cultural and linguistic differences, psychic costs of migration, as well as simply 
transport costs from migration or commuting. Higher distance costs will erode the wage of the 
workers. 𝜔𝑡𝑐is an increasing function of 𝐸𝑡𝑐 (𝜋 > 0). That is, the accessible unskilled off-farm 
wage in a community increases with the number of enterprises.  
The functional form of the agricultural output price of community c is defined as: 
𝑝𝑡
𝑐 = 𝑝𝑡 − 𝛿𝐷𝑢𝑐          (4.21) 
where 𝑝𝑡= the average price of agricultural produce in year t (same for all communities); 
As shown in Eq. (4.21), 𝑝𝑡𝑐 is a decreasing function of 𝐷𝑐 (𝛿 > 0), showing that communities 
that are closer to cities have a higher farm output prices, due to lower transportation costs.  (?̅?𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
)𝑡 is constructed as: (?̅?𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
)𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡𝑐             (4.22) 
where 𝑎𝑡𝑐= the average amount of agricultural land per labourer of 𝑐 in year t; 
Based on empirical implementation of (4.19), (4.20), (4.21), and (4.22), the theoretical model 
(4.18) can be written in a linear function: 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑡𝑐 = 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐 + 𝛾1�𝜌𝜔𝑢,𝑡𝑐 − 𝜑𝐷𝑢𝑐 + 𝜋𝐸𝑡𝑐� − 𝛾2(𝑝𝑡 − 𝛿𝐷𝑢𝑐) − 𝛾3𝑎𝑡𝑐 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡  (4.23) 
Further simplifying (4.23), one has 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑡𝑐 = 𝛽0,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐 + 𝛽1𝜔𝑢,𝑡𝑐 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑡𝑐 − 𝛾3𝑎𝑡𝑐 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡      (4.24) 
where 𝛽0,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑝𝑡; 
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 𝛽𝑐 = 𝛾𝑐 − 𝛾1𝜑𝐷𝑢𝑐 + 𝛾2𝛿𝐷𝑢𝑐 ; 
 𝛽1 = 𝛾1𝜌, note that 𝛽1 > 0; 
 𝛽2 = 𝛾1𝜋, note that 𝛽2 > 0; and 
 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 = the error term.  
Further, given two waves of observations of years 2004 and 2007, one can transform (4.24) 
into a change-to-change model by taking the differentiation between these two years  
∆𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑗
𝑐 = ∆𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝜔𝑢𝑐 + 𝛽2∆𝐸𝑐 − 𝛾3∆𝑎𝑐 + 𝜀𝑐     (4.25) 
where  ∆𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑐 = 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑗,2007𝑐 − 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑗,2004𝑐 ; 
  ∆𝛽0 = 𝛽0,2007 − 𝛽0,2004; 
 ∆𝜔𝑢𝑐 = 𝜔𝑢,2007𝑐 − 𝜔𝑢,2004𝑐 ; 
 ∆𝐸𝑐 = 𝐸2007𝑐 − 𝐸2004𝑐 ; 
 ∆𝑎𝑐 = 𝑎2007𝑐 − 𝑎2004𝑐 ; and 
 𝜀𝑐 = 𝜀𝑐,2007 − 𝜀𝑐,2004.  
To interpret Eq. (4.25), according to propositions (1), it is expected that 𝛽1 > 0 and 𝛽2 > 0. 
That is, having higher urban wages in the nearest city (𝜔𝑢,𝑡𝑐 ), or having more enterprises (𝐸𝑡𝑐) in 
community c imply higher accessible off-farm wages in c (𝜔𝑡𝑐), thus increasing 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑡𝑐 , by way 
of increasing farm land consolidation through the rental market. According to the propositions 
(3), it is expected that 𝛾3 > 0. That is, having higher land-to-labour ratio in c decreases 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑡𝑐 , 
as the incentive to consolidate will decrease where larger land tracts are already present.  
Therefore, the main prediction of the theoretical model, which has been reflected in the 
empirical model, is that in communities with access to higher off-farm employment wages 
(higher wages in the nearest city, smaller distances to the nearest city more local OFE 
opportunities in village enterprises), land consolidation will occur to a greater extent. For 
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example, given higher wages in the non-farm sector, households with better access to OFE are 
likely to give up farming, rent out their land, and fully engage in non-farm production. To remain 
competitive, other households may rent in land and expand their farm size by renting in land, 
thereby increasing the labour productivity. As a result, land consolidation occurs. This is 
especially true in terms of responses to higher urban wages since migratory OFE (in the city) 
requires the absence of this labour from the farm and therefore provides the greatest incentive to 
rent out. 
4.6.2 A Change-to-Change Model of Household Land Rental Decisions 
As a robustness check to the main findings regarding community-level land consolidation, I 
also examine the individual household decisions regarding land rentals, which would lead to 
more or less land consolidation. In the theoretical model (shown in Figure 4-6), within a 
community, the difference among households is due to different household characteristics (Zh) as 
shown as Eq. (4.5) above, which may affect their land rental decisions. Within a community, the 
development of the land rental market that is necessary for land consolidation relies on 
characteristics that differentiate households in their willingness to decrease or expand the size of 
their existing (entitled) operations. In Figure 4-6 households within the same village facing 
higher off-farm wages (greater Zh) are more likely to rent out land, while households facing 
lower off-farm wage (lower Zh) are more likely to rent in land. It is important to test the validity 
of this prediction, as it plays a key role in explaining how land consolidation of a community 
develops within a community. 
The land input demand function of a household farm operator is shown in Eq. (D.2).  
𝐴ℎ
∗ = 𝐴(𝑝𝑐,𝜔𝑐, ?̅?𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
,𝑍ℎ)         (D.2) 
where  𝑑𝐴
ℎ∗
𝑑(𝑝𝑐) > 0,  𝑑𝐴ℎ∗𝑑�𝐴�𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
�
> 0, and 𝑑𝐴ℎ∗
𝑑�𝑍ℎ�
< 0. 
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The derivation of Eq. (D.2) is shown in Appendix D. Further the directions of marginal 
effects of variable 𝑝𝑐,𝜔𝑐, ?̅?𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
,𝑍ℎ have been shown in Appendix D. 
Given a fixed amount of land entitlement, 𝐴ℎ����, if the land input demand, 𝐴ℎ∗, is greater than 
𝐴ℎ����, then household will rent in land. If 𝐴ℎ∗ is less than 𝐴ℎ����, then household will rent out land. 
The amount of land transfers will be the difference between 𝐴ℎ∗and 𝐴ℎ����.  
Using the same empirical implementation methods – shown in (4.20), (4.21), and (4.22) – into 
(D.2), I propose the following empirical model for land rental decisions:  
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡
ℎ = 𝛾0,𝑡𝑖𝑛 + 𝛾ℎ𝑖𝑛 + 𝛾1𝑖𝑛𝜔𝑢,𝑡𝑐 + 𝛾2𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑐 + 𝛾3𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑡𝑐 + 𝛾4𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑐 − 𝛾5𝑖𝑛𝑍𝑡ℎ − 𝛾6𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑡ℎ���� + 𝜇𝑡𝑖𝑛  (4.26) 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡
ℎ = 𝛾0,𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛾ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑜𝑢𝑡𝜔𝑢,𝑡𝑐 + 𝛾2𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑐 + 𝛾3𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑡𝑐 − 𝛾4𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑐 + 𝛾5𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑍𝑡ℎ +  𝛾6𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐴𝑡ℎ���� +
𝜇𝑡
𝑜𝑢𝑡            (4.27) 
where t= year 2004 or 2007; 
 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ = rented-in land of h in period t as a share of total land operation; 
 𝛾0,𝑡𝑖𝑛  = time specific constant term for rent-in model; 
 𝛾ℎ𝑖𝑛 = household-specific constant term for rent-in model. Note that this variable can 
remove the effect of all time-invariant characteristics from the independent 
variables, including observable and the unobservable characteristic; 
 𝑍𝑡ℎ = the household human capital characteristics, including the average years of 
education of household members; dummy variables of household’s labour 
force members’ experience in off-farm work (local or migratory) in past two 
years (= 1 if Yes, 0 if No). Note that, “local” refers to off-farm employment 
(OFE) in non-farm sectors while living at home, while “migratory” refers to 
off-farm employment in urban centre, thus not living at home (rural area). 
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Households with higher levels of average education or with local or migratory 
off-farm work experience (higher 𝑍𝑡ℎ) are expected to be paid at higher wage 
rates in off-farm work; 
 𝜇𝑡𝑖𝑛 = the error term;  
 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ = rent-out land as a share of total entitled land for h in period t; 
 𝛾0,𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡 = time specific constant term for rent-out model; 
 𝛾ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 = household-specific constant term for rent-out model; and 
 𝜇𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡 = the error term.  
After taking the differentiation between 2004 and 2007, one has:  
∆𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛ℎ = ∆𝛾0𝑖𝑛 + 𝛾1𝑖𝑛∆𝜔𝑢𝑐 + 𝛾3𝑖𝑛∆𝐸𝑐 + 𝛾4𝑖𝑛∆𝑎𝑐 − 𝛾5𝑖𝑛∆𝑍ℎ −  𝛾6𝑖𝑛∆𝐴ℎ���� + ∆𝜇𝑖𝑛 (4.28)  
∆𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ = ∆𝛾0𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑜𝑢𝑡∆𝜔𝑢𝑐 + 𝛾3𝑜𝑢𝑡∆𝐸𝑐 − 𝛾4𝑜𝑢𝑡∆𝑎𝑐 + 𝛾5𝑜𝑢𝑡∆𝑍ℎ +  𝛾6𝑜𝑢𝑡∆𝐴ℎ���� + ∆𝜇𝑜𝑢𝑡 
            (4.29)  
where  ∆𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛ℎ = 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛2007ℎ − 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛2004ℎ ; 
  ∆𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ = 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡2007ℎ − 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡2004ℎ ; 
  ∆𝛾0𝑖𝑛 = 𝛾0,2007𝑖𝑛 − 𝛾0,2004𝑖𝑛 ; 
  ∆𝛾0𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝛾0,2007𝑜𝑢𝑡 − 𝛾0,2004𝑜𝑢𝑡 ; 
  ∆𝑍ℎ = 𝑍2007ℎ − 𝑍2004ℎ ; 
  ∆𝐴ℎ���� = 𝐴2007ℎ������� − 𝐴2004ℎ�������; 
  ∆𝑎𝑐 = 𝑎2007𝑐 − 𝑎2004𝑐 ;  
 ∆𝜇𝑖𝑛 =𝜇2007𝑖𝑛 − 𝜇2004𝑖𝑛 ; and 
 ∆𝜇𝑜𝑢𝑡 =𝜇2007𝑜𝑢𝑡 − 𝜇2004𝑜𝑢𝑡 .  
According to the theoretical model, the signs of 𝛾1𝑖𝑛 and 𝛾3𝑖𝑛 and the signs of 𝛾1𝑜𝑢𝑡 and 𝛾3𝑜𝑢𝑡 
are undetermined. On the one hand, higher off-farm wages in a community (represented by high 
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𝜔𝑢,𝑡𝑐  or 𝐸𝑡𝑐) “directly” decrease the land input demand because of higher labour input cost in 
farming, thus decreasing 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ and increasing 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ (direct effect of wage). On the other 
hand, higher off-farm wages in a community (represented by high 𝜔𝑢,𝑡𝑐  or 𝐸𝑡𝑐) “indirectly” 
decreasing the land rental rate (shown in Eq. 4.13), thus increasing 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ and decreasing 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡
ℎ (indirect effect of wage). 
In equations (4.28) and (4.29), it is expected that the coefficients of the community’s land-to-
labour ratio are positive for rent-in model and is negative for rent-out model, that is,  𝛾4𝑖𝑛 > 0 and 
𝛾4
𝑜𝑢𝑡 > 0. An increase of the land-to-labour ratio of a community decreases the land rental rate 
of the community. With a lower land rental rates, the households who want to increase their farm 
size may rent in more land, while the household who plan to rent out land may reduce their land 
rental supply to the market. Note that the proof is shown in proposition 6 in Appendix D. 
It is expected that the coefficients of the household-level off-farm income-earning ability 
index (𝑍ℎ) are negative for rent-in model and is positive for rent-out model, that is,  𝛾5𝑖𝑛 > 0 and 
𝛾5
𝑜𝑢𝑡 > 0. Facing higher labour wage in OFE (higher value of 𝑍ℎ), the households tend to send 
more labour for OFE and leave less labour for farming. As a result, with higher value of 𝑍ℎ, the 
households who want to increase their farm size may rent in less land because of the lack of 
household farm labour, while the households who plan to rent out land may supply more land to 
the market. Note that the proof is shown in proposition 7 in Appendix D. 
4.7 Results 
4.7.1 Results of Land Consolidation Model  
Column (2) of Table 4-4 presents the results of the change-to-change Gini model (Eq. 4.25). 
In general, the results support the theoretical predictions.  
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Table 4-4. Determinants of the community-level adjusted Gini index 
 
Change-to-
change model 
Pooled OLS 
2004 & 2007 OLS 2004 OLS 2007 
Urban wage in the nearest city, 
1000¥/yr  
0.01188*** 0.01098*** 0.00167 0.01304*** 
(0.00196) (0.00361) (0.00723) (0.00408) 
Distance to the nearest city, 
100km  
 0.09157*** 0.12165*** 0.0785* 
 (0.03215) (0.02736) (0.04417) 
# of enterprises per 1,000 
labourers in community 
0.00097* 0.00075 0.00142* 0.00045 
(0.00058) (0.00047) (0.00081) (0.0005) 
Land-to-labour ratio of the 
community, mu/person  
-0.00776** -0.02004*** -0.02057*** -0.02047*** 
(0.00391) (0.00417) (0.00505) (0.00505) 
Provincial dummy: Sichuan 
 
 0.07731** 0.03578 0.09079** 
 (0.03136) (0.0539) (0.03831) 
Shaanxi 
 
 0.03066 -0.05215 0.05866 
 (0.03679) (0.05715) (0.0474) 
Jilin 
 
 0.14971*** 0.09054* 0.17275*** 
 (0.03585) (0.05221) (0.04551) 
Hebei  0.01317 -0.0043 0.02005 
 (0.02561) (0.04202) (0.03217) 
Year Dummy (year 2007)  0.00474   
 (0.02792)   
Constant 0.17808*** 0.13152** 0.26649** 0.09426 
(0.03453) (0.0596) (0.11749) (0.09102) 
Sample size 101 202 101 101 
R square 0.334 0.355 0.261 0.349 
Robust standard errors in Parentheses; 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%; 
All the OLS results have been weighted by the number of valid household observations that used to construct the Gini 
index of the community (Appendix E); 
The descriptive statistics and the definition of variables are shown in Table F-1 in Appendix F; 
I also ran models with the lagged wage as an explanatory variables but it was insignificant and therefore dropped, as 
there did not seem to be a long delay in the response to higher urban wages. 
 
The coefficient of the urban wage growth of the community’s nearest city from 2004 to 2007 
is positive and highly statistically significant, suggesting that 𝛽1 > 0 in Eq. (4.25). At the mean 
change in urban wages from 2004 to 2007 of 6.305 thousand yuan (shown in Table F-1 in 
Appendix F), the estimated coefficient of the wage change variable suggests that the predicted 
change in Gini would be 0.075. This is a very large impact since the mean Gini is 0.26 in 2004 
(shown in Table F-1 in Appendix F). In Figure 4-5, having a 0.075 increase in Gini index in a 
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community means 7.5% more households in this community rented out their land and left 
agriculture from 2004 to 2007. 
In addition, the results show that having one more enterprise per 1,000 labourers in the 
community increases the adjusted Gini index by 0.001, which indicates that 𝛽3 > 0 in Eq. (4.25). 
At the mean change in the number of enterprises from 2004 to 2007 of 0.62 (shown in Table F-1 
in Appendix F), the estimated coefficient suggests that the predicted change in Gini would be 
0.00062. This is a small impact since the mean Gini is 0.26 in 2004 (shown in Table F-1 in 
Appendix F). Thus for both urban wages accessible to rural-urban migrants through migratory 
off-farm work, and for local OFE employment opportunities in village enterprises, these findings 
provide support for the theoretical prediction in proposition (1). Farm households respond to 
increased opportunity costs of labour through the land rental market with the result that farm 
land operations consolidate. Even if land consolidation cannot occur in the form of purchases 
and sales of land, the rental market functions to achieve increases in farm size (operated).  
As expected, the change-to-change model results in column (2) of Table 4-4 show that the 
coefficient of the land-to-labour of the community is significant and negative. This result 
provides support for proposition (3) that having a higher land-to-labour ratio slows the land 
consolidation process. At the mean change in community land-to-labour ratio from 2004 to 2007 
of 0.025 (shown in Table F-1 in Appendix F), the estimated coefficient of the wage change 
variable suggests that the predicted change in Gini would be -0.0002. However, this is a small 
impact since the mean Gini is 0.26 in 2004 (shown in Table F-1 in Appendix F). 
While the change-to-change model necessarily removes all the time-invariant variables, their 
influences are nevertheless of interest. Based on the complete theoretical model of the (level) of 
the Gini index (Eq. 4.23), pooled OLS model and time-specific OLS models are estimated. 
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Column (3) in Table 4-4 presents the results of pooled OLS model, while column (4) and column 
(5) present the results of time specific OLS model for the years of 2004 and 2007, respectively. 
In general, the pooled OLS results are consistent with the results of change-to-change model. 
Communities with higher levels of average urban wages in the nearest cities have higher Ginis. 
Higher land-to-labour ratio decreases the Gini index. The consistency of the pooled OLS results 
and change-to-change model’s results suggests that the estimates of 𝜔𝑢,𝑡𝑐  and 𝑎𝑡𝑐 are robust 
whether or not I add controls for time-invariant characteristics10.  
The pooled OLS results also indicate that the Gini index is negatively affected by the 
community’s distance to the nearest city. A one-standard-deviation (45.21 km) increase (shown 
in col. 3 of Table 4-4) in the distance, 𝐷𝑢𝑐, decreases Gini by 0.04. This is a large impact since the 
mean Gini is 0.26 in 2004 and 0.35 in 2007 (shown in Table F-1 in Appendix F). According to 
the theoretical model, the expected sign of 𝐷𝑢𝑐 is undetermined. On the one hand, according to 
Eq. (4.20), the distance will erode the value of the urban wage to the village dweller, and a 
greater distance to the city lead to a lower urban wage accessible in the community. Given the 
proposition (1), having higher 𝐷𝑢𝑐 decreases the Gini index. On the other hand, according to Eq. 
(4.22), having a greater distance to the city decreases the agricultural output price. Given the 
proposition (2), having higher 𝐷𝑢𝑐 increases the Gini index. Clearly the positive distance effects 
are overwhelming negative influences, such that having greater distances leads to higher Ginis or 
greater land consolidation. 
                                                          
10 In this chapter, the change-to-change model is equivalent to a fixed effects model (FE model). The FE model can 
remove the effect of all kinds of time-invariant characteristics from the dependent variables, assessing the net effects 
of variations in the independent variables within an entity (a community). Therefore, the estimated coefficients of 
the change-to-change models (FE model) are more consistent because the FE model can control for the bias caused 
by the omitted time-invariant unobservable characteristics. 
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There are several reasons why I construct a time-specific OLS model. The pooled OLS model 
and change-to-change model are based on the assumption that the marginal effects of the 
determinants stay the same through the period 2004 – 2007. However, as discussed in the 
literature review, China has experienced a number of changes since the late of 1990s in terms of 
its institutions and economic structure, and some of these will have continuing effects. Since 
1998, land tenure has become more secure and the rural land rental markets more functional in 
land transfers (Deininger and Jin 2005). Since 2003 China has passed the Lewis turning point 
and the opportunity cost of farm labour (represented by the off-farm labour wage) across rural 
China has increased dramatically (Zhang, Yang, and Wang 2010; Cai and Du 2011; Fleisher, 
Fearn, and Ye 2011; Li et al. 2012). If the effects of these changes were not complete by 2004, 
one may expect to see different time-specific estimates for 2004 model and 2007 model.  
As shown in the time-specific empirical results in column (4) and column (5), the 2007 OLS 
model does perform better than 2004. In the former, most determinants are significant and with 
the expected signs. The R-square of 2007 is higher than 2004. The results of 2007 OLS model 
show that if the urban wage of the nearest city of a community increases by a one-standard-
deviation (4000 yuan/year), with all other variables held constant, the Gini index of this 
community of 2007 will increase by 0.052. This is a large impact since the mean Gini is 0.35 in 
2007 (shown in Table F-1 in Appendix F). In contrast, the result for the urban wage in the 2004 
OLS model is not significant, which suggests that the urban wage became more influential (on 
land consolidation) between 2004 and 2007. The insignificant estimation of urban wage in 2004 
might due to the fact that in rural China there were still surplus labour, thus a given urban wage 
growth leads to smaller increase in rural off-farm wage than that of 2007, thereby yielding 
smaller increase in Gini. 
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As for other variables, the time-specific OLS results are consistent with the previous findings. 
The total effect of 𝐷𝑢𝑐 on land consolidation is positive. Having more enterprises increases Gini. 
Having higher levels of land-to-labour ratio decreases Gini. 
4.7.2 Results of Household Land Rental Model 
Land consolidation will be the result of individual household decisions. More specifically, in 
the theoretical model, within a community, households with human capital characteristics that 
are consistent with higher wages are more likely to rent out land. Similarly, lower education, less 
experience, etc. will reduce the expected off-farm wage, making these households more likely to 
rent in land. These theoretical predictions are tested by the household models for renting in and 
renting out land.  
Table 4-5 reports the estimated coefficients for household land rent-in decision model. 
Column (2) shows the change-to-change model for the rent-in decision (Eq. 4.27); column (3) 
presents the results of the corresponding pooled OLS model; and columns (4) and (5) present the 
results of time-specific OLS models for 2004 and 2007 respectively.  
According to the change-to-change model results in column (2), having a 6.305 thousand 
yuan increase in urban wages from 2004 to 2007 (the mean change in urban wages), would 
increase the share of land rented in, 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ, from 4.2% to 6.5%, with all other variables held 
constant. This is a large impact. Given the average household land operation as 7.9 mu in 2004, 
having a 6.305 thousand yuan increase in urban wages from 2004 to 2007 would increase the 
average rented-in land by 0.18 mu. As shown in proposition 5 of the Appendix D, the effect 
unskilled off-farm wage rate of the community is undetermined. First, higher wage decreases 
land rental rate, thereby increasing 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ (the indirect land-rent-rate effect). Second, higher 
wage driving up labour cost in farming, thereby decreasing 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ (the direct wage effect). The 
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empirical result suggests that, for land rent in model, the indirect land-rent-rate effect dominates 
the direct wage effect. 
Robust standard and township-clustered standard errors in parentheses; 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%; 
The descriptive statistics and the definition of variables are shown in Tables F-2 and F-2 in Appendix F; 
Note that the households who rented out all of their entitled land (with land operation zero) were excluded from this 
model.  
 
Table 4-5. Share of rented-in land of household, divided by total land operation 
 
Change-to-
change 
model 
Pooled OLS 
2004 & 
2007 
OLS 2004 OLS 2007 
Urban wage in the nearest city, 
1000¥/yr  
0.00356** -0.00345 -0.0024 -0.00535 
(0.00141) (0.00292) (0.00374) (0.00346) 
Distance to the nearest city, 100km   0.00956 0.02519 0.01848 
 (0.01768) (0.02385) (0.02013) 
# of enterprises per 1,000 labourers 
in community 
0.00084 0.00091 0.00014 0.00135 
(0.00098) (0.00095) (0.00052) (0.00125) 
Land-to-labour ratio of the 
community, mu/person  
0.00831*** 0.00661* -0.00435 0.01014*** 
(0.00254) (0.00345) (0.00508) (0.00372) 
Past local OFE experience in last 2 
years (dummy) 
-0.01266 -0.00694 -0.00719 -0.00559 
(0.01146) (0.00948) (0.00884) (0.01343) 
Past migratory OFE experience in 
last 2 years (dummy) 
 -0.00284  -0.01757 -0.00905 -0.02145 
(0.01145) (0.01072) (0.01472) (0.01422) 
The average years of education of 
household members (year) 
-0.00132 -0.00135 0.0016 -0.00241 
(0.00246) (0.00179) (0.00196) (0.00231) 
Household land-to-labour ratio -0.01087*** -0.01414*** -0.00607** -0.01701*** 
(0.00272) (0.00311) (0.00248) (0.00352) 
Provincial dummy: Sichuan 
 
 -0.04024 -0.01616 -0.06201 
 (0.03333) (0.02656) (0.04123) 
Shaanxi 
 
 -0.05685* -0.04124 -0.08564* 
 (0.03345) (0.02723) (0.04313) 
Jilin 
 
 -0.00386 0.04283 -0.02765 
 (0.03454) (0.03767) (0.03839) 
Hebei  -0.04843* -0.00067 -0.07552** 
 (0.0284) (0.02221) (0.03488) 
Year Dummy (year 2007)  0.07676***   
 (0.02217)   
Constant 0.02748 0.14424** 0.09215 0.27444*** 
(0.02898) (0.06311) (0.06606) (0.09544) 
Sample size 569 2514 753 1761 
R square 0.042 0.062 0.034 0.066 
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Column 2 also shows that having high land-to-labour ratio of the community 
increases 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ. For example, if the land-to-labour ratio of a community increases by 0.025 
mu/person (the mean change from 2004 to 2007), the value is of 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ would increase by 
0.02%. Though this impact is small, it is consistent with the theoretical prediction. That is, 
having a higher land-to-labour ratio in a community is likely to yield a lower land rental rate, 
thereby increasing households’ land input demand, which in turn increases 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ. The pooled 
OLS result and the year-specific OLS results are generally supportive of the change-to-change 
model results.  
Table 4-6 reports the estimated coefficients for household land rent-out decision model. 
Column (2) presents the results of change-to-change model (Eq. 4.28); column (3) presents the 
results of pooled OLS model; and columns (4) and (5) present the results of the OLS models for 
2004 and 2007 respectively.  
According to the change-to-change model results in column (2), having a 6.305 thousand 
yuan increase in urban wages from 2004 to 2007 (the mean change in urban wages from 2004 to 
2007), would increases the share of land rented out, 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ, from 2.8% to 5.5%, with all 
other variables held constant. This is a large impact. Given the average household land operation 
as 7.5 mu in 2004, having a 6.305 thousand yuan increase in urban wages from 2004 to 2007 
would increase the average rented-out land by 0.2 mu. As shown in proposition 5 of the 
Appendix D, the effect unskilled off-farm wage rate of the community is undetermined. First, 
higher wage decreases land rental rate, thereby decreasing 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ (the indirect land-rent-rate 
effect). Second, higher wage driving up labour cost in farming, thereby increasing 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ (the 
direct wage effect). The empirical result suggests that, for land rent-out model, the direct wage 
effect dominates the indirect land-rent-rate effect. Notably, the urban wage has different 
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marginal impacts in land rent-in model and land rent-out model. That is, in land rent in model, 
the urban wage’s indirect land-rent-rate effect dominates its direct wage effect. In land rent out 
model, the urban wage’s direct wage effect dominates the indirect land-rent-rate effect.  
Robust standard and township-clustered standard errors in parentheses; 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%; 
The descriptive statistics and the definition of variables are shown in Tables F-1 and F-2 in Appendix F; 
Note that the households with no land entitlement were excluded from this model. 
 
 Table 4-6. Share of rented-out land of household, divided by total land entitlement 
 
Change-to-
change 
model 
Pooled OLS 
2004 & 
2007 
OLS 2004 OLS 2007 
Urban wage in the nearest city, 
1000¥/yr  
0.00425** 0.00517 0.0026 0.00479 
(0.00210) (0.00362) (0.00415) (0.00403) 
Distance to the nearest city, 
100km  
 0.04104** 0.03667 0.04586** 
 (0.01682) (0.02395) (0.02181) 
# of enterprises per 1,000 
labourers in community 
0.00180*** 0.00138*** 0.00068 0.00164*** 
(0.00045) (0.00036) (0.0006) (0.00035) 
Land-to-labour ratio of the 
community, mu/person  
-0.00242* -0.00411* -0.00277 -0.00435* 
(0.00125) (0.00207) (0.00382) (0.00248) 
Past local OFE experience in last 
2 years (dummy) 
0.02512** 0.02007* 0.01627 0.02316* 
(0.01018) (0.01013) (0.01318) (0.01157) 
Past migratory OFE experience in 
last 2 years (dummy) 
0.00101 0.01675* -0.00002 0.02397** 
(0.01026) (0.00901) (0.01088) (0.01135) 
The average years of education of 
household members (year) 
0.00457* 0.00360** 0.00437** 0.00331 
(0.00255) (0.00176) (0.00199) (0.00221) 
Household land-to-labour ratio 0.00226 0.00098 -0.00065 0.00128 
(0.00198) (0.00137) (0.00154) (0.00179) 
Provincial dummy: Sichuan 
 
 0.03661 0.04864 0.02433 
 (0.02854) (0.0422) (0.02808) 
Shaanxi 
 
 -0.01622 -0.01182 -0.02724 
 (0.02331) (0.02963) (0.02894) 
Jilin 
 
 0.03907 0.02682 0.0358 
 (0.02537) (0.02593) (0.0303) 
Hebei  0.01124 0.00847 0.00568 
 (0.01463) (0.01963) (0.01871) 
Year Dummy (year 2007)  -0.01484   
 (0.02293)   
Constant -0.08201** -0.105* -0.06517 -0.11326 
(0.03926) (0.05446) (0.06702) (0.08295) 
Sample size 1176 2557 764 1793 
R square 0.061 0.051 0.038 0.055 
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In addition, the results show that having one more enterprise per 1,000 labourers in the 
community increases 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ by 0.0018, which indicates that 𝛾3𝑜𝑢𝑡 > 0 in Eq. (4.28). As the 
mean change in the number of enterprises from 2004 to 2007 of 0.62, the estimated coefficient 
suggests that the predicted change in 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ would be 0.11%. This is a small impact since the 
mean 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ is 4.2% in 2004. The results above consistently show that household with higher 
urban wage growth of the nearest city and more community enterprises in the community tend to 
rent out more land entitlement.  
Column 2 also shows that having higher land-to-labour ratio of the community 
decreases 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ. For example, if the land-to-labour ratio of a community increases by 0.025 
mu/person (the mean from 2004 to 2007), the value of 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ would decrease by 0.006%. 
Though this impact is small, it is consistent with the theoretical prediction. That is, having a 
higher land-to-labour ratio in a community is likely to yield a lower land rental rate, thereby 
increasing households’ land input demand, which in turn decreases 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ.  
Results in column (2) also confirm the major prediction of the theoretical model–the 
households having higher off-farm wages within a community are more likely to rent out land. 
The change-to-change model results show that, if a household did not have local OFE experience 
in the year 2002 and 2003 but gained local off-farm work experience in year 2005 or 2006, 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡
ℎ would increase by 2.5% from 2004 to 2007. With the average household land 
entitlement as 7.5 mu in 2004, a 2.5% increase would increase the average rent out land by 0.19 
mu. In addition, having one more year of education would increase 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ by 0.46%. With 
the average household land entitlement as 7.5 mu in 2004, a 0.46% increase would increase the 
average rent out land by 0.035 mu, a significant though small impact. 
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The results of the pooled and time-specific OLS models are generally consistent with the 
results of change-to-change model. Having more enterprises in the community increases 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡
ℎ. Having higher land-to-labour ratios in the community decreases 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ. The 
households with local or migratory OFE experience or with higher levels of average household 
education are likely to rent out more of their entitled land. 
Last, as a robust test, I also use linear probability models to investigate the household land 
rental decision, by using the same set of independent variables in Eqs. (4.26) and (4.27). The 
dependent variable, instead the share of rented-in or rented-out land, is a dummy variable of 
whether the household rented in land or rented out land in that year. The results of the linear 
probability models are consistent with previous results (shown in in Appendix G). 
Consistent with the theoretical prediction and previous results, the empirical results of the 
pooled OLS and the 2007 models show a significant positive effect of greater distance to the 
nearest city on 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ. As shown in Eq. (4.20), the unskilled off-farm wage accessible to 
community members is a decreasing function of the distance. As higher off-farm wages 
(represented by the urban wage) are expected to increase 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ, because of higher 
opportunity costs of farm labour, one may expect a negative effect of distance on 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ. 
Additionally, as shown in Eq. (4.22), farm output price is decreasing function of the distance to 
the nearest city. As higher farm output prices will drive up land input demand, decreasing 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡
ℎ, greater distances may also decrease land input demand, thereby increasing 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡
ℎ. The empirical results support this expectation. According to the results in column (3), 
having a one-standard-deviation (45.21 km) increase in the distance, 𝐷𝑢𝑐, increases 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ by 
1.86%. This is a large impact since the mean 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ is 2.8% in 2004 and 4.8% in 2007. 
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The results of the household land rental model provides support for the theoretical model 
about the micro mechanism by which land rental markets are instrumental in land consolidation. 
That is, within a community, households with a higher opportunity cost, measured as having 
higher off-farm wages (higher average household education and more off-farm work experience) 
are more likely to rent out land. This finding has very important implications for China, 
indicating that within communities the households that are most involved in off-farm 
employment and are well-positioned to access OFE, are actively participating in the land rental 
market by renting out their farm land and therefore driving the consolidation of land operations. 
The characteristics and circumstances of the households on the other side of the transaction, that 
is, renting in are less clear. Note that, these findings appear consistent with a recent study by 
Huang, Gao, and Rozelle (2012). Based on a panel data of a national representative sample from 
2000 and 2008, Huang, Gao, and Rozelle (2012) find that the OFE participation has significant 
and positive impacts on stimulating household to rent out cultivated land, while the effect is less 
prominent for renting-in decisions. 
4.8 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Based on survey data from 101 communities in rural China in 2004 and 2007, I examine the 
nature and determinants of the consolidation of farm operations. Using community-level adjusted 
Gini coefficients, I show that, despite the absence of private land ownership, the land 
consolidation has occurred in China, through rental arrangements. Further, I investigate the 
causes of land consolidation using a localized land rental market model, with a particular 
emphasis on understanding the role of the urban wage and off-farm work opportunities. The 
results provide support for the hypotheses that land consolidation occurs at faster rates in 
communities with higher urban wages, with more local off-farm work opportunities, and with 
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lower per capita land resources. A time-specific analysis reveals that urban wage growth was 
more important in 2007 than it was in 2004.  
I also develop and test a theoretical model of the household participants in the land rental 
market underlying the land consolidation process. One of the primary theoretical predictions of 
the household model, that households with a higher opportunity cost, that is, with more 
education and with off-farm work experience are likely to be the households that rent out land, is 
supported by the results.  
This study has a number of implications for China’s agricultural policy. First, the empirical 
results confirm the theoretical prediction that the growth of the accessible off-farm wage in a 
rural community facilitates agricultural land consolidation.  If the urban/rural wage gap persists 
as China’s urban-based economic development proceeds, land consolidation is likely to continue. 
Additionally, there is some evidence of this in that the growth of urban wage rates in China had 
significant and larger effects on land consolidation in 2007 than in 2004, signifying that urban 
wage growth may have played an increasing important role in facilitating agricultural land 
consolidation recently.  
Second, in the literature, rural-urban migration drives the land consolidation process as those 
permanently re-locating to urban areas sell their land to those remaining, resulting in an increase 
in farm size for the latter. In the absence of being able to buy and sell their land, the results for 
China show that households with more education and previous experience in off-farm 
employment are most likely to rent out their land. However, the motivation of the households 
renting in is less clear. If land consolidation is a policy objective then supporting land rental 
market and making land resources more transferable might be attractive. It will also be important 
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to facilitate the expansion of farm operations by those renting in, possibly through improving 
their productivity in agriculture through specific training and assisting access to financial capital.  
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5. SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND FURTHER STUDY 
5.1 Summary and Conclusions 
In this dissertation, I examine how China’s rural labour and farmland use changes during the 
economic transformation, recognizing the uniqueness of China’s residence registration system 
(the Hukou system) and collective land ownership systems. This study contributes to 
development economics literature by examine the development process of China in its unique 
context, improving our understanding of the nature of economic transformation. 
Neoclassical models of labour migration argue that free movement of labour (migration) will 
eventually lead to the convergence of wages between farm and non-farm sectors. Further the 
rising opportunity costs of farm labour (or off-farm wages) are predicted to lead to an increase in 
farm size. Using data collected from rural households in five provinces in China, this study 
shows that, the increase of OFE in China is largely consistent with market-driven expectations, 
and that in recent years, the attraction of a higher urban wage has begun to produce consolidation 
of farming operations through rental arrangements.  
Chapter 2 examines the self-selection of individuals into OFE. The results show that 
individual and household characteristics are important in the self-selection into local and 
migratory/urban OFE versus farming. More educated, young, and male workers are more likely 
to select into migratory OFE, while the less educated, senior, and female workers are more likely 
to select into farming only. Having more preschool children in the family increases the 
probability of self-selection into local OFE and decreases the probability of self-selection into 
migratory OFE. Moreover, I also confirm that the market-based driving forces (e.g. average off-
farm wages) play key roles in OFE growth. An increase in off-farm wages increases the 
probability of selection into OFE and decreases the probability of selection into farming only. 
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The larger the off-farm wage gap between local OFE and migratory OFE (reflected by the 
interactive term of distance variable and urban wage variable), the smaller is the probability of 
self-selection into local OFE. 
Chapter 4 examines the trend of consolidation of farming operations and its determinants, 
with special attention to the effect of the urban wage. Using a Gini coefficient to measure the 
inequality between land operations and land entitlements, the results show that farm operations 
become more consolidated from 2004 to 2007. That is, the amounts of agricultural land operated 
by farm households become less unlike the amounts of their land entitlements. Land 
concentration develops at faster rates in communities with higher urban wages in the nearest 
urban center, and in communities with fewer per capita land resources. Additionally, a more 
refined time-specific analysis reveals that the urban wage growth of the community’s nearest city 
becomes the major contributor of land concentration in 2007. The primary theoretical predictions 
were also tested in a micro-level household model, showing that the households that are most 
involved in OFE are active players and the driving forces of the consolidation of farm operations. 
5.2 Implications 
The Hukou system and the HRS were initially designated to address particular problems in 
another era. For example, the Hukou system was initially designated to control the rural-urban 
migratory labour flows of the Big Push industrialization approach in 1950s. The HRS was 
initially designated to address the lack of production incentives within the commune system. As 
the nature of China’s economy has changed and new challenges have risen, there may be a 
disconnect between these long-standing institutions and modern goals and objectives. For 
example, at present, urbanization and agricultural land consolidation have been designated 
national priorities for China (Johnson 2013). The Hukou system and the land tenure structure 
may present obstacles to reaching these development goals as they may have made the labour 
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and land less mobile and thus impede efficient resource allocation. To make effective 
urbanization policies and agricultural policies, one must understand the development process of 
China, such as the nature of OFE growth and agricultural land consolidation, given China’s 
unique institutional context. 
Research findings in this dissertation have policy implications for policy makers. First, 
successful urbanization may require more than simply increasing the number of people that work 
in urban areas. Successful urbanization may also entail a means for urban workers to settle down 
and live in urban areas with their families. Chapter 2 of this dissertation suggests gender 
differences in the selection into OFE. For all focal-person groups, male workers are more likely 
to participate in migratory OFE, while females (spouses of male workers) are more likely to 
participate in farming only. This family separation experienced by migratory OFE workers may 
result in an incomplete, temporary, and partial urbanization. For successful urbanization, 
government may pursue means of ensuring security and stability for rural-urban migrants and 
their families to settle down in cities. For example, the governments of migrant-receiving cities 
could make available affordable housing and school enrolment for the children for the selected 
migrants. Moreover, to facilitate the participation of more rural females in OFE, local rural 
government could make education for girls as well as boys more affordable. Adult rural female 
workers might be given greater opportunities to receive education and training, so that they can 
meet the minimum requirement for OFE. 
Second, land consolidation following agricultural labour out-migration that is occurring 
through land rental transactions will increase the land-to-labour ratio. In order to make the 
recombined land resources more productive, new technology, new investment, and new 
management skills are also required. Chapter 2 of this dissertation finds that the farming 
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population is less educated and older than the rural population employed off the farm. The older 
age and lower education profile of China’s farmers may hinder future land consolidation because 
of the limits of their knowledge and their more limited lifespan for realizing returns on large 
investments. A successful and smooth land consolidation may also require policies to attract 
private investment and human capital to agriculture. Government could facilitate access to credit 
from formal financial institutions for farmers. To broaden the knowledge and skills base of 
agricultural sector, agricultural business development services may be instrumental in facilitating 
the adoption of new practices and technologies. 
Third, chapter 4 of this dissertation suggests that urban wage growth is the engine of land 
consolidation of the hinterlands. As long as the urban wage growth continues, consolidation of 
farming operations is likely to be the response. To sustain the required rate of growth in land 
consolidation to realize economies of size and scale, additional measures may be considered. 
There may be ways to reduce the legal and other institutional barriers that impede consolidation, 
for example, making land use right more secure, improving the land rental market, and making 
land resources more transferable. 
5.3 Directions for Further Study 
This study contributes to the urbanization and the land consolidation literature for China. 
However, there are a number of areas that can be further pursued. 
First, this dissertation focuses on exclusively the agricultural labour out-migration and its 
induced “lost labour” effects in agriculture. However, coincident with the growth of labour out-
migration, financial remittances generate positive “remittance effects”. That is, agricultural out-
migrants may contribute to agricultural production of their labour-sending households through 
their remittances. Moreover, off-farm work experience may enable agricultural out-migrants to 
accumulate human capital and mobilize their social capital. When the migrants return to their 
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origin, these characteristics may make them the prime candidates of agricultural innovators, 
which may contribute land consolidation. The size and determinants of these feedback effects to 
the agriculture sector and to rural areas warrant further research.  
Second, it is still unclear what makes households rent in land and expand farms. Do they have 
superior agricultural production abilities and knowledge? Or do they have better access to market 
information, financial services, or local political powers? The answer to these questions holds 
special importance for China’s agricultural development, as the renting-in households today are 
likely to become the innovators in the future. Further research is needed to determine how the 
decision to expand farm operations occurs. 
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 2 
Table A-1. Variable definition and data sources 
Variables Variables Unit Data source 
Individual-level variables: 
Male Male 1, female 0 dummy CCAPa 
Ageb between 16-20 If age was between 16 and 20 1, otherwise 0 dummy CCAP 
Age between 21-30 If age was between 21 and 30 1, otherwise 0 dummy CCAP 
Age between 31-40 If age was between 31 and 40 1, otherwise 0 dummy CCAP 
Age between 41-50 If age was between 41 and 50 1, otherwise 0 dummy CCAP 
Primary schoolc If personal highest educational attainment is 
primary school 1, otherwise 0 
dummy CCAP 
Mid school  If personal highest educational attainment is 
mid school 1, otherwise 0 
dummy CCAP 
High school  If personal highest educational attainment is 
high school 1, otherwise 0 
dummy CCAP 
College or higher  If personal highest educational attainment is 
college, university or higher 1, otherwise 0 
dummy CCAP 
Household-level variables: 
Number of Children Number of preschool children in the 
household 
person CCAP 
 
Hhld female labour Additional female labour force members in 
household (excluding individual him/herself) 
person CCAP 
Hhld male labour Additional male labour force members in 
household (excluding individual him/herself) 
person CCAP 
Hhld entitled land Household entitled land from the village in the 
beginning of the year 
mu CCAP 
Having CCP member If household has CCP member 1, otherwise 0  dummy CCAP 
Community-level variables: 
Village enterprises The number of village enterprises per 1000 
population 
#/1000 
persons 
CCAP 
Distance to city  Distance from the village to its nearest city 10km Google Maps 
(2012) 
Wage of nearest city  Average annual urban wage of the village’s 
nearest city 
1000 
yuan/year 
CNBS (2005; 
2008) 
a CCAP rural household survey, 2005 and 2008. 
b The left-out category (reference variable) of age dummies is “age between 51-65”. 
C The left-out category (reference variable) of education dummies is “illiterate or primary school not finished”. 
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Table A-2. Descriptive statistics of household head focal persons in 2004 
Variables All  Farm only  Loc. OFE  Mig. OFE Mean S. D.  Mean S. D.  Mean S. D.  Mean S. D. Sample size 724   334 (46%)  296 (41%)  94 (13%) Male % 0.98 0.13  0.98 0.15  0.99 0.12  1.00 0.00 
Age years 47.67 9.39  50.70 8.60  45.47 9.60  43.86 8.10 
Primary school  0.32 0.47  0.35 0.48  0.31 0.46  0.27 0.44 
Mid school  0.38 0.49  0.33 0.47  0.42 0.49  0.45 0.50 
High school  0.10 0.30  0.06 0.24  0.15 0.36  0.09 0.28 
College or higher  0.01 0.08  0.00 0.00  0.01 0.08  0.03 0.18 
Number of Children 0.23 0.47  0.25 0.49  0.22 0.45  0.21 0.46 
Hhld female labour  1.30 0.63  1.31 0.67  1.31 0.60  1.26 0.57 
Hhld male labour  0.53 0.66  0.61 0.70  0.47 0.62  0.40 0.59 
Hhld entitled land 7.94 7.18  9.50 7.53  6.08 6.15  8.27 7.62 
Having CCP member % 0.06 0.23  0.06 0.24  0.05 0.22  0.06 0.25 
Village enterprises 2.60 7.58  1.39 3.65  4.43 10.87  1.12 2.28 
Distance to city 5.18 4.34  5.30 4.70  4.98 4.03  5.41 3.96 
Wage of nearest city 11.97 2.63  11.56 2.33  12.55 2.90  11.57 2.36 
Source: CCAP 2005 survey; Google Maps (2012); National Bureau of Statistics of China (2005). 
 
Table A-3. Descriptive statistics of household head focal persons in 2007 
Variables 
All  Farm only  Loc. OFE  Mig. OFE 
Mean S. D.   Mean S. D.   Mean S. D.   Mean S. D. 
Sample size 1738   808 (46%)   645 (37%)   285 (16%) Male % 0.95 0.22  0.92 0.27  0.96 0.19  0.99 0.10 
Age years 49.14 9.09  52.23 8.27  47.36 8.98  44.41 8.42 
Primary school  0.32 0.46  0.34 0.47  0.29 0.45  0.30 0.46 
Mid school  0.41 0.49  0.35 0.48  0.46 0.50  0.46 0.50 
High school  0.12 0.33  0.08 0.28  0.16 0.37  0.13 0.34 
College or higher  0.01 0.08  0.00 0.05  0.01 0.09  0.01 0.10 
Number of Children 0.22 0.47  0.24 0.48  0.21 0.45  0.22 0.45 
Hhld female labour  1.36 0.71  1.38 0.74  1.33 0.70  1.34 0.63 
Hhld male labour  0.63 0.70  0.72 0.71  0.55 0.68  0.56 0.65 
Hhld entitled land 8.73 9.56  10.01 9.87  7.47 9.96  7.93 6.99 
Having CCP member % 0.08 0.27  0.08 0.27  0.08 0.27  0.06 0.24 
Village enterprises 2.75 7.04  1.97 5.35  4.28 9.48  1.53 3.07 
Distance to city 5.16 4.15  5.32 4.62  4.78 3.52  5.53 3.98 
Wage of nearest city 18.28 4.01  17.71 3.34  19.26 4.73  17.70 3.52 
Source: CCAP 2008 survey; Google Maps (2012); National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008). 
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Table A-4. Descriptive statistics of household head’s spouse in 2004 
Variables 
All  Farm only  Loc. OFE  Mig. OFE 
Mean S. D.   Mean S. D.   Mean S. D.   Mean S. D. 
Sample size 708   535 (76%)   143 (20%)   30 (4%) Male % 0.01 0.11  0.01 0.07  0.03 0.17  0.07 0.25 
Age years 45.96 9.27  46.51 9.31  44.20 9.08  44.50 8.62 
Primary school  0.28 0.45  0.29 0.45  0.31 0.46  0.13 0.35 
Mid school  0.25 0.43  0.22 0.41  0.31 0.47  0.40 0.50 
High school  0.05 0.21  0.03 0.17  0.08 0.28  0.17 0.38 
College or higher  0.01 0.08  0.00 0.04  0.02 0.14  0.00 0.00 
Number of Children 0.23 0.47  0.24 0.47  0.21 0.46  0.10 0.40 
Hhld female labour  0.40 0.58  0.40 0.58  0.36 0.59  0.50 0.73 
Hhld male labour  1.42 0.68  1.44 0.70  1.34 0.59  1.40 0.67 
Hhld entitled land 7.86 6.88  8.57 7.17  5.52 5.61  6.49 3.94 
Having CCP member % 0.14 0.34  0.14 0.35  0.14 0.35  0.03 0.18 
Village enterprises 2.61 7.66  1.80 5.35  5.58 12.80  2.91 6.61 
Distance to city 5.17 4.36  4.98 3.82  5.34 4.75  7.72 8.78 
Wage of nearest city 12.01 2.65  11.76 2.46  12.94 3.24  11.94 1.87 
Source: CCAP 2005 survey; Google Maps (2012); National Bureau of Statistics of China (2005). 
 
Table A-5. Descriptive statistics of household head’s spouse in 2007 
Variables 
All  Farm only  Loc. OFE  Mig. OFE 
Mean S. D.   Mean S. D.   Mean S. D.   Mean S. D. 
Sample size 1613   1186 (74%)   349 (22%)   78 (5%) Male % 0.03 0.18  0.02 0.14  0.05 0.22  0.15 0.36 
Age years 47.75 8.98  48.87 8.84  44.72 8.71  44.15 8.11 
Primary school  0.32 0.47  0.34 0.47  0.30 0.46  0.27 0.45 
Mid school  0.25 0.44  0.21 0.40  0.39 0.49  0.37 0.49 
High school  0.06 0.24  0.04 0.20  0.12 0.32  0.15 0.36 
College or higher  0.00 0.07  0.00 0.03  0.01 0.12  0.03 0.16 
Number of Children 0.22 0.47  0.25 0.48  0.16 0.43  0.18 0.39 
Hhld female labour  0.51 0.68  0.54 0.68  0.37 0.62  0.68 0.73 
Hhld male labour  1.51 0.71  1.57 0.71  1.33 0.66  1.50 0.80 
Hhld entitled land 8.74 9.50  9.48 9.78  6.75 8.64  6.47 6.94 
Having CCP member % 0.18 0.39  0.18 0.39  0.20 0.40  0.13 0.34 
Village enterprises 2.67 6.72  2.00 5.15  4.95 10.21  2.72 6.00 
Distance to city 5.18 4.24  5.04 3.85  5.27 4.57  6.84 7.11 
Wage of nearest city 18.33 4.04  17.83 3.58  20.17 5.00  17.68 3.50 
Source: CCAP 2008 survey; Google Maps (2012); National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008). 
 
  
 120 
Table A-6. Descriptive statistics of head’s youngest working-age child in 2004 
Variables 
All  Farm only  Loc. OFE  Mig. OFE 
Mean S. D.   Mean S. D.   Mean S. D.   Mean S. D. 
Sample size 403   88 (22%)  71 (18%)  244 (61%) Male % 0.50 0.50  0.33 0.47  0.49 0.50  0.56 0.50 
Age years 24.13 5.59  25.27 6.65  26.03 5.76  23.17 4.89 
Primary school  0.28 0.45  0.39 0.49  0.20 0.40  0.26 0.44 
Mid school  0.45 0.50  0.41 0.49  0.58 0.50  0.43 0.50 
High school  0.16 0.37  0.06 0.23  0.15 0.36  0.20 0.40 
College or higher  0.04 0.20  0.00 0.00  0.03 0.17  0.06 0.23 
Number of Children 0.29 0.53  0.40 0.58  0.44 0.65  0.20 0.45 
Hhld female labour  1.10 0.57  0.98 0.66  1.14 0.62  1.14 0.51 
Hhld male labour  1.34 0.65  1.47 0.64  1.37 0.78  1.29 0.60 
Hhld entitled land 8.02 7.27  9.20 9.09  5.82 4.23  8.24 7.12 
Having CCP member % 0.15 0.36  0.08 0.27  0.20 0.40  0.16 0.37 
Village enterprises 2.37 7.02  1.89 6.73  4.76 12.37  1.84 4.38 
Distance to city 5.15 4.81  5.27 4.67  4.64 4.39  5.26 4.98 
Wage of nearest city 11.90 2.55  11.32 1.98  12.75 3.08  11.86 2.51 
Source: CCAP 2005 survey; Google Maps (2012); National Bureau of Statistics of China (2005). 
 
Table A-7. Descriptive statistics of head’s youngest working-age child in 2007 
Variables 
All  Farm only  Loc. OFE  Mig. OFE 
Mean S. D.   Mean S. D.   Mean S. D.   Mean S. D. 
Sample size 1063   194 (18%)  217 (20%)  652 (61%) Male % 0.51 0.50  0.35 0.48  0.53 0.50  0.55 0.50 
Age years 25.53 6.75  26.31 7.84  28.49 7.51  24.31 5.72 
Primary school  0.20 0.40  0.30 0.46  0.18 0.38  0.18 0.38 
Mid school  0.53 0.50  0.46 0.50  0.63 0.48  0.52 0.50 
High school  0.15 0.35  0.09 0.28  0.11 0.31  0.18 0.38 
College or higher  0.07 0.25  0.01 0.10  0.05 0.22  0.09 0.28 
Number of Children 0.28 0.52  0.33 0.53  0.34 0.56  0.25 0.49 
Hhld female labour  1.17 0.61  1.05 0.60  1.13 0.65  1.23 0.60 
Hhld male labour  1.37 0.69  1.52 0.71  1.29 0.73  1.36 0.67 
Hhld entitled land 8.92 9.19  11.61 9.42  6.95 8.35  8.78 9.22 
Having CCP member % 0.20 0.40  0.18 0.38  0.21 0.41  0.21 0.41 
Village enterprises 2.63 6.77  1.82 5.07  5.20 10.54  2.02 5.24 
Distance to city 4.91 3.95  5.45 4.53  4.08 3.52  5.03 3.86 
Wage of nearest city 18.29 4.01  17.54 3.13  20.38 4.68  17.82 3.77 
Source: CCAP 2008 survey; Google Maps (2012); National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008). 
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Table A-8. Summaries of the first differences between 2004 and 2007  
Variables 
Head   Spouse   Youngest child 
mean Std. Dev.   mean 
Std. 
Dev.   mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Sample size 556   532   260  
Age between 16-20       -0.2077 0.4158 
Age between 21-30 -0.0288 0.1673  -0.0263 0.1602  0.0692 0.5854 
Age between 31-40 -0.0486 0.3224  -0.0639 0.3357  0.1269 0.3666 
Age between 41-50 -0.0288 0.4277  -0.0451 0.4732  0.0115 0.1070 
Number of children -0.0180 0.5265  -0.0132 0.5151  -0.0038 0.6056 
Hhld female labour  0.1061 0.6476  0.1090 0.5977  0.2115 0.6674 
Hhld male labour 0.1043 0.5198  0.0733 0.5921  0.0500 0.4985 
Hhld entitled land 0.5827 7.0812  0.7367 6.9822  0.2315 6.8606 
Having CCP member % 0.0126 0.2282  0.0301 0.2658  0.0154 0.2775 
Village enterprises 0.2812 5.3536  0.3588 5.4652  0.4583 4.6733 
Wage of nearest city 6.4069 1.7621  6.4151 1.7648  6.4388 1.7724 
Source: CCAP 2005 and 2008 survey; National Bureau of Statistics of China (2005, 2008). 
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APPENDIX B: ALTERNATIVE MODEL RESULTS OF CHAPTER 2 
Table B-1. Marginal effects of Logit & Probit models for household head  
 Pooled Logit Model  Pooled Probit Model 
Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE  Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE 
Male -0.222*** 0.048 0.116***  -0.222*** 0.048 0.126*** 
(0.067) (0.069) (0.017)  (0.066) (0.068) (0.015) 
Age between 21-30 -0.312*** 0.206*** 0.210***  -0.315*** 0.200*** 0.196*** 
(0.034) (0.069) (0.067)  (0.035) (0.069) (0.061) 
Age between 31-40 -0.345*** 0.168*** 0.224***  -0.342*** 0.165*** 0.219*** 
(0.029) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.039) (0.037) 
Age between 41-50 -0.228*** 0.121*** 0.125***  -0.223*** 0.117*** 0.123*** 
(0.028) (0.032) (0.026)  (0.028) (0.031) (0.025) 
Primary school -0.144*** 0.154*** 0.009  -0.142*** 0.149*** 0.011 
(0.038) (0.04) (0.024)  (0.037) (0.037) (0.024) 
Mid school -0.178*** 0.181*** 0.011  -0.175*** 0.175*** 0.015 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.025)  (0.038) (0.036) (0.026) 
High school -0.231*** 0.247*** 0.012  -0.232*** 0.240*** 0.016 
(0.046) (0.058) (0.035)  (0.046) (0.056) (0.037) 
College or higher -0.423*** 0.291* 0.243  -0.418*** 0.275* 0.252 
(0.038) (0.152) (0.172)  (0.045) (0.144) (0.166) 
Number of children -0.006 -0.002 0.008  -0.008 0.0001 0.009 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.019)  (0.025) (0.025) (0.02) 
Hhld female labour -0.006 0.004 0.003  -0.004 0.003 0.001 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.011)  (0.019) (0.017) (0.012) 
Hhld male labour -0.02 0.003 0.014  -0.021 0.004 0.015 
(0.02) (0.022) (0.013)  (0.019) (0.022) (0.014) 
Hhld entitled land 0.011*** -0.008** -0.003**  0.010*** -0.006** -0.003** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Having CCP member -0.018 -0.005 0.018  -0.016 -0.002 0.025 
(0.053) (0.047) (0.032)  (0.05) (0.045) (0.035) 
Village enterprises -0.006 0.010** -0.009*  -0.006 0.010** -0.008 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Distance to city -0.01 0.004 0.003  -0.01 0.004 0.004 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.004)  (0.014) (0.012) (0.005) 
Wage of nearest city -0.023*** 0.025*** -0.004  -0.023*** 0.025*** -0.004 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
Interaction term of 
distance and wage 
0.001 -0.001 0.0001  0.001 -0.001 0.0002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0003)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) 
Year 2007 0.112** -0.198*** 0.073***  0.108** -0.195*** 0.078*** 
(0.045) (0.038) (0.022)  (0.046) (0.038) (0.023) 
Obs. 1882 1882 1882  1882 1882 1882 
Pseudo-R2 0.13 0.094 0.087  0.129 0.093 0.087 
* Sig. at 10%; ** sig. at 5%; *** sig. at 1%; Robust & township-clustered S. E. in Parentheses. 
The dummy of “Age between 16-20” is omitted, as there is no observation with age between 16-20. 
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Table B-2. Marginal effects of Logit & Probit models for head’s spouse 
 Pooled Logit Model Pooled Probit Model 
Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE  Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE 
Male 
 
-0.299*** 0.091 0.127**  -0.303*** 0.110* 0.146** 
(0.096) (0.065) (0.054)  (0.088) (0.063) (0.058) 
Age between 21-30 
 
-0.190** 0.126 0.057  -0.175*** 0.119 0.059 
(0.078) (0.08) (0.047)  (0.073) (0.079) (0.048) 
Age between 31-40 
 
-0.130*** 0.091* 0.031*  -0.122*** 0.088** 0.034* 
(0.042) (0.037) (0.018)  (0.041) (0.037) (0.019) 
Age between 41-50 
 
-0.106*** 0.086*** 0.015  -0.099*** 0.082*** 0.016 
(0.035) (0.032) (0.014)  (0.034) (0.031) (0.015) 
Primary school -0.056 0.046 0.009  -0.054 0.045 0.008 
(0.037) (0.031) (0.014)  (0.035) (0.031) (0.014) 
Mid school -0.147*** 0.107*** 0.031*  -0.147*** 0.108*** 0.03* 
(0.034) (0.028) (0.018)  (0.033) (0.027) (0.018) 
High school -0.370*** 0.255*** 0.103**  -0.360*** 0.249*** 0.100*** 
(0.064) (0.051) (0.042)  (0.061) (0.048) (0.039) 
College or higher -0.522** 0.485** 0.019  -0.496** 0.457** 0.012 
(0.215) (0.21) (0.052)  (0.179) (0.188) (0.053) 
Number of children 0.022 0.005 -0.020**  0.016 0.011 -0.023** 
(0.031) (0.029) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.029) (0.01) 
Hhld female labour  0.021 -0.039** 0.011**  0.024 -0.040** 0.012** 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.005)  (0.02) (0.018) (0.005) 
Hhld male labour  -0.003 -0.018 0.014***  -0.002 -0.019 0.017*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.005)  (0.015) (0.016) (0.006) 
Hhld entitled land 0.010*** -0.007** -0.002***  0.007** -0.005* -0.002*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
Having CCP member 0.015 0.001 -0.012  0.018 -0.002 -0.014* 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.008)  (0.023) (0.022) (0.008) 
Village enterprises  -0.005*** 0.005*** 0.0003  -0.006*** 0.005*** 0.0002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Distance to city -0.005 0.001 0.001  -0.006 0.003 0.0004 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.002)  (0.011) (0.009) (0.002) 
Wage of nearest city -0.017*** 0.018*** -0.002*  -0.018*** 0.020*** -0.003** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.001)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) 
Interaction term of 
distance and wage 
-0.0001 0.00001 0.0001  0.00001 -0.0001 0.0002 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001)  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001) 
Year 2007 0.099*** -0.109*** 0.012  0.100*** -0.114*** 0.013 
(0.028) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.031) (0.011) 
Obs. 1787 1787 1787  1787 1787 1787 
Pseudo-R2 0.138 0.127 0.127  0.133 0.123 0.127 
* Sig. at 10%; ** sig. at 5%; *** sig. at 1%; Robust & township-clustered S. E. in Parentheses.  
The dummy of “Age between 16-20” is omitted, as there is no observation with age between 16-20. 
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Table B-3. Marginal effects of Logit &Probit models for youngest child 
 Pooled Logit Model Pooled Probit Model 
Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE  Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE 
Male 
 
-0.067*** 0.009 0.057*  -0.069*** 0.011 0.055* 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.031)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.03) 
Age between 16-20 
 
0.012 -0.248*** 0.403**  0.02 -0.264*** 0.419** 
(0.15) (0.072) (0.16)  (0.174) (0.082) (0.162) 
Age between 21-30 
 
0.01 -0.277** 0.411*  0.018 -0.292** 0.422* 
(0.145) (0.127) (0.215)  (0.166) (0.145) (0.216) 
Age between 31-40 
 
0.007 -0.134 0.268  0.015 -0.15* 0.281 
(0.152) (0.061) (0.167)  (0.176) (0.077) (0.173) 
Age between 41-50 
 
0.201 -0.085 -0.098  0.218 -0.095 -0.041 
(0.274) (0.068) (0.364)  (0.275) (0.086) (0.325) 
Primary school -0.071** 0.099 0.07  -0.082** 0.099 0.068 
(0.028) (0.074) (0.062)  (0.033) (0.069) (0.062) 
Mid school -0.187*** 0.130** 0.160***  -0.204*** 0.135** 0.156*** 
(0.038) (0.057) (0.059)  (0.041) (0.054) (0.058) 
High school -0.156*** 0.072 0.245***  -0.173*** 0.074 0.247*** 
(0.021) (0.077) (0.052)  (0.022) (0.072) (0.054) 
College or higher -0.179*** 0.021 0.307***  -0.188*** 0.03 0.314*** 
(0.015) (0.087) (0.044)  (0.015) (0.088) (0.046) 
Number of children 0.016 0.067*** -0.104***  0.014 0.070*** -0.104*** 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.039)  (0.023) (0.025) (0.038) 
Hhld female labour  -0.060*** -0.02 0.097***  -0.064*** -0.023 0.094*** 
(0.02) (0.017) (0.027)  (0.02) (0.018) (0.026) 
Hhld male labour  0.035* -0.039* 0.003  0.038* -0.038* 0.002 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.029)  (0.021) (0.02) (0.029) 
Hhld entitled land 0.003*** -0.003 -0.002  0.004*** -0.003 -0.002 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Having CCP member -0.026 0.031 0.002  -0.027 0.028 0.004 
(0.023) (0.029) (0.035)  (0.025) (0.03) (0.034) 
Village enterprises  0.0001 0.004*** -0.007**  0.0001 0.005*** -0.007** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Distance to city -0.003 0.012 -0.017  -0.003 0.012 -0.016 
(0.008) (0.01) (0.013)  (0.009) (0.01) (0.013) 
Wage of nearest city -0.006 0.022*** -0.026***  -0.006 0.023*** -0.025*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Interaction term of 
distance and wage 
0.0004 -0.001 0.001  0.00036 -0.0009 0.00106 
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009)  (0.00051) (0.00063) (0.00078) 
Year 2007 0.018 -0.138*** 0.145***  0.017 -0.140*** 0.141*** 
(0.031) (0.038) (0.048)  (0.032) (0.038) (0.047) 
Obs. 1185 1185 1185  1185 1185 1185 
Pseudo-R2 0.119 0.128 0.098  0.118 0.126 0.097 
* Sig. at 10%; ** sig. at 5%; *** sig. at 1%; Robust & township-clustered S. E. in Parentheses.  
 
 125 
Table B-4. Regression results for all working-age household members 
 Pooled Linear Probability Modela Fixed Effects Model 
Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE  Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE 
Male 
 
-0.196*** 0.102*** 0.114***     
(0.017) (0.018) (0.021)     
Age between 16-20 
 
-0.464*** -0.124*** 0.543***  -0.100 -0.187* 0.302*** 
(0.025) (0.022) (0.032)  (0.096) (0.101) (0.093) 
Age between 21-30 
 
-0.410*** -0.042* 0.436***  -0.040 -0.113 0.132* 
(0.024) (0.021) (0.026)  (0.080) (0.086) (0.076) 
Age between 31-40 
 
-0.300*** 0.080*** 0.219***  -0.103* 0.031 0.053 
(0.027) (0.021) (0.03)  (0.053) (0.063) (0.044) 
Age between 41-50 
 
-0.147*** 0.089*** 0.059***  -0.086** 0.057* 0.028 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.016)  (0.038) (0.034) (0.025) 
Primary school -0.085*** 0.074*** 0.011     
(0.019) (0.017) (0.014)     
Mid school -0.176*** 0.123*** 0.045**     
(0.023) (0.017) (0.018)     
High school -0.255*** 0.132*** 0.124***     
(0.028) (0.029) (0.026)     
College or higher -0.346*** 0.080 0.224***     
(0.029) (0.051) (0.05)     
Number of children 0.025* 0.025 -0.045**  0.018 0.027 -0.042** 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
Hhld female labour  -0.042*** -0.017 0.052***  0.035* -0.015 -0.005 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009)  (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) 
Hhld male labour  -0.006 -0.026** 0.033***  -0.008 -0.006 -0.003 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.010)  (0.026) (0.027) (0.02) 
Hhld entitled land 0.007*** -0.004* -0.003***  0.002 0.0002 -0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Having CCP member -0.037** 0.013 0.024  -0.019 0.0001 0.020 
(0.014) (0.02) (0.019)  (0.04) (0.056) (0.034) 
Village enterprises  -0.004*** 0.008*** -0.004***  -0.002 0.003 -0.003* 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Distance to city -0.005 0.006 -0.001     
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007)     
Wage of nearest city -0.013*** 0.023*** -0.009**  -0.004*** -0.003** 0.004*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Interaction term of 
distance and wage 
0.0004 -0.0005 0.0003     
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)     
Year 2007 0.041 -0.150*** 0.083***     
(0.0281) (0.027) (0.022)     
Obs. 5934 5934 5934  3196 3196 3196 
Pseudo-R2 0.293 0.132 0.281  0.012 0.012 0.017 
* Sig. at 10%; ** sig. at 5%; *** sig. at 1%; Robust & township-clustered S. E. in Parentheses.  
a the repeated individual observations in 2007 have been excluded. 
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Table B-5. Marginal effects of Multinomial Logit & Probit models for head  
 Pooled M. Logit Model  Pooled M. Probit Model 
Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE  Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE 
Male -0.201*** 0.075 0.127***  -0.204*** 0.068 0.136*** 
(0.071) (0.071) (0.018)  (0.068) (0.068) (0.016) 
Age between 21-30 -0.322*** 0.138* 0.184***  -0.323*** 0.151** 0.172*** 
(0.035) (0.076) (0.066)  (0.036) (0.073) (0.061) 
Age between 31-40 -0.349*** 0.134*** 0.215***  -0.347*** 0.137*** 0.210*** 
(0.029) (0.043) (0.041)  (0.03) (0.041) (0.037) 
Age between 41-50 -0.229*** 0.106*** 0.123***  -0.225*** 0.105*** 0.121*** 
(0.028) (0.033) (0.027)  (0.028) (0.032) (0.026) 
Primary school -0.151*** 0.152*** -0.001  -0.145*** 0.145*** 0.0003 
(0.038) (0.04) (0.025)  (0.037) (0.037) (0.026) 
Mid school -0.186*** 0.183*** 0.004  -0.18*** 0.173*** 0.007 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.026)  (0.038) (0.036) (0.027) 
High school -0.244*** 0.247*** -0.003  -0.241*** 0.238*** 0.003 
(0.047) (0.057) (0.036)  (0.047) (0.055) (0.038) 
College or higher -0.434*** 0.272* 0.163  -0.426*** 0.243* 0.183 
(0.04) (0.155) (0.159)  (0.047) (0.148) (0.158) 
Number of children -0.006 -0.002 0.007  -0.008 -0.001 0.009 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.02)  (0.025) (0.026) (0.021) 
Hhld female labour -0.007 0.004 0.003  -0.004 0.003 0.001 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.012)  (0.019) (0.018) (0.013) 
Hhld male labour -0.019 0.003 0.015  -0.019 0.004 0.015 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.014)  (0.019) (0.022) (0.015) 
Hhld entitled land 0.011*** -0.008** -0.003**  0.010*** -0.007** -0.003** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Having CCP member -0.018 -0.003 0.020  -0.022 -0.004 0.026 
(0.053) (0.049) (0.035)  (0.051) (0.046) (0.037) 
Village enterprises -0.003 0.011** -0.009*  -0.003 0.011** -0.008* 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Distance to city -0.009 0.005 0.004  -0.010 0.005 0.005 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.005)  (0.014) (0.013) (0.005) 
Wage of nearest city -0.024*** 0.026*** -0.003  -0.023*** 0.025*** -0.003 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Interaction term of 
distance and wage 
0.001 -0.001 0.0002  0.001 -0.001 0.0002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0003)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) 
Year 2007 0.122*** -0.194*** 0.072***  0.114*** -0.191*** 0.077*** 
(0.044) (0.04) (0.023)  (0.044) (0.04) (0.024) 
Obs. 1882 1882 1882  1882 1882 1882 
* Sig. at 10%; ** sig. at 5%; *** sig. at 1%; Robust & township-clustered S. E. in Parentheses. 
The dummy of “Age between 16-20” is omitted, as there is no observation with age between 16-20. 
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Table B-6. Marginal effects of Multinomial Logit & Probit models for head’s spouse 
 Pooled M. Logit Model Pooled M. Probit Model 
Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE  Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE 
Male 
 
-0.267*** 0.126* 0.141**  -0.288*** 0.133** 0.155*** 
(0.093) (0.067) (0.059)  (0.087) (0.062) (0.06) 
Age between 21-30 
 
-0.188** 0.126 0.062  -0.175** 0.114 0.062 
(0.075) (0.08) (0.05)  (0.071) (0.08) (0.05) 
Age between 31-40 
 
-0.127*** 0.093** 0.034*  -0.123*** 0.087** 0.037* 
(0.041) (0.038) (0.019)  (0.041) (0.037) (0.02) 
Age between 41-50 
 
-0.105*** 0.088** 0.017  -0.101*** 0.083*** 0.018 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.015)  (0.033) (0.032) (0.016) 
Primary school -0.054 0.045 0.008  -0.052 0.046 0.006 
(0.036) (0.032) (0.015)  (0.035) (0.031) (0.015) 
Mid school -0.141*** 0.110*** 0.031*  -0.141*** 0.111*** 0.030* 
(0.034) (0.028) (0.018)  (0.032) (0.027) (0.018) 
High school -0.360*** 0.259*** 0.101**  -0.353*** 0.255*** 0.098*** 
(0.065) (0.05) (0.041)  (0.062) (0.047) (0.038) 
College or higher -0.538*** 0.508** 0.030  -0.505*** 0.480*** 0.025 
(0.202) (0.208) (0.068)  (0.174) (0.182) (0.067) 
Number of children 0.018 0.003 -0.021*  0.014 0.011 -0.025** 
(0.031) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.029) (0.01) 
Hhld female labour  0.027 -0.037** 0.011**  0.026 -0.039** 0.013** 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.005)  (0.019) (0.018) (0.006) 
Hhld male labour  0.002 -0.017 0.015***  0.001 -0.019 0.018*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.005)  (0.015) (0.016) (0.006) 
Hhld entitled land 0.009*** -0.008** -0.002***  0.007** -0.005* -0.002*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
Having CCP member 0.014 -0.001 -0.013  0.018 -0.004 -0.014 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.008)  (0.023) (0.022) (0.009) 
Village enterprises  -0.005*** 0.005*** 0.000  -0.006*** 0.005*** 0.0002 
(0.001) (0.002) (0)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.0005) 
Distance to city -0.003 0.002 0.001  -0.005 0.004 0.0005 
(0.011) (0.01) (0.002)  (0.011) (0.01) (0.002) 
Wage of nearest city -0.016*** 0.018*** -0.002  -0.017*** 0.020*** -0.003* 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) 
Interaction term of 
distance and wage 
0.0001 0.00003 0.0001  0.00002 0.0001 0.0002 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001)  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001) 
Year 2007 0.100*** -0.110*** 0.010  0.102*** -0.114*** 0.012 
(0.027) (0.029) (0.01)  (0.029) (0.031) (0.012) 
Obs. 1787 1787 1787  1787 1787 1787 
* Sig. at 10%; ** sig. at 5%; *** sig. at 1%; Robust & township-clustered S. E. in Parentheses.  
The dummy of “Age between 16-20” is omitted, as there is no observation with age between 16-20. 
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Table B-7. Marginal effects of Multinomial Logit &Probit models for youngest child 
 Pooled M. Logit Model Pooled M. Probit Model 
Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE  Farm only Loc. OFE Mig. OFE 
Male 
 
-0.069*** 0.008 0.061**  -0.071*** 0.012 0.059* 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.03)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.03) 
Age between 16-20 
 
-0.057 -0.278*** 0.335**  -0.061 -0.294*** 0.356** 
(0.125) (0.083) (0.16)  (0.139) (0.088) (0.168) 
Age between 21-30 
 
-0.041 -0.314** 0.355*  -0.039 -0.333** 0.372* 
(0.137) (0.145) (0.203)  (0.154) (0.155) (0.209) 
Age between 31-40 
 
-0.054 -0.155** 0.21  -0.054 -0.172** 0.227 
(0.13) (0.07) (0.164)  (0.146) (0.079) (0.176) 
Age between 41-50 
 
0.261 -0.06 -0.202  0.224 -0.083 -0.141 
(0.343) (0.107) (0.369)  (0.305) (0.114) (0.33) 
Primary school -0.074** 0.068 0.006  -0.086** 0.072 0.015 
(0.031) (0.074) (0.073)  (0.035) (0.068) (0.068) 
Mid school -0.192*** 0.098* 0.094  -0.209*** 0.108** 0.102* 
(0.039) (0.059) (0.062)  (0.042) (0.055) (0.059) 
High school -0.165*** 0.015 0.151**  -0.183*** 0.019 0.163** 
(0.023) (0.069) (0.074)  (0.024) (0.065) (0.069) 
College or higher -0.191*** -0.036 0.227***  -0.200*** -0.030 0.230*** 
(0.016) (0.071) (0.073)  (0.015) (0.071) (0.072) 
Number of children 0.021 0.073*** -0.095**  0.017 0.077*** -0.094** 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.037)  (0.024) (0.027) (0.037) 
Hhld female labour  -0.068*** -0.026 0.094***  -0.067*** -0.029 0.096*** 
(0.022) (0.018) (0.026)  (0.021) (0.019) (0.025) 
Hhld male labour  0.036* -0.038* 0.002  0.038* -0.037 -0.001 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.028)  (0.022) (0.021) (0.028) 
Hhld entitled land 0.004*** -0.003 -0.001  0.004*** -0.003 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Having CCP member -0.027 0.03 -0.003  -0.028 0.028 -0.0003 
(0.025) (0.03) (0.034)  (0.027) (0.031) (0.034) 
Village enterprises  0.001 0.004*** -0.006**  0.001 0.005*** -0.006** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Distance to city -0.001 0.013 -0.012  -0.001 0.013 -0.012 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.012) 
Wage of nearest city -0.004 0.024*** -0.019***  -0.004 0.024*** -0.02*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Interaction term of 
distance and wage 
0.0003 -0.001 0.001  0.0003 -0.001 0.001 
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Year 2007 0.015 -0.148*** 0.133***  0.014 -0.145*** 0.131*** 
(0.031) (0.04) (0.046)  (0.033) (0.039) (0.046) 
Obs. 1185 1185 1185  1185 1185 1185 
* Sig. at 10%; ** sig. at 5%; *** sig. at 1%; Robust & township-clustered S. E. in Parentheses.  
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APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS OF CHAPTER 4 
Proof of Proposition (1):  
Using (4.14) of Chapter 4, I have: 
 [𝜔𝑐+𝜃𝑍ℎ′
𝑝𝑐𝛼
] 11−𝛼 = 𝐻𝑐?̅?𝑐
𝐻𝑐𝑍ℎ
′
𝐿�𝑐
 
Therefore ?̅?
𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
[𝑝𝑐𝛼] 11−𝛼 − 𝑍ℎ′�𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ′� 11−𝛼 = 0 
Totally differentiating the equation I have  
{[𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ′] 11−𝛼 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ′ 1
1−𝛼
[𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ′] 𝛼1−𝛼}𝑑𝑍ℎ′ + 𝑍ℎ′ 1
1−𝛼
[𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ′] 𝛼1−𝛼𝑑𝜔𝑐 = 0  
Therefore 𝑑𝑍
ℎ′
𝑑𝜔𝑐
= − 𝑍ℎ′ 11−𝛼�𝜔𝑐+𝜃𝑍ℎ′� 𝛼1−𝛼[𝜔𝑐+𝜃𝑍ℎ′] 11−𝛼+𝜃𝑍ℎ′ 1
1−𝛼
�𝜔𝑐+𝜃𝑍ℎ
′
�
𝛼
1−𝛼
  
Given that 0 ≤ 𝑍ℎ′ ≤ 1, 𝜃 > 0, 𝜔𝑐 > 0, and 0 < 𝛼 < 1, I have 𝑑𝑍ℎ′
𝑑𝜔𝑐
< 0 
Further, using Eq. (4.12) of Chapter 4, I have 𝑑𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑐
𝑑𝜔𝑐
> 0 
Proof of Proposition (2):  
Using (4.14) of Chapter 4, I have: 
 [𝜔𝑐+𝜃𝑍ℎ′
𝑝𝑐𝛼
] 11−𝛼 = 𝐻𝑐?̅?𝑐
𝐻𝑐𝑍ℎ
′
𝐿�𝑐
 
Therefore ?̅?
𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
[𝑝𝑐𝛼] 11−𝛼 − 𝑍ℎ′�𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ′� 11−𝛼 = 0 
Totally differentiating the equation I have  
?̅?𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
𝛼
1−𝛼
[𝑝𝑐𝛼] 𝛼1−𝛼𝑑𝑝𝑐 − {[𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ′] 11−𝛼 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ′ 1
1−𝛼
[𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ′] 𝛼1−𝛼}𝑑𝑍ℎ′ = 0  
Therefore 𝑑𝑍
ℎ′
𝑑𝑝𝑐
= 𝐴�𝑐𝐿�𝑐 𝛼1−𝛼[𝑝𝑐𝛼] 𝛼1−𝛼[𝜔𝑐+𝜃𝑍ℎ′] 11−𝛼+𝜃𝑍ℎ′ 1
1−𝛼
[𝜔𝑐+𝜃𝑍ℎ′] 𝛼1−𝛼  
Given that 0 ≤ 𝑍ℎ′ ≤ 1, ?̅?𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
> 0, 𝑝𝑐 > 0, 𝜔𝑐 > 0,𝜃 > 0, and 0 < 𝛼 < 1, I have 𝑑𝑍ℎ′
𝑑𝑝𝑐
> 0. 
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Further, using Eq. (4.12) of Chapter 4, I have 𝑑𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑐
𝑑𝑝𝑐
< 0 . 
Proof of Proposition (3):  
Using (4.14) of Chapter 4, I have: 
 [𝜔𝑐+𝜃𝑍ℎ′
𝑝𝑐𝛼
] 11−𝛼 = 𝐻𝑐?̅?𝑐
𝐻𝑐𝑍ℎ
′
𝐿�𝑐
 
Therefore ?̅?
𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
[𝑝𝑐𝛼] 11−𝛼 − 𝑍ℎ′�𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ′� 11−𝛼 = 0 
Totally differentiating the equation I have  [𝑝𝑐𝛼] 11−𝛼𝑑 ?̅?𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
− {[𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ′] 11−𝛼 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ′ 1
1−𝛼
[𝜔𝑐 + 𝜃𝑍ℎ′] 𝛼1−𝛼}𝑑𝑍ℎ′ = 0  
Therefore  𝑑𝑍
ℎ′
𝑑
𝐴�𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
= [𝑝𝑐𝛼] 11−𝛼[𝜔𝑐+𝜃𝑍ℎ′] 11−𝛼+𝜃𝑍ℎ′ 1
1−𝛼
[𝜔𝑐+𝜃𝑍ℎ′] 𝛼1−𝛼  
Given that 0 ≤ 𝑍ℎ′ ≤ 1, 𝑝𝑐 > 0, 𝜔𝑐 > 0,𝜃 > 0, and 0 < 𝛼 < 1, I have 𝑑𝑍ℎ′
𝑑
𝐴�𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
> 0. 
Further, using Eq. (4.12) of Chapter 4, I have 𝑑𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑐
𝑑
𝐴�𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
< 0. 
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APPENDIX D: HOUSEHOLD LAND INPUT DEMAND 
As shown in the household model (Eq. 4.5 of Chapter 4), the optimal scale of land operation 
of a household farm operator is determined by the land rental rate in community c, the household 
off-farm labour wage, household labour endowment, and farm output price. That is, the 
agricultural land input demand is 
𝐴ℎ
∗ = 𝐴(𝑝𝑐, 𝑟𝑐,𝜔𝑐,𝑍ℎ)         (D.1) 
Note that, as shown in Eq. (4.13), 𝑟𝑐 is a function of 𝑝𝑐 and ?̅?
𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
, with 𝑑𝑟
𝑐
𝑑(𝜔𝑐) < 0 and 𝑑𝑟𝑐𝑑�𝐴�𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
,�<0.  
Therefore, Eq. (4.25) can be transforms into 
𝐴ℎ
∗ = 𝐴(𝑝𝑐,𝜔𝑐,𝑍ℎ, ?̅?𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
)         (D.2) 
One can reach following propositions: 
4. 𝑑𝐴
ℎ∗
𝑑(𝑝𝑐) > 0. The higher the agricultural output price, the higher land demand 𝐴ℎ∗. 
5. 𝑑𝐴
ℎ∗
𝑑(𝜔𝑐) = 𝜕𝐴ℎ∗𝜕(𝜔𝑐) + 𝜕𝐴ℎ∗𝜕𝑟𝑐 𝑑𝑟𝑐𝑑(𝜔𝑐) is undetermined. The household model show that 𝜕𝐴ℎ∗𝜕(𝜔𝑐) < 0, 
while community-level regional equilibrium model shows that 𝑑𝑟
𝑐
𝑑(𝜔𝑐) < 0, implying that 
𝜕𝐴ℎ
∗
𝜕𝑟𝑐
𝑑𝑟𝑐
𝑑(𝜔𝑐) > 0. 
6. 𝑑𝐴
ℎ∗
𝑑�
𝐴�𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
�
> 0 . The higher the land-to-labour ratio of the community, the lower 𝑟𝑐 ( 𝑑𝑟𝑐
𝑑�
𝐴�𝑐
𝐿�𝑐
,�<0), 
and the higher 𝐴ℎ∗. 
7. 𝑑𝐴
ℎ∗
𝑑�𝑍ℎ�
< 0. The higher 𝑍ℎ, the lower 𝐴ℎ∗.  
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APPENDIX E: REGRESSION WEIGHT OF CHAPTER 4 
One of the assumptions of OLS model is that each observation of dependent variable provides 
equally precise information. That is, it assumed that the standard deviation of the error term is 
constant over all observations of the dependent variable. However, in 2004, the Gini index is 
calculated through 8 household observations. In 2007, the Gini index is calculated through 20 
household observations. More household observations are included in the computation of Gini, 
the more precise measurements of Gini index will be. Therefore, in a weighted OLS regression, 
less weight is given to the less precise measurements and more weight to more precise 
measurements when estimating the unknown parameters in the model. Empirically I construct 
the weight as  
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡
𝑐 = 𝑛𝑡𝑐    
where  𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑐 =weighting factor for the community c in period t; 
 𝑛𝑡𝑐 =the number of valid household observations that used to construct the Gini 
index of the community c in period t. 
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APPENDIX F: VARIABLE SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 4 
Table F-1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics (community) 
Variable Description Source Mean St. dev. 
Adjusted Gini 2004 The adjusted Gini index of a 
community c in 2004, Using Eqs. 
(4.2) and (4.3) 
CCAPa 0.260 0.113 
Adjusted Gini 2007 Gini in 2007  CCAP 0.352 0.130 
Change of Gini  Adjusted Gini 2004 minus Gini 
2007 
 0.092 0.112 
     
Urban wage 2004 The average annual wage in 2004 of 
the urban residents (with urban 
Hukou) who live in the core area 
of the community’s nearest city, 
1,000 yuan/year 
CNBS (2005) 11.967 2.633 
Urban wage 2007 1,000 yuan/year CNBS (2008) 18.271 4.000 
Change of wage Urban wage 2007 minus urban wage 
2004 
 6.305 1.728 
     
Enterprises 2004 The number of enterprises per 1000 
labourersb of the community in 
2004, #/1000 persons 
CCAP 4.774 12.474 
Enterprises 2007 #/1000 persons CCAP 5.394 14.628 
Change of 
enterprises 
Numbers of enterprises 2007 minus 
numbers of enterprises 2004 
 0.620 14.249 
 
     
Community land-to-
labour ratio 2004 
The average agricultral land 
entitlement per labourerb in a 
community in 2004, mu/person 
CCAP 3.582 3.572 
Community land-to-
labour ratio 2007 
mu/person CCAP 3.606 3.938 
Change of land-to-
labour ratio 
Community land-to-labour ratio 
2007 minus community land-to-
labour ratio 2004 
 0.025 2.698 
     
Distance to city Distance from the community to of 
the nearest city,100km 
Google Map 
(2012) 
0.524 0.452 
a CCAP rural household survey, 2005 and 2008;  
b Community labourers consist of all residents of a rural community with local Hukou and age between 16 and 65. 
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Table F-2. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics (household) 
Variable Description Mean St. dev. 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛2004
ℎ   Rented-in land in 2004 as a share of total land 
operation, share 
0.042 0.146 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛2007
ℎ   Share 0.084 0.200 
Change of 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛2007ℎ − 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛2004ℎ   0.044 0.245 
    
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡2004
ℎ   Rented-out land of in 2004 as a share of total 
land entitlement, share 
0.028 0.153 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡2007
ℎ   share 0.048 0.198 
Change of 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡2007ℎ − 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡2004ℎ   0.028 0.224 
    
Local OFE 
experience 2004 
A household has at least one member working in 
local OFE within last 2 years 1, otherwise 0.  
0.515 0.500 
Local OFE 
experience 2007 
Dummy 0.494 0.500 
Change of local OFE 
experience 
Local OFE experience of 2007 minus local OFE 
experience of 2004 
-0.004 0.527 
    
Migratory OFE 
experience 2004 
A household has at least one member working in 
local OFE within last 2 years 1, otherwise 0.  
0.386 0.487 
Migratory OFE 
experience 2007 
Dummy 0.461 0.499 
Change of migratory 
OFE experience 
Migratory OFE experience 2007 minus 
migratory experience 2004 
0.065 0.548 
    
Hhld education 2004 The average years of education of household 
labour force membersa in 2004, years/person 
6.687 2.518 
Hhld education 2007 years/person 7.102 2.450 
Change of hhld 
education 
Household education 2007 minus household 
education 2004 
-0.322 1.563 
    
Household land-to-
labour ratio 2004 
The average land entitlement per household 
labour force membera, mu/person 
6.654 2.512 
Hhld land-to-labour 
ratio 2007 
mu/person 7.063 2.441 
Change of hhld land-
to-labour ratio 
Hhld land-to-labour ratio 2007 minus hhld land-
to-labour ratio 2004 
0.316 1.582 
Data Source: CCAP rural household survey, 2005 and 2008;  
a Household labour force member consists of every family member in a household of working age, between 16 and 
65, except for those in schooling, military and prison, those who do not participate in farm production or off-farm 
work due to health consideration (e.g., too old and ill) and those who only do domestic work at own home. 
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APPENDIX G: ALTERNATIVE MODEL RESULTS OF CHAPTER 4 
Table G-1. Linear probability model of household rental decision model (rented-in) 
 
Change-to-
change 
model 
Pooled OLS 
2004 & 
2007 
OLS 2004 OLS 2007 
Average urban wage of the nearest 
city, 1000¥/yr  
0.00294 -0.00705 -0.00939 -0.00803 
(0.00285) (0.00456) (0.01036) (0.00487) 
Distance to the nearest city, 100km  0.00381 0.01053* 0.01625 
 (0.03169) (0.03634) (0.03627) 
# of enterprises per 1000 labourers of 
the community 
0.00002 0.00039 -0.00016 0.0008 
(0.00127) (0.00126) (0.0013) (0.0016) 
Land-to-labour ratio of a community, 
mu/person 
0.01875*** 0.01620*** 0.00284 0.02000** 
(0.00455) (0.00563) (0.00674) (0.00652) 
Past local OFE experience in last 2 
years (dummy) 
-0.01593 0.00262 0.00055 0.00578* 
(0.0168) (0.01795) (0.02188) (0.02418) 
Past migratory OFE experience in 
last 2 years (dummy) 
0.00235 -0.00282 -0.02367 0.00517 
(0.02083) (0.01905) (0.02479) (0.02388) 
The average years of education of 
household labour force members 
-0.00554 -0.00225 0.00104 -0.00367 
(0.00419) (0.00285) (0.00406) (0.00358) 
Household land-to-labour ratio -0.01489*** -0.01580*** -0.00832* -0.01775*** 
(0.00332) (0.0034) (0.00407) (0.00399) 
Provincial dummy: Sichuan 
 
 -0.00187 -0.0113 -0.01056 
 (0.04542) (0.06879) (0.05376) 
Shaanxi 
 
 -0.07234 -0.07408 -0.09702 
 (0.04704) (0.06203) (0.06089) 
Jilin 
 
 -0.02778 0.05803 -0.06866 
 (0.03991) (0.06386) (0.04382) 
Hebei  -0.03121 0.03047 -0.06451 
 (0.03899) (0.05542) (0.0432) 
Year Dummy (year 2007)  0.13656***   
 (0.03565)   
Constant 0.12559** 0.22475** 0.2367 0.38978*** 
(0.05976) (0.08622) (0.16868) (0.12415) 
Sample size 616 2638 780 1858 
R square 0.028 0.036 0.027 0.031 
Robust standard and township-clustered standard errors in parentheses; 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table G-2. Linear probability model of household rental decision model (rented-out) 
 
Change-to-
change 
model 
Pooled LP 
2004 & 
2007 
LP 2004 LP 2007 
Average urban wage of the nearest 
city, 1000¥/yr  
0.00516** 0.0061 0.00576 0.00525 
(0.00227) (0.0045) (0.00587) (0.00502) 
Distance to the nearest city, 100km  0.05626*** 0.05314** 0.05544** 
 (0.02045) (0.02477) (0.02698) 
# of enterprises per 1000 labourers 
of the community 
0.00175*** 0.00149*** 0.00138 0.00156*** 
(0.00043) (0.00035) (0.00095) (0.0004) 
Land-to-labour ratio of a 
community, mu/person 
-0.00266 -0.00563* -0.00173 -0.00648* 
(0.00156) (0.00286) (0.00239) (0.0038) 
Past local OFE experience in last 2 
years (dummy) 
0.02525** 0.01952 0.01972 0.02005 
(0.01103) (0.01181) (0.01533) (0.01342) 
Past migratory OFE experience in 
last 2 years (dummy) 
0.00639 0.02667** 0.01009 0.03371** 
(0.01135) (0.0107) (0.01602) (0.01237) 
The average years of education of 
household labour force members  
0.00328 0.00463** 0.00409* 0.00505 
(0.00265) (0.00202) (0.00235) (0.00268) 
Household land-to-labour ratio 0.00285 0.00179 0.00022 0.0021 
(0.00244) (0.00144) (0.00186) (0.00187) 
Provincial dummy: Sichuan 
 
 0.03617 0.09009 0.00784 
 (0.03635) (0.05178) (0.03972) 
Shaanxi 
 
 -0.03569 -0.00132 -0.05479 
 (0.035) (0.03836) (0.04502) 
Jilin 
 
 0.03245 0.02843 0.02711 
 (0.03594) (0.02909) (0.04696) 
Hebei  -0.00834 0.0039 -0.01914 
 (0.02104) (0.02346) (0.02849) 
Year Dummy (year 2007)  -0.01681   
 (0.03141)   
Constant -0.07677* -0.10919 -0.12144 -0.10243 
(0.04309) (0.06712) (0.0912) (0.10798) 
Sample size 1232 2638 780 1858 
R square 0.040 0.047 0.049 0.048 
Robust standard and township-clustered standard errors in parentheses; 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
